Ladies and gentlemen, maybe it's about time for us to start the event while we are still waiting for some of our guests who are coming late.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. My name is David Wang. I teach modern Chinese literature and culture here at Harvard University.

Together with my colleagues at Wellesley College, Professor Ellen Widmer and Professor Mingwei Song, I would like to extend my warmest welcome to all of you for this event, May Fourth at 100: China and the World.

100 years ago, on May 4th, 1919, students, literati, and the citizens at large rose up to protest China's diplomatic setback at Versailles to demand national reform and a cultural renaissance. Since then, May 4th has developed to become an historical event and a cultural institution and a myth of sorts. And 100 years later, today here at Harvard, we are gathering together to think again about the causes and the consequences of the May 4th Movement and to take issue with the common wisdom regarding the so-called legacies of the May 4th. And on this occasion, this is actually a sobering moment for us to ponder questions such as: Is enlightenment one of the ultimate causes of the May 4th? Isn't enlightenment also a kind of enchantment? Isn't the cause of revolution also begetting something unexpected? Evolution or no revolution. Or isn't the ultimate cause of democracy and freedom resulting in something we now call a harmonious society?

This is a moment when China is supposed to be going strong and rising. This is a moment that we have so much more to expect of this nation to transfer itself into something even better and bigger. This is an international conference in which we would like to gather different colleagues from different disciplines. We will get together to cover a very wide range of topics from politics to thought, from literature to language. This is also an international conference in the sense that we would like to open up new horizons beyond the so-called obsession with China. We want to put China back on the international or global map to think of how this event, the May 4th, could be understood anew as a kind of an international engagement with not only Chinese modernity but also global modernity.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of you for being here to share your wisdom and the thought with each other and particularly with our own students. Also, I'd like to thank Professor Michael Szonyi, director of the Fairbank Center here, to deliver welcome remarks to this event. I wanted to add
one note that almost 30 years ago, in 1990, Professor Ellen Widmer and I organized a conference “From May 4th to June 4th” right here at the Fairbank Center. Now, 29 years after or 30 years, almost, we are here to celebrate or commemorate the centennial conference, centennial anniversary in celebration of the May 4th and its legacies. Without further ado, may I have the honor to introduce Professor Michael Szonyi to deliver our opening remarks. Thank you.

Michael Szonyi: Excellent. Thank you and good morning. I am very pleased to welcome you all to Harvard University and to this conference marking the centenary of the May Fourth Movement. As David mentioned, my name is Michael Szonyi, I have the honor of directing the Fairbank Center for Chinese studies. I'd like, first of all, to repeat David's welcome to all of you from near and far for joining us for this conference. I would also like to pay particular thanks to Professor David Wang for his leadership in bringing together scholars from around the globe, from across disciplines, for today's conference but also for the many other activities and conferences, the actually extraordinary number of activities and conferences that David organizes. On David's behalf, I'd like to offer thanks to the other institutions besides the Fairbank Center that have sponsored today's event. These include the Harvard-Yenching Institute, the Asia Center here at Harvard, the Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations, the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation, Wellesley College, and National Taiwan University.

Michael Szonyi: I am very pleased that the Fairbank Center is able to serve as a co-sponsor of today's conference. The confluence of individuals and ideas from across different universities and across different disciplines is precisely what we strive to achieve in our mission to advance scholarship in all fields of Chinese studies. I don't think I had realized until just now how many May Fourth conferences David has organized because I was going to refer to four years later than 1990. David and Ellen Widmer organized the 75th Anniversary Conference on the May Fourth Movement. We look forward to may anniversary conferences going forward.

Michael Szonyi: But I will say, as a historian who is interested in the role that history plays in contemporary society, I find it particularly fascinating how understanding of this movement has changed and, indeed, has stayed the same over the past quarter century. The May Fourth Movement continues to play a central role in our understanding, not simply of literature and culture but also of China's modern history and society more broadly. It continues to shape the constructs through which Chinese intellectuals and Chinese people more broadly understand their past, their present, and their future, even today. It is a mark of the significance of the movement. An ironic mark, I suppose, and a somewhat disheartening marker that the birth place of the movement, Beijing University, held a conference on the May Fourth movements at 100 about two weeks ago that turned out to be a very politically sensitive event with all sorts of restrictions. On the one hand, I think it shows some discouraging developments in China today. On the other hand, I think it shows the continued importance of the movement. And, on the third hand, I think it indicates that we here in the United States can still play an important role in the intellectual discourse around China past, present, and future.
Michael Szonyi: As many of you are probably aware, the president of Harvard, Larry Bacow, recently visited China and gave a public speech at Peking University, again, the very birthplace of the movement. In this speech, President Bacow referred to May Fourth as "a movement that demonstrated to the world a deep commitment on the part of young Chinese to the pursuit of truth and a deep understanding of the power of truth to shape the future. Even now", he continued, "President Cai Yuanpei speaks to us." "Universities are places for grand learning", he said. "They are grand because they follow the general principles of free thought." Under his visionary leadership and in the months that followed the outbreak of the protest initially, tremendous intellectual exploration and dramatic social change were unleashed.

Michael Szonyi: Individuals in China and China collectively continued to struggle to unify the ideals of the May Fourth Movement with action. But nonetheless, the words of Cai Yuanpei about the university, about the role of free thought in promoting a better society, continue to ripple through history to the present day. Thank you so much for including me. Best wishes to all for a successful conference.

David Wang: Thank you. Okay, before we start the keynote speech today, I would like to introduce to you one book, a book edited by Professor Mingwei Song of Wellesley and myself. This is a book which features more than 50 scholars from different fields in the disciplines of thinking about the significance of May Fourth 100 years after its first breakout. For our guests this year, for invited guests here to this conference, we would give a copy to each and every one of you as a gift and as a souvenir. Hopefully, this will be stimulating enough for you to think about the various dimensions and the aspects of May Fourth.

David Wang: Also, I'd like to say a few words about the keynote speeches. We have arranged the two keynote speeches. One for today and one for tomorrow. And for today, we have the greatest honor to have Professor Rudolf Wagner of University of Heidelberg and he will deliver his remarks very soon. For tomorrow morning, we will have Professor Chen Pingyuan from Beijing University and he will share his own thoughts about the May Fourth with us. I cordially invite you to be here to listen to their wonderful discoveries about this historical event.

David Wang: Now, without further ado, may I introduce Professor Zhaoguang Ge, the host of the first keynote speech, to introduce Professor Rudolf Wagner, please welcome Zhaoguang Ge from Fudan University. Thank you. Please, come over.

Zhaoguang Ge: [Foreign Language 00:10:43]

Rudolf Wagner: Thank you very much for your kind introduction and good morning to you all. And, let me see that the machinery here is properly working so that I can use this device here. That’s ok. So, ladies and gentlemen, I will talk about the (how do I get my slides on. Push the button. Ok). So let me just introduce shortly the structure of my talk. I will shortly introduce May Fourth as an event. Then I will make a first short summary of some of the recent developments in the study of May Fourth New Culture. And then we will talk about the big section, which is getting out of the prison house of nation state historiography, namely the May Fourth political agenda. We have a May Fourth New Culture agenda and a political agenda and I will mostly focus on the political agenda.
And I will go through seven short challenges the May Fourth protagonists were facing, you know. And these are the handling of the "Twenty-one Demands" in ‘15; that’s Wilsonism and the May Fourth in ‘19 and the Paris agreement; that is talking to Thomas Lamont, the head of the Morgan Bank, in ‘20; that is de-railing the ratification of the Paris Treaty it the United States in ‘21; de-railing the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance ‘21; recovering Shandong at the Washington Conference in ‘22; and finally, staying on course: the American Information Committee. That is anymore the Committee on Public Information which some of you may know.

So, now the event. An event is not an event. It becomes one only in hindsight, but even if you plan it, and there was a plan of course, namely Zhang Guotao was saying on the evening of May 3rd “mingtian you quanzhong yundong” (tomorrow is a mass movement), you know. So he had an understanding there is a “yundong,” it was not organized by a party. It is basically rejecting party organized movements. And it is not organized by the state. And it is rejecting party movements not only accidentally, but it also fixed its date not at a date fixed by a party, the Jinhudang. Liang Qichao’s Jinhudang had a demonstration planned on May 7th (9th!), which is the Guochi ri, the “National Shame Day”, because that is the day when the fifteen demands were signed, when the twenty-one demands were signed in 1915. So they went on May Fourth in a rejection of this kind of party organized events.

Now the May 4th protagonists were rather successful and very active in fixing this event. And they from as a matter of fact a week after the event already had a jingshen, a “spirit” or even “spirits” of May 4th. Two weeks later, you know, it became something like a turning point in history and they were basically rejecting other big turning points. The first big turning point they rejected, of course, was the Republican revolution, you know which is not. So they didn’t date themselves in the tenth year of the Republic but 1919.. So, you know, they rejected the Republican calendar. And so here we have basically already from an early time on that they were setting themselves as a turning point in language and fiction, the development of press and public opinion, societal organization, conceptual history, state/party/society relations, and finally, of course, as finally, of course, Hu Shih's New Values in society.

Not this became one part of a very dominant master narrative that was staying on course pretty much into the late 1970's, because many of the intellectuals in China itself, as well as abroad, were following the master narrative of the May 4th protagonists. And then it was challenged in many respects. It was challenged because you had, from early on, various problems with it. One of the problems with it was that you had a big challenge from the Left, which is associated with the name of Mao Dun.

I think there is going to be a talk here on Mao Dun, which is already talking about Mao Dun’s criticism of the May 4th. He went much further in 1931 when he gave a speech in a Marxist-Leninist study group. In which he bluntly declared that May 4th is not a part of the revolution, but it's target. Because it is a bourgeois revolution and a revolution of a Chinese bourgeoisie which is weak in the bone and is not revolutionary and has become decadent and decrepit and something like that. So, the real revolutionaries are going against May 4th.

And you get, on the other end, the problem that these protagonists were so strong and effective in dominating the public discourse that, both on the Communist side and the Guomindang side, there were various efforts to de-fang it... to get its teeth out. And so, how the way how they did that actually was already in the agreement of United Front in ’37.

They already decided May 4th is going to be Youth Day, and Youth Day was then declared as a point where people who were praised by the Guomindang or the Communists for their unstinting loyalty to whatever the party had ordered them to do. They were labor heroes, party heroes. So the very spirit of
May 4th was, in a way, de-fanged and taken over by the state agencies. And that is how it stayed to this day. I remember in 1989, you had two parallel celebrations. In the Renmin Dahuitang, you had Zhao Ziyang praising young policemen, soldiers, and so on and so forth, their laolao shishi fazong dang de lingdao. And you had, outside on Tiananmen, people trying to celebrate what they thought was the real May 4th heritage. So we had a split thing there.

The challenges to the cultural narrative about May 4th, which I have just outlined, were mostly internalist. That is they were going for an internalist kind of challenge. And the literary break is not such a break, because you had important changes since late Qing in literature. Milena Dolezelova’s edited volume was the first to do that, but this has led to many other studies. Others went and say "Well, the language they are pushing was not as dominant. As a matter of fact, they were pretty marginal for many, many years." You had the stuff people actually read denounced. The “yuanyang hudiepai” writing was the really more important literary stuff." So you get studies on this one here. You had studies on conceptual history, which show that the big import was already around 1900-1910, of new concepts coming in, and May 4th was a little bit on the later side.

And then the big claims, namely that this was the Chinese Renaissance or the Chinese Enlightenment, have been nicely taken apart by Yu Yingshi in a fine essay. We have quite a lot of studies which are dealing with internal Chinese materials to take that apart. But you had already an assumption or an admission, in a way, by Hu Shih writing in 1933 in the Chinese Renaissance. "Slowly but quietly but unmistakably, the Chinese Renaissance is becoming a reality". He had just read a book about Renaissance, so his knowledge was not exactly very profound. He had a book introducing the Renaissance and that's it. Then he read a book about Enlightenment and said, "This is it, too." So you had, basically, a rather quick fix appropriation of these big things. He went on. He said, "The product of this rebirth looks suspiciously occidental; but, scratch its surface and you will find that the stuff of which it is made is essentially Chinese bedrock, which much weathering and corrosion have only made stand out more clearly the humanistic and rationalist China resurrected by the touch of the scientific and democratic."

Now this is a very funny thing. Here we have the "Chinese bedrock" suddenly is even more Western than the Western stuff, the scientific and democratic, the si and de, that we all know. And, suddenly, what is the bedrock? It's humanistic and rationalistic. So this is straight out of the playbook of John Dewey. So you scratch time and tradition what you get is straight West. You had a very strange idea there. That it looks occidental was something he was saying. And there were, in the early 40's, other writers were pushing that line very hard and say, This is just a second rate Western import, this May 4th business, with no cultural substance whatsoever. To call that a Renaissance is totally overblown. And there was a similar criticism on the question of the Enlightenment.

If we look at this question about this "bedrock" mentioned by Hu Shih and look at one thing which I just mentioned on the side. Because I have been always amazed that this book [picture: cover of Xin wenhua cishu 新文化辭書], which I personally consider a work worth great attention by scholars dealing with May 4th, hasn't found any market.

This is a book which came out in 1923, went through 16 unchanged printings, has about 900 pages, and it's one of the highest quality books in China in the 20th century. Now this is what it is. It has the nice title Xin wenhua cishu 新文化辭書 [Terminological handbook of New Culture]. Now, what could be clearer, dealing with the Xin wenhua [New Culture] than a Xin wenhua cishu [Terminological handbook of New Culture]?
Now, if you look into the Xin wenhua cishu what that is, it is very interesting. I give you just one entry I used for another purpose. You see, all the entries are arranged according to the Western alphabet. The entire organization is according to the Western alphabet. Now, you get the key terms are included in brackets. There is always a bibliography in there. If you look at the Bergson article or things like that, you have a detailed bibliography of his writings in both Chinese and in the Western thing with original source. It's of a bibliographic quality of which there is... no book after 1949 has ever reached this level of quality both in terms of text and in terms of sophistication of these entries. You read these entries, they are unbelievable. You read the entry on Buddhism... [This is the wrong slide]. That's 80 pages.

But the interesting thing is, in the entire book, China is not part of New Culture. There is not a single element that's dealing with China. So, the Xin wenhua [New Culture] bafen zhi bai shi xifang de wenhua [is one hundred percent Western culture]. I'm not inventing that. This is just a standard handbook which is standing on everybody's table there. And you have of course Mao Dun working in it. And the editorial team, you look at the names there, which haven't been studied very well, it is really very interesting.

So that is just for introduction. Now we are moving to the second phase here and we are going to the political agenda. We are dealing with handling the "Twenty-One Demands" in '15, because obviously May 4th, in it's strong focus on Japan, was taking on very explicitly some of the personnel even were in both the developments of four years before. Now, in '19, there was an assumption that the Peking government, which had some of the same persons which had signed the "Twenty-One Demands", such as Cao Rulin, they were going to sign the Paris Agreement again and sell off Chinese things. They had just signed a treaty half a year ago with Japan which reconfirmed the validity of the agreement on the twenty-one demands. The two core elements defining the May 4th political focus are: sovereignty as a principle and the rejection of Japan's takeover of the Shandong concession as a specific policy. So these were the political things very clearly.

The shared understanding they were operating in in the first World War is something one should spend a second on. Namely, you get a new understanding of the importance of publicity and propaganda in the first World War. All the participants in the war, the Germans, the Japanese, the French, the English, the Americans, were all setting up propaganda departments by the state. And these propaganda departments were pushing, first in the United States as an example, to convince the American public to join the war. Now, Wilson had won his election in '12 with a platform of not joining the war. Re-election, right? With a platform in '16 of not joining the war. A year later, he switched and joined the war. So, suddenly, there was a big anti feeling to get into the war and there was a very strong pro-German group in the United States with a lot of newspapers and propaganda fed by the Germans to push for keeping America out of that war.

The first thing was to convince the American public. The second thing was to convince the opponents, the Germans, to somehow lose faith that they would win. Then you have to keep your friends on your side and the neutrals neutral or pull them over to your side. Here, you have basically the same thing going on all over the place. So you get a move from a understanding of the press and of media as a medium of information and rational discourse to an instrument of propaganda where you had different understanding of the public.

Since the late 19th century, since the Psychologie des Foules, The Psychology of the Masses, famous book in 1895 in French, came out in English, German, so on and so forth... This defined to say, The masses are not rational. Collectively, they are into all sorts of wild fancies and a good politician has to be able to control them. He has to keep them onto a good course, otherwise they go all over the place. The
government has to use propaganda means as a very positive thing to prevent the masses from going haywire, which they would spontaneously do.

This assumption fed a notion that we have to go into some big propaganda effort because the assessment at the time was that, in a war, you have various factors which are important: military hardware, information, strategy, alliances, so on and so forth. And then the question, "What is the relative importance of the psychological factor?" The American military decided in 1917 that the psychological factor outweighs all other factors together.

Suddenly, you get an importance of the psychological factor, which is completely new. We get all these committees being set up. They recruited normally people from the new mass media, Lord Northcliffe in England who was running all the tabloids in England. He became the head of the British committee on war propaganda. Here you have people hired from these new mass media, tabloid mass media, and they were running this thing.

You look at the development of propaganda in the 20's and 30's in the United States. Everybody and his grandmother who became famous then, like Freud's nephew Bernays here from Boston. He, of course, worked in the Committee on Public Information here in the United States.

Then you see the second big development between the wars. Mainly, the development of advertisement. Advertisement is moving also from providing information to using other instruments of propaganda to convince people. The same people who are writing the propaganda ad books are setting up the big companies for advertisement. It's exactly the same personnel. Bernays is in both areas. He advised governments, and backed up companies. So that's the same thing.

So this is the general context here and it comes with a conviction, shared by all sides, mainly that the effect of this convincing the public to accept a certain point has a huge impact on government and, therefore, it is the key to effective political action if you cannot rely on direct government support there.

And this was the situation in '15, where the government was under a rigid rule not to divulge that these existed at all, these "Twenty-One Demands". And there was a kind of an inside communication between some members of the Chinese government and the foreign community that the only way to deal with that would be to divulge them, to make them public, and put the Japanese on the defensive. Because neither the French nor the Japanese [should be: English] were willing to come out in the open. Because the Japanese had just entered the war on their side and there was a big issue, namely, the Japanese were very pro-German. They assumed the Germans might win and there was a strong tendency in Japan to side with the Germans in that war. So, to get the Japanese to side with them in that war, meant that when the Japanese were sort of doing this, they were … the British and French kept low because they didn't want to criticize that.

Now, in very short manner, you look at the way this thing happened. The [later] Finance Minister, Chow Tzu-ch’i [name down here on the last line of the slide] sent a telegram to a journalist called Donald. And Donald, you know this book Donald of China. This is a absolutely wonderful figure, an amazing figure. He sent a telegram to Donald "Chaos. Come to Peking straight away." So Donald went [to Shanghai,] from Shanghai to Peking. Then, in a very complex way, managed to get, to basically talk to Chow Tzu-ch’i, write what he thought might be the demands which Chow Tsu-ch’i could not release. He wrote them down and he asked him "Just strike out those which are wrong." He was largely right, but in some of them he was wrong. Then he asked, "Give me some indication what else could they be?" So he did that. So in this process he cooked up a kind of invented list of these demands and then tried to get that public.
talking to the American ambassador, who was helping him do that, the next thing was that, once this got to the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the London Times, they called, of course, their foreign office and they called the Japanese Embassies for confirmation. And they said, "This is all lies. This is all poorly invented." Something like that. Didn't publish. So the Japanese impact was strong enough to block publication.

And, eventually, there was some inside story that somehow the Chinese government and Reinsch, the American Ambassador, had some kind of a secret strategy how to get it released and they leaked it first to Donald, the original translation. And then Donald had the real thing. That was published. And the effect was that the world press took that up straight away. The Japanese were pushed into taking off and accepting the non-signing of Group 5 of these demands, which basically established a Japanese advisory board which was to run all of China. And the effect was that the usage of the media and the usage of targeted propagandistic media means turned out to be effective. And convinced the American ambassador, Donald, and the Chinese government that this was important. And the important thing here was international public opinion. International public opinion was the key thing. There was a big demonstration in Peking against signing the "Twenty-One Demands" with some 200,000 people. But, at that moment, this did not have the same impact as international public opinion.

Here is a picture of Chow Tzu-ch’i and here is Paul Reinsch. That's our the American ambassador there. And here is Henry Donald, Donald of China, who was doing all of that muck-raking here. And this is, as a matter of fact, the... Eventually Donald was asked by Lou Tseng-Tsiang, the Foreign Minister, to write the Chinese reply, which he did. And this was something that he did that at 1:00 in the afternoon. The ultimatum ran out at 10:00 in the evening. 1:00 in the afternoon, Lou Tseng-Tsiang got him in and said "You have to write it." So Donald sat down, wrote the reply, without the 5th group, which then eventually was accepted. So you have basically an interaction where the Chinese government is having quite some agency, cannot exact it because they are bound by the Japanese threat of war action if they divulge it, they go with the American ambassador and they go with the foreign journalist and make a targeted leak. And then they become convinced "Yes, this is the way to go."

So now, what we have here is that you have China sitting at that time in a kind of a asymmetrical situation of communication. Namely, the information about the "Twenty-One Demands", which is sitting in Peking, gets to China by being published first in the Chicago Daily News. From the Chicago Daily news, it gets into the Washington Post. And the Washington Post gets it to the Washington Post correspondent in China. The Washington Post correspondent in China gets it to the North China Herald. And the North China Herald is then translated in the Shenbao in Shanghai. Because of the Chinese language newspapers, the Shenbao had Reuters, but Reuters was...I’ll talk about that in a sec’. The Chinese newspapers, as a matter of fact, none of them had subscribed to a news agency. There were three news agencies of importance. That was Reuters, Kokusai, and Havas. And the Germans were already out of it because they were not being allowed to be active anymore. And none of these news agencies were subscribed by the Chinese newspaper outside Reuters.

The problem was that Reuters had made an agreement with Kokusai, the Japanese State Agency, that all East Asian news would be collected by Kokusai and Reuters would distribute it. So whatever they would know about China was coming through a Japanese source. Whatever got to America or England or something like that about China, got through a Japanese source. So you had a skewed thing there where even America was completely marginalized.

America tried to overcome that by, from a very early time on, trying to set up some independent communication structure, which would improve Chinese information in the United States and vice versa.
And that was done since already the late Qing with Millard, a man we are going to come back to. Here in '07, you have exactly the same situation with the exception of occasional utterances such as the writings of Thomas Millard, that's the Millard Review founder, or the dispatches of Fred McCormick, the Peking correspondent of the Associated Press, and the redoubtable Morrison of the London Times, an Australian there.

No news was published about China which did not originate in Japanese sources and reach the press through Japanese controlled channels. This is the consequence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. When Reuters and Kokusai made that kind of arrangement. You get then, in '15, at the "Twenty-One Demands", you get then, suddenly, translations again in the Shenbao and other newspapers of articles in the American press, which had been reprinted in the North China Daily News where suddenly resisting the "Twenty-One Demands" was defined as a Chinese sacred duty. The notion of what to do and how to handle that was again filtered through editorials and opinion pieces coming from the United States through the North China Herald and so on and so forth.

We have basically an agreement between the Japanese actors who tried to block release of the news and the Chinese actors who tried to get it out. Mainly, that going public and doing propaganda work was absolutely essential and, therefore, the Japanese blocked it and the Chinese tried to get it out.

Now, challenge number 2 is Wilsonism. We have the Paris Agreement, you know all about it. I don't have to say anything about that. Wilson's position changed after America entered the war in '17. His war time speeches were making the point that the U.S. is entering the war, not to defend themselves or in search of spoils, but to defend two high principles. Namely, the sovereignty of nations and democracy. And to establish the framework for a lasting peace. That's the League of Nations then, right?

Now, in the particular situation there, we have the new technologies, namely the cables and the wireless, and the news agencies. And they gave this war a huge media presence which earlier wars didn't have. They really had a fast, immediate media presence through imagery and so on and so forth. And this introduced many people in Asia to start taking interest in international matters because they had access to it on a day-by-day level. Wilson's speeches are part of this media presence of the war.

The Committee on Public Information set up in 1917, directly with the United States entering the war, is one of these things. So this was the Committee on Public Information set up by Wilson. Priorities were domestic, the enemy, and the neutrals. There was nothing in East Asia, although, Reinsch was very strongly pushing for a China branch which didn't exist at the time. What did the ambassador do? He said, "If they don't set up a China branch, I'll do it myself." So he set up a group of translators who started translating, into Chinese, Wilson's speeches as well as important war news. In the committee of these translations, you have two famous people in there. The translator of Wilson's speeches is Chiang Mon-lin. The main translator for the other stuff is Feng Youlan.

So here you have the American Embassy in Peking already setting up these wonderful things. The third person involved there is Charles Crane. Crane is a wealthy businessman from Chicago who originally was considered [to become] ambassador in China during the late Qing. When Reinsch, after the Paris Agreement was divulged, decided "I'm not part of that anymore," he resigned. He resigned as ambassador and became advisor to the Chinese government. So he was consistent. He started before the Committee on Public Information came and he ended when Wilson abandoned his own principles. And his successor, Reinsch {should be: Crane}, continued straight the same policy without publicly criticizing Wilson but he was, as a matter of fact, pushing this anti-Japanese direction strongly.
The leaders, what you get now is a kind of a setting up in rather late in August 1918 of the China branch of the Committee on Public Information, which lasted only for some like nine months. And this China branch was run by Carl Crow, who set up the first advertisement agency later, by John Powell, the editor of the Millard Review at the time, by Paul Reinsch, the ambassador, and it was supported by Millard, by one figure we are talking about later, Anderson, big author in the North China Daily News, by Gilbert, also an author there, by Joe Sokolsky and by Donald whom we have already met. So you have a group of foreigners running this China branch of the Committee on Public Information and here we have some of the names [Images]. Here's Crane. Here you have Wilson's war time speeches. This is with Chiang Mon-lin as the translator. So this is the coming out already in ’17, long before they went into the thing [should be: set up the China Branch]. Here is Powell. This is Carl Crow.

The CPI activities, I'll be very short because they have been outlined elsewhere. They established modern media links directly to United States, mobilized the community of American businessmen, missionaries, and educators, and reached out to Chinese opinion leaders. They had the list of 25,000 Chinese opinion leaders to whom they distributed, via American contacts, Wilson's speeches. So this was a really effective way. Then they had posters with Wilson's pictures, slogans, and ads posted all over the place. So China suddenly became an advertisement platform for American political things.

Now I would suggest to call this group the Betterment of China group because these were people who had a commitment to the betterment of China. They were critical of whatever government agency was there, but they had a long-term commitment and they had, all, a strong focus on preventing Japan to take over. Now we are talking a little about the personal connection between the May 4th protagonists with this Betterment of China group. I will especially talk about the connection between Hu Shih and Sokolsky.

Sokolsky, in Shanghai, set up a Bureau of Public Information in Shanghai in May in 1919. When he directly asked Hu Shih to be a member of the advisory board, that's the letter where he wrote that to him [Image]. Now, if you look at the list of the advisory board of this China Bureau of Public Information, Hu Shih at the time is not transcribed as Hu Shih, but as Hu Suh and he signed that way. Here you have... Let me see. Where is Hu Shih? Here. Here is Hu Shih. That's the transcription at the time. And so you have in there... You have student leaders, you have business people, you have financiers, you have bankers. You have a group of anybody who had been involved in May 4th, and this is really a May 4th profile, very interesting. You look at this group here and they, as a matter of fact, were having even regular meetings. And the manager of the entire thing, as you see up here, is George Sokolsky. Sokolsky and Hu Shih started off a very close friendship.

The functions of these foreigners in the May 4th Movement is clear. Mainly, they had wide connections within China. If you look at their correspondence, they knew everybody in the political world personally and very well. They had very wide connections among foreigners because they were all correspondents of foreign papers. They were able to internationally advise the May 4th protagonists on what the international effect would be, formulate strategies, and disseminate supportive information internationally. They were writing articles in the foreign press.

The accepted leader of this Betterment of China group is a guy called Anderson, who is referred to in the internal correspondence as the "Admiral". Roy Scott Anderson, he wrote under the name of Bruce Baxter in the North China Daily News. You read these pieces and you see the May 4th action in Shanghai and Peking followed that advice straight away. This is very clear that he has a key role in helping them to articulate strategy and take this advice.
Here [Image] is George Sokolsky along with his Chinese name there Sokesi, and he writes under the name of Gramada in the various papers. He also writes in the United States. This [Image] is Thomas Millard, founder of the Millard Review, then he became an advisor to the Chinese Government.

Hu Shih and Sokolsky were very close friends. Sokolsky referred to Hu Shih in a letter to Lamont as “the leader of intellectual China”. Hu Shih wrote about Sokolsky: “In 1919, he was aiding the student government.” Sokolsky wrote to Hu Shih about himself, "The student movement of '19, in which I had the honor to participate with an enthusiasm and a faithfulness to China equal to any Chinese." Between the two, you have nearly a hundred letters written between 1919 and '54. And they're very personal, socializing with family, always dealing with China's political situation.

Okay. Promoting each other’s publishing activities. Hu Shih writes a preface to Sokolsky's monstrous and wonderful book *Outline of Universal History* in 1928. This, as a matter of fact, is the only world history which is rigidly written from an East Asian perspective. Doesn't exist anywhere else. It's an extremely interesting book. Hu Shih writes a very flattering preface to that.

Just to give you some specimens of these letters [Images], we have Hu Shih in handwriting, crackity crackity, he writes in type script. You see my bad style of photography of these things. They are all fuzzy so I have to break my eyes to get them. Here we have basically very close personal contacts between key May 4th protagonists and foreigners operating in there who are not just sort of vaguely friends, but they are talking politics, they are talking strategy, they are going into great details.

Now we are talking challenge number three. I'll go very quickly now. Thomas Lamont, you all know him. Those of you at Harvard know him because he's, of course, the guy who has given the money for the Lamont Library, the undergraduate library here at Harvard. He is a partner in the Morgan Bank and, when Wilson changed his attitude to the International Banking Consortium and started to agree with it. He originally thought "These are bankers. They are going to rape China" - then you decide "Okay, we have to keep something to control the Japanese." So they set up the International Banking Consortium. Lamont was in charge of it. The French and English instantly agreed because they were dependent on the United States during the war. And the Japanese were barking. They said "We want our interest in Manchuria and Mongolia protected." So Lamont then decided "I have to go to East Asia." And that's what he did.

He visited China and Japan in early 2020 [should be 1920] and he connected - instantly, when news got around, a pro-Japanese figure, Bronson Rea, wrote to him and tried to get the trip organized by him. Then Sokolsky wrote him. He basically wrote a criticism of an article he [Lamont] had written. He [Lamont] picked up Sokolsky's offer and then got into very close contact in writing. Look at this archive here in the Baker Library. He has a correspondence with Millard, with Anderson, with Sokolsky, and with Carl Crow. He is directly engaged with this group here. No further communication with Bronson Rea.

Lamont, in China, was pushing for the setting up of a legitimate central government - there wasn't a real government at the time- with a central war ministry to control these various armies, but he also wanted securities for the banks to have them [the bonds] salable. That meant establishing some sort of control over that.

He was meeting, in Shanghai, everybody and his grandmother from Sun Yat-sen to various warlords to the bankers. But Sokolsky also set up a big meeting with the students. And we have a wonderful protocol of that in a journal which nobody reads. It's called World's Work where you have a detailed description of that discussion, and a very controversial discussion, because the students thought the International Consortium is a way to monopolize China and control it. So they were against it.

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When Lamont came to Shanghai, the first rumor was that the students are going to come with stones and throw stones at his hotel to express their anger about it. And then he did something wonderful. He said "Why don't you come for tea?" So he invited them for tea. Thirty of them came, 10 of them women, and had a long discussion. In the end, it seems, he managed to convince the students that he had a good point in actually getting Japan into the Consortium because it would prevent Japan from doing loans to various government figures outside the rules of the Consortium. So it was in the Chinese interest to do that.

Then he went to Peking. What you do, is Sokolsky writes to Hu Shih and writes to him and says "You have to meet him." Next thing you see, you have a big meeting here. This is it [Image]. You look at the Hu Shih diary. Here is the meeting with Lamont. And you see Hu Shih writes on the side here "We had a very long talk. Went with xuesheng daibiao [student representatives]." They are with it in the meeting with Lamont. And then Hu Shih writes, "We had a long talk. What he was saying made me very depressed." Obviously, he [Lamont] had, by now, an understanding. He admits that the State President and the Prime Minister and so on and so forth - "This Chinese situation's not very funny."

Here we have basically an engagement where Lamont came to China, managed, with the help of these foreigners and the various people involved like Hu Shih, to turn around the opinion on the Consortium. And you look at the effect when they came back to the United States, all the Chinese Student Unions in the United States invited him to speeches and with very flattering letters, which are also in this correspondence.

Challenge four, and we do that in one sentence, this is the ratification of the Paris Treaty in the United States. You all know that the United States did not join the League of Nations, but not only that. And how did it happen? It happened that Crane, who was the successor of Reinsch as the ambassador in China and was a wealthy man, he hired... He had been convinced by Millard that the only way to block the Shandong acceptance by the United States was to derail that treaty.

There was a big opposition in the Senate against Wilson, so it wasn't Millard's doing. But, in fact, Millard spent weeks in the United States going public with interviews, pamphlets, memoranda, and so forth to undermine the signing of the Paris Treaty on the main point that the Chinese objected to the Shandong thing. It was unacceptable. It was against principle. And, in a combination of anti-Wilson feeling in the Senate and the rationale Miller provided, the entire treaty was turned down. And America, a year later, did a direct treaty with Germany to end the war. The effect was that this meant the United States could come back to the Shandong question because they had not accepted, officially, as a treaty the Paris Treaty. So they had a legitimate cause to come back to it. Very effective way.

But, in this case, you have practically no Chinese agency. You have Crane coming in there, Millard coming in there. He's operating in the United States. In China, you would think that, this is just two years after the May 4th movement, there would be a big interest in that thing. You look at the correspondence, the Chinese are totally disinterested. And then you get these letters from Sokolsky saying "We have to restart the student movement." They write to each other, "We have to restart. We have to do something." Because it was a total no-brainer. The Chinese press didn't report about it although Shandong was returned to China. You think that's an important thing. Well, it was not effective.

The next on the list, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Now the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was in 1902. It was up for renewal in '22. So, in '21, they started negotiations. And the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had a very important clause. If Japan or Great Britain are involved in a war, the other party would support. That was the big point. Crane went into action again.
In this case, he negotiated with Wellington Koo in the Chinese Foreign Ministry and with other figures, and he hired a famous fake news producer, a professional propagandist named Lenox Simpson who you all know under the name of Putnam Weale. So Putnam Weale went to London. He was also British, so that was good. He went to London in Summer '21 and talked, not to the British - that was hopeless. He talked to the dominion people: the Canadians, the Australians and said "Do you really, in the case there is a war between Japan and the United States, which looks like something that might be coming very soon... Do you really want to get involved in a war against the United States?" Now the Canadians said, "Not really." And the Australians said "Definitely not." The British government was basically stalled because the dominion leaders said "We are not going to be a part of that." They basically suspended that. And then came a proposal by Harding here, the American President, of setting up a conference to deal with the question of this arms race which had started already, and to block that. Then they said "Let's go for that." This [Image] is Lenox Simpson, a very beautiful, nicely made up fellow. This was the Washington Conference.

We are going to now... that's the last point here. Here we have now, at the Washington Conference, the main point there was to get an arms agreement between the big powers. That was found, a freeze on the present situation. Japan cannot build big naval installations in the Pacific, that was all fine. But, Shandong was not on the agenda. But the Chinese were invited as a minor power and a system was set up that they would in parallel negotiate with the Japanese about Shandong. That didn't get anywhere. And then, as a matter of fact, both Hughes, the American Foreign Minister, and Balfour, the British Foreign Minister, joined in and they pushed very hard with the effect the Japanese agreed to return Shandong to full Chinese control. The effect of that was the Americans were very instrumental in that because you had very little public pressure in China. You had very little propaganda pressure, but you had a brilliant operation by the Chinese delegates there which was a very Wellington Koo and Wang Chonghui the lawyer in the International Court of Justice, and Alfred Sze, who were able to put Japan on defensive by using Wilsonian principles in defending themselves.

The effect of propaganda and publicity in China itself and international was marginal, but the main agency was the U.S. Government. Here you have [Image]... I won't go for that. This is just on restarting the student movement and so on and so forth. I don't have time for this.

The last thing I want to mention is... I show these things here [Images] so you see, in the 30's, suddenly something coming up which is the American Information Committee. They are publishing things strictly criticizing Japan. Pamphlets which are in every American University library. You'll find them here in Harvard, too. They were widely disseminated. Their main purpose was to rouse a public opinion against Japan especially in the United States, but also among foreigners in China. And you look at the address here in 160 Avenue Edward VII. That's Carl Crow's address. That's the address of his advertisement agency. And Carl Crow, of course, was the head of the CPI China branch, Committee on Public Information China branch, in the earlier years.

So what you have here is a group of foreigners who, as a matter of fact, before the American government joined the war setting up the Committee on Public Information, they already started. When the Americans turned around in Paris to agree with the Paris Agreement, Wilson did. They continued their activity and when, as a matter of fact, then you get into a new... they continued that in these two other things which I have mentioned, in Washington and in London. And, eventually, they were continuing that in the '30's to the point that some of the members in this group went with Hollington Tong, a Missouri educated journalist, to join the Guomindang Foreign Propaganda Office, where they were very strongly engaged in their... And this is especially true for Donald and Powell, both of them were members of this propaganda

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The price paid by both Donald and Powell is quite high. Donald was getting out of a Japanese prison camp in Indonesia where, happily enough, he was not discovered. They were all high on the Most Wanted list for the Japanese. He got out of it, but he had cancer which was not discovered so he died two years later. And the Chinese had sent a plane, Chiang Kai-shek sent a plane to have him buried in Shanghai. And Powell came back to Missouri without his two feet. They had a little price paid for their loyalty and advocacy in there.

That's about what I'm going to say. Let me just make very short some points. The May 4th was consciously acted as part of international political ideological current in both the cultural and political realms. Politically, it shared with this cultural current an idealized version of Wilsonism as a way to sovereignty, democracy, and peace. And the understanding that propaganda in the local and international public sphere, through writings, actions, and so on, was crucial for securing the national interest in preventing the dark deals of secret diplomacy.

The movement had to compensate for a strong asymmetry in the available means of communication, information, and propaganda compared to Japan and the Western powers. It did so. It did compensate by relying on foreign participants who were sympathetic to its goals: nationally, internationally informed, as well as connected and active in media communications. These foreigners were constituent and accepted elements in this movement. They provided guidance, information, and international propaganda. They made use of U.S. official support if it could be had, but continued to act in the same manner if it was not forthcoming.

The Chinese leaders, in politics and society, as well as foreigners sympathetic to this movement, were aware that the country was dependent for the defense of its territorial integrity and for its economic development on foreign support. They made great efforts to convince the U.S. public that such a support, rather than siding with Japan, coincided with vital U.S. economic and security interests. China was able to retain an often very emotional commitment of many of these foreigners over time even though some left in frustrations and some went over to Japan.

The legitimacy given to propaganda by the high aims of sovereignty, democracy, and peace in China came at the price that the means of propaganda as an argumentative genre itself were not questioned in China. And propaganda elements came, and continued to be pervasive in literature, the arts, and scholarship.

And I have, again, gone over time and I apologize.
David Wang: Okay. Alright. We will be able to accommodate a couple of questions, but not necessarily long answers. And then we'll take an immediate break. Okay. Yeah. Any particular questions? Comments? Yes.

Olga Lomova: [inaudible 01:05:27] it was so interesting. It was really very interesting. I would just like make a small remark. You showed the interplay or the position of China in the certain global, mainly American, politics. But I would emphasize even further the global situation and just make a small remark that my country, Czechoslovakia, resulted from... was successful in Versailles in 1918 and became an independent country. And, again, everything depended on the ability of the future President Masaryk to draw the sympathy of American public.

Olge Lomova: He had an American wife. He was very active in the United States, he was a professor and a man of letters. So I just would like to say that this is something more general and it shows perfectly how much the Chinese case was connected to global processes going all over the globe, even in Central Europe. So thank you very much.

Rudolf Wagner: Thank you very much. I mean, just one sentence to that. The, of course, Wilson's main point on sovereignty was designed for the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. So that was he was focused on. Wilson had no problem at all with the American protectorate in the Philippines or appropriating Hawaii or things like that. He wasn't a rigid anti-colonialist. He assumed that there was a condition for sovereignty and the condition for sovereignty is a civilized political system and stable political system. And a lot of places, Erez Manela has pointed out in The Wilsonian Moment, all these liberation movements are coming. Wilson was totally disinterested because he felt they did not have the wherewithal, number one, and in some other cases like Vietnam or India, they were colonies still under the allies where he felt In Paris they couldn't deal with that. The main point is Wilson himself never had the idea of spreading the sovereignty idea worldwide. But Reinsch, Crane, and these people said "This is what you say" and the readers took their own path there.

David Wang: Okay. Okay. Then we'll take a break and then we'll reconvene at 11:10 [inaudible 01:08:04]. Thank you.