James Robson: Hi. Good afternoon everyone. I'd like to welcome you on behalf of The Asia Center and the co-sponsors of this event including The Fairbanks Center for Chinese Studies, The Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, and the program on US-Japan relations at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, to this very special event on behalf of Professor Ezra Vogel's new book, China and Japan: Facing History.

James Robson: Thank you all very much for coming. We knew, I think, that this would be a well attended event and it looks to be an overflowing crowd this evening. My name is James Robson. I'm the new Victor and William Fung Director of the Asia Center and also a professor in the Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations. And I'd like to just briefly say how delighted we are to have this event as the first large Asia Center co-sponsored event of the year, and my first event as the new director, since it's so fitting that it centered on Professor Ezra Vogel.

James Robson: Ezra Vogel as you know, was the first director of the Asia Center, which he inaugurated in 1997, and I can see there are also some former directors and acting directors in the audience tonight, or this evening, as well.

James Robson: Professor Vogel's work, as you all know, and his substantial body of scholarship, embodies many of the key features that the Asia Center aims to foster. Which is precisely the issues of transnational and trans-regional work. As you know, the new book, which will be the topic of discussion this evening, goes all the way back to connections between China and Japan in the seventh century and it carries on up to the present day.

James Robson: So now my only role this evening is to introduce the introducer. So I'd like to now introduce Professor Elizabeth Perry, the Henry Rosovsky Professor of Government, and also the Director of the Harvard-Yenching Institute, who will introduce and also moderate the event this evening. But thank you all very much for coming. Very much look forward to this evening's event.

Elizabeth Perry: Thank you very much, James. It's a genuine pleasure and privilege to be part of today's event, a book talk by America's preeminent scholar of East Asia, Professor Ezra Vogel. Professor Vogel, as you know, is the Henry Ford Professor of Social Sciences Emeritus here at Harvard and the author of numerous books, bestselling books, agenda setting books, on both China and Japan.

Elizabeth Perry: On the Japan side, we have back from 1963 I believe it was, Japan's New Middle Class, and then, much more controversially, in 1979, Japan as Number One: Lessons for America. I was very interested when I was in China just a couple months ago seeing that the Chinese translation of Japan as Number One was featured very prominently in several bookstores in Shanghai. Maybe you can explain that to us later on. It was a surprise to me.
Elizabeth Perry: On the China side, Ezra has also written very important books; Canton under Communism, in 1969; One Step Ahead in China that looked at the province of Guangdong and its role in the new post-Mao reforms, published in 1989; more famously perhaps, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, which came out in 2011. And today as James mentioned, Ezra will be introducing his new book from Harvard University Press, China and Japan: Facing History.

Elizabeth Perry: It's appropriate, I think, that the event today which is focused on Sino-Japanese relations is being held here in the Thai Auditorium. But right outside the Thai Auditorium we have the Japan Friends of Harvard Concourse, and I do want to let you all know that right after we meet here in the Thai Auditorium, you are all welcome to a reception in the Japan Friends of Harvard Concourse right outside where if there still any books left for purchase you're welcome to do that there. We do hope you'll stay to join us for the reception right outside afterwards.

Elizabeth Perry: As professor Robson noted, Ezra was the founding director of the Asia Center here at Harvard. He served also as director for a couple of terms of the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies and also the program on US-Japan relations.

Elizabeth Perry: Although Ezra retired officially from Harvard almost 20 years ago now, in the year 2000, he has continued to be incredibly active and engaged since then. Still not only a member, but a leader of our community both here at Harvard and far beyond, both intellectually and administratively. He's kept extremely busy writing new books, helping to organize the Public Intellectuals Program at the National Committee on US-China relations, coordinating a weekly seminar at the Fairbank Center on critical issues facing China, lecturing to both academic and public audiences all around the world.

Elizabeth Perry: Professor Vogel will focus today on the question of how Japan and China have interacted with each other, not only politically, militarily, but also culturally, and particularly I think, how they've learned from each other since the seventh century transmission of Buddhism right down to much more recent cultural exchange and imitation.

Elizabeth Perry: Let me mention just one such cultural practice, one that Ezra doesn't focus on in his book but has intrigued me for a long time. In 1950 Japan came up with the idea of what it calls Ningen Kokuhō, living national treasures. And these individuals are certified practitioners of critically important Japanese cultural traditions, Kabuki, Bunraku, and so on that are deemed to deserve public recognition and protection.

Elizabeth Perry: In much more recent times, just the last few years, both Taiwan and the PRC have authorized their Ministries of Culture to follow the Japanese example by designating recognized masters of Chinese arts calligraphy, a Beijing Opera, and so on as a ren jian guo bao, or also living national treasures.
Elizabeth Perry: Now I mentioned this particular bit of mutual learning because whether we know him as Ezra Vogel or whether we know him as Fu Gao Yi. He is truly an American living national treasure. He practices the art of East Asian studies like none of the rest of us. He remains at the very top of his game and he demonstrates to all of us, whether we're political scientists, or sociologists, or historians, whether we work primarily on China or on Japan, how to practice the art of East Asian studies at the very highest level.

Elizabeth Perry: So it's my great privilege and pleasure to turn the proceedings over to Ezra. I think in the middle of his talk, he will also introduce a couple of his colleagues who worked with him on the latest book and they will make some comments of their own as well. But he's asked to introduce them himself. So Ezra.

Ezra Vogel: As they say in Chinese, "guo jiang." I mean you've overpraised me, and what I feel is that none of this would be possible without this community. And I think it's the intellectual community around Harvard. I did realize how lucky I was to be here and take part of that when I got started. But I couldn't have done all the research without the stimulation of colleagues, without the cooperation of so many people, and without the direct help, particularly when it comes to this book, I received help from so many people.

Ezra Vogel: I hesitate to mention a few because I would be leaving out some of the others, but some I think deserves special... On the China side, I want to particularly thank Paul Cohen who's here, and Mike Szonyi who's here. On the Japan side, I wanted to particularly thank Andy Gordon and Susan Pharr. And on the Korean side I want to thank Carter Eckert. And I want to thank my wife, Charlotte Ikels, who born in the book and all the things that I've done working on that from the beginning to the end.

Ezra Vogel: And I want to thank Kathleen McDermott from the Harvard Press who ushered the book through the press, the one on Deng Xiaoping, and also this, through the press and saw that it met all the stages and got through everything smoothly.

Ezra Vogel: I want to also tell how lucky I am to have colleagues like Liz and to have collaborators like Paula Harrell and Rick Dyck. I got into this book in, after I finished Deng Xiaoping, I was finished writing about 2010. And at that time the Chinese-Japanese relations were really at their low. And I felt that I wanted to contribute to them as somebody who was known in both countries. I felt that maybe a bystander, you know the Chinese have the "pang guan zhe qing," and the person stands outside can sometimes see things more clearly, not always.

Ezra Vogel: But I would try. And that I thought maybe an outsider who liked both countries, who had good friends in both countries, who wanted both countries to succeed, might be able to tell a story in a way that might be helpful to those in the two countries who wanted to try to improve relations. And that was the motivation for getting into it.
Ezra Vogel: The Chinese said that Japanese got to study history and I decided that in order to write this book I had to go into history. I think my colleagues know very well that I'm not a historian. I have no claims to be a historian. I don't read early Chinese or Japanese texts, but I felt I had to learn about history. And so I relied on many other people like Josh Vogel, who spent a couple of years here, who has done so much to introduce Japanese studies of China into the Western literature, and to many scholars who've written really good monographs.

Charlotte: We can't hear you Ezra. The mics on the lectern.

Ezra Vogel: Thank you. My wife has always looked after me very well.

Richard Dyck: He was thanking you, Charlotte.

Ezra Vogel: So I decided I would try to at least learn enough about history and I would try to connect the dots. I think one of the things that I was taught as a sociologist under Talcott Parsons was to try to see the big picture, try to see how things fit together. And that's in a way what I've tried to do in this study.

Ezra Vogel: And Paula Harrell who joined me has done, I think, the best research of anybody I know on this period when the Chinese were learning from Japan. And Rick Dyck, who got his PhD with me in 1975, has been in Japan most of the time since that time. He happened to have jobs making money and running companies, but he was really a scholar at heart, and he's remained a scholar at heart, and has worked so hard on this study. And I've learned from both of them as a part of this study.

Ezra Vogel: Now what I thought I'd do in this brief time today is, since I can't cover everything, is to cover three highlights when one country was really learning a tremendous amount from each other. And the first period I wanted to talk about is a period from 600 to 838 when Japan was learning from China. And the second period is the period from 1895, the end of the Sino-Japanese War, up until the Second World War. And I will let the person that I learned from on that topic, Paula Harrell talk about that topic. And then as that topic end I want to have Rick Dyck talk some about the transition to the next stage. And then I will talk about the third time when one country learned a lot from another and that's when Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978 and China again learned so much from Japan.

Ezra Vogel: Now to go back to this first period, the reason I started in 600 to 838 is that that was the year when Japan sent the first mission to China to study. And 838 was the time of the last mission. They thought of sending missions at a later time, but 838 was the time of the last mission.

Ezra Vogel: And as I look at it in the broad sociological respective, what the Japanese were trying to do during that time was establish a broader administrative structure. Delmar Brown at the University of California had described this early period of
rule before Empress Suiko came to power in 593 as one that was run by clans. And the clans had kind of a connection. There were about 30 clans and they had various relationship with each other. And it wasn't a large enough scale to really have a broad administrative structure.

Ezra Vogel: And through Koreans who came to Japan, and through some Japanese who had heard about China, they knew that in the city of Chang'an that had just been unified in 589 by Empress of Sui Dynasty, WenDi had begun to establish a very large administrative structure, and had all the aspects of a broad administrative structure that would be useful in Japan as they tried to establish the same thing. The strongest clan of these that wanted to stretch out, the Soga clan, was taking that lead.

Ezra Vogel: And when they went to Chang'an in 600 they found a city that was some estimates, almost a million people, perhaps the biggest city in the world, the most cosmopolitan, the Yellow River Capitol, that era and that area that provided leadership in all kinds of different direction.

Ezra Vogel: And so they began sending these missions. There are differences of opinion as to whether Shōtoku Taishi was even a real person, but I think the general explanations that most historians rely on is that emperor Suiko relied on her nephew Shōtoku Taishi to carry out many of these projects of bringing a culture from China so that they could develop this administrative district.

Ezra Vogel: Now one of the basic things they had to have at that time was a written language, because to cover a broader geographical area you needed some kind of written word for communication and for precise directions that would cover an area that extended beyond a one little locality.

Ezra Vogel: And there are a few things that archeologists have found, whether Chinese characters before that period of 600, but there was not very large language. And Professor Murray of Columbia has traced how the language developed and how during this early period of the Sui-Tang in China and then after Empress Suiko and Shōtoku Taishi, they tried to standardize a language that was a written language. So they brought in the written language from China.

Ezra Vogel: They also decided they needed a capital location that was more stable. Until that time, they had had capitals that moved around depending on which clan was in charge, and whichever clan was, used their locality as the capital of the center. But in the late 600's they decided that they wanted to have a stable capital and so they set the capital in Nara in 710. And they laid out the capital on the basis of what they saw in Chang'an. It was the same north-south axis, and with the capitol at the top, and then numbered streets along the sides.

Ezra Vogel: And then when some of the people in that Nara period felt some of the monks were getting too much control and they wanted to hold new capital, they set up the Heian dynasty and then set the capital in Kyoto, finished at 794, which also
was laid out exactly on the basis of Chang'shan, ah, Chang'an. That person working on the modern era you know confuses from the previous... From Chang'an.

Ezra Vogel: And so in Kyoto, even today, you have the numbered streets down and you can still see the signs of the basic layout of that city which is based on Chang’an.

Ezra Vogel: They also decided they needed some kind of legitimation for their government and Buddhism, of course it started in India but it had become essentially a Chinese religion, so from the Japanese point of view it was a Chinese religion. And Buddhism, linked to heaven, gave a kind of a natural legitimation. And the term, "tian di," you know the emperor after all was the linkage with heaven, and the Japanese too, the "tengo" was linked with heaven. And that provided kind of a natural overall linkage with the early Chinese concepts and provided a basis for the Japanese to provide that kind of perspective.

Ezra Vogel: They also introduced Confucianism which provided a wonderful philosophy that underpinned the rule. The Confucian eminences serve your elder brother and you serve your Lord, and it was a wonderful philosophy to be introduced that helped reinforce the loyalty of the subjects to the nation. And they developed various codes in Japan that grew out of the Taihō codes and so forth that set up rules for collecting taxes from broader administrative area, for hiring people to serve in the army and serve in labor projects, and set up rules that again also were based on those they learned from China.

Ezra Vogel: They also decided to write history, which would provide legitimation. And the Chinese dynastic history was adapted in Japan, in the Kojiki and Nihon Shoki. One thing that was a little different in Japanese culture was that they gave more emphasis to heredity, and continued to do so over the centuries, than China.

Ezra Vogel: So when they wrote their long history, they traced it all the way back, blood, to the descendant from heaven, from jinyu tengo. But the idea of that kind of basic history which provided legitimation, and that those who won the battles are the legitimate heirs, and that continued through the centuries, that came, in a way, from the idea of the dynastic histories that came from China.

Ezra Vogel: And in terms of the arts, they also picked up, it wasn’t so central to the administration, but they picked up things like some of the Makoto, and the old Japanese classic instruments are really instruments that came from China. And of course literature, and so many Japanese learned literature as it was from China.

Ezra Vogel: So in all these ways, Japan learned its basic civilization, its basic culture from China. And the amazing thing is what a small number of people did that. At each mission maybe had as much as three or four ships, a hundred, two hundred people at most on a ship, so several hundred people, 15-17 times that they sent missions. But they often left a monk living in Chang’an. And the monk of course,
was the intellectual of the day, who provided understanding what was going on. And if they stayed from one time to the next, by the next time the delegation came in 15-20 years later, the monks who had stayed, learned an awful lot about what was going on in Chang'an. So that enabled Japan to absorb that culture in a very remarkable way.

Ezra Vogel: So the quick summary I would have of that learning from China was that it was very deep. It was on a small scale, but it was formative, and set the basis for Japanese civilization that’s continued even today and continues to have a very basic impact.

Ezra Vogel: Now the next big stage of learning there, of course continued relations over the centuries in between this, but there was nothing comparable to one side learning that much from another until 1895. In 1895, suddenly Chinese decided to begin to learn from Japan. And until that time, China had really looked so down on Japan. One of our early PhD students at the Fairbank, Noriko Kamachi, described Huang Zunxian, who was for first deputy in the first Chinese mission in Tokyo in 1877, couldn't even get his book published, probably the best book about Japan in Chinese, couldn't get it published till after the war was over. So they knew almost nothing about it.

Ezra Vogel: One of the big reasons that Japan won the war is that they had so much better information. They had been collecting information and they had a better educational system. And so China was suddenly shocked that Japan was suddenly way ahead of them. A few people in China of course understood that before, but on a really big scale they understood it. And at that time, in 1895 when they began thinking of learning from Japan, they didn't have a centralized administration like in its first period when Japan was learning from China and had a well organized, but very small scale.

Ezra Vogel: We had a really massive scale, and to my view, nobody in the West has done as much research on this period as Paula Harrell. And so for a description of that period I turned to Paula. Paula, cheers.

Paula Harrell: Okay. Thank you very much. I’d like to offer a few additional perspectives on the sudden sharp turn for the better in China-Japan relations after the war in 1895. So soon after in fact that the ink was barely dry on the peace treaty. China and Japan had co-existed in a China centered world for centuries, and then you had Western intrusion which forced new choices on both. But when it came to basic cultural and institutional borrowing between them, it was always a one-way street, Japan learning from China. Now, for the first time ever, China turned to Japan for lessons on how to run a country and develop its resources. Deng Xiaoping could have been talking about 1895 when he told his Japanese hosts on a visit to Japan in 1978, he said, "Now the roles of teacher and student are reversed."
Paula Harrell: This role reversal came from reassessments on both sides, as Ezra was mentioning. Top Chinese officials, some Chinese officials, took a new look at Japan and they recognized that Japan success was less about weapons acquisition, more about remaking institutions along Western lines, especially giving top priority to creating a nationwide system of public schools.

Paula Harrell: In Japan victory boosted public confidence. It also increased calls for a new Asia for the Asians foreign policy. Less Euro-centered, more focused on strengthening ties with China as Japan's natural ally, geographically and culturally. High level talks in Wuhan in 1899 resulted in agreement to move ahead with three joint activities; study tours to Japan for Chinese officials; hiring Japanese advisors and teachers to work in China; and study in Japan for Chinese students. This sounds contemporary. And in fact, it was the first instance anywhere of a late developing country fashioning a sort of development assistance program for a later developing country. In pragmatic terms, this was viewed by both sides as a win-win. For China, fast track modernization without exclusive reliance on Western advisers. For Japan, increasing its influence in Asia while strictly adhering to international norms.

Paula Harrell: The visible change in the next few years was in the number of people to people contacts. Ezra was just talking about this. While Chinese civilization had made an enormous difference in Japanese society and cultural life over the past 13 centuries before this, actual travelers each way were few. Remarkably few. In some long periods, zero. By contrast, between 1900 and 1911 at least a thousand Chinese officials were sent to Japan on study tours to investigate schools from kindergarten to college. Also to look at firms, factories, prisons, banks. Hundreds of Japanese advisors and teachers, more than 500 by 1909, were hired on contract to work in various parts of the Chinese bureaucracy, advising on schools development, revising laws, organizing a police system, much as Western advisers worked in Japan in 1870's and the 1880's, and with the same measurable results.

Paula Harrell: In other words, for example, in the all important teacher education sector, study in Japan started small with 13 Chinese youths sent to Tokyo in 1896. Then it ballooned to over 10,000 in 1905 with the excitement that was felt Asia-wide over Japan's defeat of Russia. It's estimated that upwards of 50,000 Chinese students attended Japanese schools from 1896 to 1937.

Paula Harrell: Study in Japan was an eye opener for Chinese students, in school and beyond the classroom. Tokyo was a modern city with an active modern press offering, far and away more extensive coverage of world events and public opinion than anything available in Chiang China. They learned how the West viewed the rest, where China stood in the global power rankings, and on the Social Darwinist scale of fittest races, which was an intense discussion in the Meiji press and students' journals of the day.
Paula Harrell: Study in Japan turned students into nationalists. Some also became anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang government. This points to the familiar part of the story and that is how Japan-returned students formed a core group within Sun Yat-sen revolutionary party. And the ultimate irony that the young people expected to rescue the Chiang regime as it transitioned to a constitutional monarchy under Japan's tutelage, in the end contributed to its downfall.

Paula Harrell: But not all students were revolutionaries. There were many sympathizers as well. Many of these people joined China's modernizing bureaucracy; new army, staff of new schools and provincial assemblies. 90% of new recruits to bureaucratic positions from 1906 to 1911 were graduates of Japanese institutions. And these people, and the revolutionaries as well, were in place after 1911. One telling example, I think, involves the well-known legal expert, Ariga Nagao, who was hired by China's new Republican government in 1913 to help write a constitution. His staff of Chinese assistance in Beijing were all former students of his at Waseda University. And Ariga's story highlights the fact that a number of Japanese advisers stayed on in China after 1912 as politics grew more chaotic on both sides. Some consulted on railway development, others on compiling new laws. Still others worked with Manchu separatists planning a separate state in Manchuria.

Paula Harrell: Ariga Nagao himself remained in Beijing after the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914, that major event that was out of China in Japan's control but had such strong repercussions on each. He himself publicly opposed Japan's 21 demands in 1915. Japanese opinion on what to do about China was not uniform. And this was also true of Chinese students, who for various costs and political reasons, continued to enroll in Japanese schools, around three to four thousand on average, up to the outbreak of war in 1937.

Paula Harrell: Again, one can say that certainly study in Japan acted in myriad ways to alter the mindset of students at the individual level. Many whose stories we know, Lu Xun, Guo Moruo, Chen Duxiu, Chiang Kai-shek, Li Dazhao, Zhou Enlai. Many others, hundreds of others who were important then, but their stories are more or less forgotten now.

Paula Harrell: So just to make a final point, as we hear even these days talk of Asia for the Asians, once again, I think it's worth remembering that China and Japan's modern relationship was not always confrontational. China learning from Japan brought some measurable, positive results indicative of the potential for a mutually beneficial relationship. It was a matter of choice and commitment.

Ezra Vogel: Thank you so much Paula. When that period was ending there was one particular person who was not well known, named Jiang Baili who devised the strategy of how to defeat Japan and Rick Dyck has been under that. As somebody who took spent a lot of time learning about psychology, I wanted to describe some of the people who made such an important difference. And in
the end I have biographies. I don't think of them as just reference notes. I think
as fascinating people who played a key role between the two countries.

Ezra Vogel: But Jiang Baili was the one who developed a strategy of how to defeat Japan,
was one of those students, and played a very important role in the next stage.
And unfortunately there was one man, a Japanese, who understood the rising
nationalism in China and who wrote about it and tried to stop it. He later
became prime minister in the post war period and that's Ishibashi Tanzan. So
I've asked Rick to talk about those two people who played such a key role in the
transition after this second period. Rick.

Richard Dyck: And the other order I had was to keep it within five minutes. This has been an
amazing project to work on for me. And Ezra just kept the drafts coming and
coming, coming, and kept us all on our deadlines. I'm sure you've all read the
book and the pages just fly by. So I'm sure you've read this on page 247. Ezra
and I went back and forth, back and forth, and I'm not sure we completely
nailed it, but Japan's tragedy was it had the ability to mobilize military forces
without a clear strategy or mission, without a central authority capable of
creating and implementing a strategy. Sounds like Iraq, does it?

Richard Dyck: I'll get into Jiang Baili, but I think first of all, I belong to a study group in Japan
that's mainly professors, Showa jūninenkai, which Showa jūnen is 1937. This
group just gets together about five or six times a year for half a day and just
talks about 1937. How did 1937 happen?

Richard Dyck: If you go to a bookstore in Japan, you'll find shelves about 1937, how did it
happen? Now the Chinese will say that it was aggressive invasion. And the
Japanese will say, makikomareta. We got tangled up. And it's someplace in
between there. When Prime Minister Abe issued his 70th Anniversary
statement, Kitaoka Shinichi, who's become a very good friend and has helped us
on this project, had a press conference because he was the author of the
statement. And somebody in the audience asked, "Wasn't the problem the
Tokyo War Crime Trials? Shouldn't we have had our own war crime trials?" And
Kito said, "If we had had our own war crime trials, even now in 2015, we'd still
be in the war crime trials. We could never make a decision about what
happened." And it's really a murky period of history.

Richard Dyck: But I'd like to first of all talk about Jiang Baili. He's a fascinating person. I want to
get this through because I want to make sure I do it before the five minutes is
up. And he's one of these fascinating people that... Actually Paula's writing was
one of my first introduction. Matsumoto Shigeharu also wrote about Jiang Baili
because he was one of his best friends when he was in Shanghai. So in Shanghai
Jidai he writes a lot about Jiang Baili.

Richard Dyck: Jiang Baili was born in 1982, 1882 sorry. In Zhejiang Province in a very bookish
family and so he had a rather Chinese classical scholarly education. His first
newspaper that he ever read was about the Sino-Japanese War and the defeat

Ezra Vogel - China and Japan Facing History (Completed 01/18/20) Page 10 of 26
Transcript by Rev.com
of the Ching by the Japanese. The newspaper came to him several months late, but that got him interested in current events. He went to the antecedent of Zhejiang University and then he took the opportunity to go to Japan and study in Japan.

Richard Dyck: He linked up with Liang Qichao, who was a very consequential person, and he helped edit Liang Qichao’s various periodicals that he was writing. He wrote articles himself. And the group that was around Liang Qichao, they... If you read Joseph Levinson for example, he says they were coming to grips with the contraction of China, from China being their entire world, to China being a nation within a world. They’re also coming over with an expansion because they had their identity as being from Zhejiang Province, or Hunan Province, or whatever, and now they were going to try to get an identity as Chinese.

Richard Dyck: He decided, even though he had this classical education to go into the military, which was kind of strange. His family was against it. Liang Qichao was against it. But he studied. He studied very hard and he got into the Shikan Gakkô, which is the premier military academy. He graduated first in his class. The Meiji Emperor would come to the commencement and give a ceremonial sword to the graduates and imagine his surprise when it’s not a Japanese, it’s a Chinese. They thought they would give the sword, then another sword, to the second in the class. It turned out that that was also a Chinese.

Richard Dyck: He was in the 16th class. It was an amazing class. Itagaki Seishirō, who was one of the co-conspirators of Manchuria was in the class. Okamura Yasuji, who was later to command the Japanese army in China. Nagata Tetsuzan was in it. I don’t know how many of you know about Nagata Tetsuzan. Nagata Tetsuzan was trying to reform the army. The army had sort of gotten out of control in many ways. And Nagata Tetsuzan was trying to reform the army in 1935 when a lieutenant came in and slaughtered him. Jiang Baili actually went to Japan to meet Nagata Tetsuzan shortly before he was assassinated and got an earful about the problems with the Japanese army.

Richard Dyck: Liang Qichao took a group of sort of Chinese opinion leaders to Europe after the great war. Here are these Chinese who had studied the Enlightenment, believed that progress will always be the case. They go to Europe and they see the destruction of the war and they’re trying to come to grips with this. They all wrote various articles about it.

Richard Dyck: Jiang Baili came to a kind of epiphany because after studying Japan, he had studied in Germany. He had a huge amount of respect for the German military and he was trying to figure out why did the Germans lose? And he came to the conclusion that it’s much more difficult to motivate an army when it’s aggressively invading its neighbor. So why did the French win? Because the French were defending their territory. And his biggest concern always about the Chinese was apathy. The Chinese don’t care. They lose Taiwan, they don’t care. They lose Hong Kong, they don’t care. They lose Manchuria. They don’t care.
The Chinese just don't care. What can you do to a country that doesn't care? He said maybe we've been training them the wrong way. We should train Chinese to defend the Homeland, that the Homeland is under attack and we can train to defend.

Richard Dyck: He went back and he started meticulously planning the defense of China. If the Japanese come in, they're probably going to take over this railway and therefore we will do this. They will try to take over Nanjing, if Nanjing's the capital. We'll move Nanjing to Luoyang. We'll move Nanjing to Changqing. We will retreat. We will bring them in. They will have long supply lines.

Richard Dyck: The other thing he realized in his trips to Japan, and this was this surprised me, was the Japanese had fallen very much behind in military technology. He was studying at the military academy in 1904 and 1905. This was the Russo-Japanese War. This when you have massive infantry going in and fighting with bayonets. The thing they found out about World War I is that there's modern artillery, there's armored vehicles.

Richard Dyck: Japan, up until the 1930's, had never manufactured an internal combustion engine. Japan had no automotive industry. It had no ability to manufacture tanks. It had no ability to manufacture... The first invasion of Japan was actually in 1932 in the invasion of Shanghai and they took in 5,000 horses, and they pulled the artillery manually. And he said, we could do something here. We can defend against this kind of a country. Now the Japanese are very motivated. They're very well trained. But there is a way to defend China.

Richard Dyck: I'll go on, but this is just an example of the results of what Paula was talking about of the Chinese coming and learning from Japan. Both sides, weaknesses and strengths.

Ezra Vogel: Thank you. For me, the conclusion that Rick told me, we were trying to squeeze everything in a little time, is that Jiang Baili could see that the Japanese army was stronger, that they were going to invade, and the Chinese were not prepared to stop them. But if they had a long, protracted war that the Chinese could outwait them and that they would win the war that way. And Jiang Baili was an advisor of Chiang Kai-shek, and that this was before Mao wrote On Protracted War, and became kind of the way that they would resist themselves from, and beat the Japanese eventually, was through weeding them down and wearing them out. Which is of course what they did.

Ezra Vogel: My colleagues have so much to say that we don't have a lot of time. I'll try to talk briefly about this third period and then throw it open and hope to have a little time for questions.

Ezra Vogel: The third period, of course, was beginning in 1978. And China and Japan had had difficulty getting closer relationships after World War II. Dulles and other Americans didn't want them to have too close relations during the Cold War and
so prevented them from having bigger relations. But once the United States in 1971 began to open up, the Japanese moved very fast and within one year Tonaka Kakuei had normalized relations, and they were on the way to developing relationship.

Ezra Vogel: But it wasn't until the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in '78 that they really began to have close relations and Deng Xiaoping in the middle of '78, I think, already had ideas that he was going to be leading China and that he wanted to have Japanese support. So in October '78, two months before the famous Third Plenum, he went to Japan and established relations. And he rode on that Shinkansen, the fast train. At that time China had zero fast trains. Now China has about as much fast trains as the rest of the world altogether.

Ezra Vogel: If I remember correctly, during the Great Leap Forward, China was making about 13 million tons of steel in one year. The large Japanese steel plants were making about that much. One plant was making about that much. So when Deng went to Japan, not only did he ride on the fast train, but he visited the steel plant, Kimitsu, which was the biggest plant at the time, which was the model for Baoshan. And before long Baoshan was producing tremendous modern steel. And as you now know, China produces about as much steel as the rest of the world combined.

Ezra Vogel: In addition to visiting a steel plant, he also visited a modern automobile plant that had robots. He visited at the company that's now having a little bit of trouble, Nissan, which at that time was way ahead in robotics. And he asked how many autos an average person produces a year, and it was something like 94. And he said, "Well, we do about one year." So they could learn that.

Ezra Vogel: He also visited the person he called the god of modern enterprise and that's Matsushita Kōnosuke. And Matsushita as a young man had spent some time in China and had a vision of getting modern electronic equipment. This is of course before the computer and the internet, but it was the days when they were beginning with simple computers, calculating machines, and television sets. And Matsushita had the vision of getting those all through China. And Deng met him, went to Osaka to meet him. And so within the next 15 years, Japan was doing an awful lot to help China.

Ezra Vogel: A lot of the details of the Chinese aid program were well known in Japan. They're not publicized widely in China. And this is one of the things that's frustrating to the Japanese because they gave so much money and so much technical help.

Ezra Vogel: I remember in the 80's going around some Guangdong factories, they had big signs up there. They were studying Japanese management system and putting quality control in the factories. And JETRO had programs, whatever the technical specialty that was needed in China, they would send that specialist to
Ezra Vogel: China to help promote those studies. So they did a tremendous amount during that period in China.

Ezra Vogel: And so I think this is the third period, really, when one country was learning a tremendous amount. One thing that I think has not been publicized as much as it should be, is on the overall advisory organizational level. They were moving into a market economy. But most market economies did not have government leadership to try to push ahead and modernize. But Japan, as a late developer, had a bureaucracy that was trying to modernize and promote modernization in a market economy.

Ezra Vogel: And there was a group of Japanese who were invited by Gu Mu to go to China, headed by Ōkita Saburō that went regularly and I think maybe that group is still meeting. But it was not a widely publicized group. But in the 1955 when Japan settled on its big modernization program and they had a lot of really first-class bureaucrats who were thinking ahead. One of my favorites, Shimokobe Atsushi, who was a head later head of NIRA, and so forth, and Ōkita Saburō, and that they were in this group that went to China to provide advice every year.

Ezra Vogel: And so I think in the overall program of how you get a system, a national system that's working on modernization but using market economy, that at that top level, as well as all that lower level of technology down to the factory, down to the industrial sector, Japan played an important role.

Ezra Vogel: I was going to talk more about the stage of overtaking, because learning, of course, is from the more advanced. And the time when Japan over took China was the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-95. The time when China again came back, I trace it in my book and I've been thinking more about it, I would say is the period from about 2008 to 2014. And in 2010 the World Bank declared that the Chinese economy was larger than the Japanese. So they were clearly passing at that time.

Ezra Vogel: In 2008 Japan did the Olympics and you had the Asian financial crisis. And I think a lot of the Chinese were already begin to feel that, there was a lot of, "Soon we're going to be passing these guys and we're not going to have to put up with what we put up before." And so in 2010-2012, you has some of the most horrific incidents, and there are a lot of reasons you can give for those incidents.

Ezra Vogel: But I think underneath it was also a very fundamental thing. China is again resuming its place as the dominant power of Asia. And from the period of 1895, first in warfare than in teaching and in technology, Japan was at the top of the heap. But now China is at the top of the heap. And I think the new kind of adjustment that Japan and China are trying to reach a recognition of this new fact that China's now again at the top of the heap.

Ezra Vogel: And I think it wasn't just military power. I think Fukuzawa when he was talking about Datsu-A getting out of Asia and 1885 he was saying, "Look, these guys
don't have much to teach us. We can look down on these guys." I think by 2012 the Japanese were beginning to recognize that there's some pretty smart Chinese and they've learned a lot of technology. They've thought about the international markets and these guys are no longer the backwards civilization that they were when we beat them in 1894-95.

Ezra Vogel: So I think there is a very fundamental way in which we're now entering a new era when the Chinese are again at the top. And the two countries hopefully are beginning to come to terms with that. One cannot expect that that will happen quickly. But when the cherry blossoms bloom next year, we expect Xi Jinping to go to Japan. And we hope they will listen to what I tell them about trying to get along with each other. Thank you very much.

Elizabeth Perry: Thank you all very much. So we've heard about for particular periods in Sino-Japanese relations. First, the seventh to the ninth century when Japan was learning from China. Then the period immediately after the Sino-Japanese War and before Japan's invasion of China, when China was learning from Japan. A second period after the Cultural Revolution and the death of Mao, the post-Mao period in China, when again China was learning from Japan. And then most recently as Ezra mentioned, the contemporary period where this relationship seems to be shifting, perhaps more similar to what it was 1,500 years ago, when again, Japan perhaps will feel compelled to learn from China.

Elizabeth Perry: The floor will shortly be open for questions. I just wanted to pose one general question but I won't ask the panelists to answer it now. I think we'll take a number of questions and then come back to you and you can answer whatever is of interest to you and avoid those things that you don't feel like responding to.

Elizabeth Perry: But my question is both in reading the book and in hearing you talk, you talk, of course, about a number of different channels of cultural transmission back and forth between them, some official, some unofficial. So we have official channels of government officials, and government sponsored students who study in the other country, but we also have many unofficial channels, Buddhist pilgrims, today, hordes of Chinese tourists in Japan for example, business people, students who are not actually sponsored by their governments, and I just was interested in your reflections on how the official and unofficial transmission differs. Which you see as the longer term, whether they brought very different kinds of things back to the two countries, whether some of them had more of a kind of modifying and friendly longterm effect on others less so, and so forth.

Elizabeth Perry: I, anyway, would be interested in thoughts that you may have about.

Ezra Vogel: One of thing I think that both China and Japan have assumed is that merchants are too selfish and you can't leave everything to them. They're going to be doing two things too much on their own and it requires some kind of government supervision.
Ezra Vogel: And I think from the period of 600 to 838 there was a surprisingly, I think, good feeling at the top. The Japanese accepted that they were paying homage and that they followed protocol. And so I think there was a sense that the official provided channels that could control those.

Ezra Vogel: After 838 I think one role that has been very important are Buddhist monks. Because I think from this period of 838 up to the time when they really began resuming contacts in the middle of 19th century, that the Buddhist monks were more reliable than the merchants. And so sometimes the merchants would attach themselves to monks and they would keep up almost a semi-official role.

Ezra Vogel: And I think the role of Buddhism between the two countries has been one of the extraordinarily interesting, lasting things that sort of substituted for governments providing that goodwill. Even today in Japan, the Komeito, a Buddhist party.

Elizabeth Perry: Soka Gakkai.

Ezra Vogel: Soka Gakkai. And by the way, the ambassador from China to Japan the last nine years, Cheng Yonghua, most of the Chinese learn all about Japan in Chinese universities and they do a good job of training in language. But he actually studied at a Japanese university. What university? Soka University.

Richard Dyck: Soka University.

Ezra Vogel: Which is the Soka Gakkai's university. And I think a lot of the reasons he had so many good friends in Japan and did better than a lot of the other Japanese ambassadors because of that Buddhist connection.

Ezra Vogel: So I think that in addition to the official government connection, that in controlling all these rapacious pirates... A lot of the images in the era I didn't talk about were of Japanese rapacious pirates and so forth, and the merchants were entirely too selfish. That in addition to the government playing a role in sort of supervising, controlling that, I think the Buddhists... And also in learning, because they were the sages in those early days. And a lot of the Japanese on these early delegations was the Buddhist guy who stayed there, and because before they had modern equipment and so forth, you’re copied long texts and brought those texts back to Japan.

Ezra Vogel: So the Buddhist monks, I think, also played a absolute critical role in addition to government and the merchants.

Paula Harrell: And today, the large number of tourists and many of whom, of course, want to go to Japanese Buddhist temple. And I know very few Chinese who visited Japan who don't have a positive impression about that.
Ezra Vogel: I was going to say one thing about the contrast between those early days when you maybe have several hundred, maybe in those early trips from 600-838 AD, you may have had, I don't know, 15-20,000 Japanese who went to China all together. I don't know what the numbers are. Nobody knows. Now an average over 25,000 tourists go a day from China to Japan.

Paula Harrell: Mm-hmm (affirmative).

Ezra Vogel: Last year it was over 8 million tourists from China to Japan. And I think that they have been playing a role. I think, of course, now that you have more middle-class Chinese who can afford to travel, they travel. And some of that I've talked to, they see the signs in this Chinese language and they feel more comfortable than they do in a lot of other countries. There's a certain familiarity in the culture that if the countries can manage their differences and not squabble over the Senkaku Diaoyu Dao, and all the commercial competition, and so forth, I think there is a large cultural base that the two sides can use to develop a deeper understanding.

Ezra Vogel: And I think a lot of the Japanese who go to China really have a deeper understanding of most of us Westerners. I think they've dug in more to the local areas and they're more familiar phrases. And as you know, in the 19th century, Josh Fogel has talked a lot about this, some of the early contacts in 19th century, they communicated by brushstroke, by brush.

Ezra Vogel: And so even when they didn't have language and didn't have an interpreters, the scholars in China and Japan, and a lot of the early contacts, when the Chinese began sending a mission to Japan in 1877, a lot of the early contacts between the Chinese in the mission there and local people was through the brush. And they used to have kind of brush parties and exchange views by writing calligraphy because they could understand that way. Yeah.

Elizabeth Perry: Yes, Paula.

Paula Harrell: Well a couple of points. One is the question, I think, of expectations. Many of the Japanese advisors who went to China were both Western educated and they also had a classical Chinese education, because that was still part of the Meiji school curriculum. So they were well in Chinese and it produced different sorts of reactions. In other words, in the case of some people they expected more, they hoped for more, interaction, or better coordination of activities, and were disappointed because that didn’t happen, or when that didn't happen.

Paula Harrell: That was true in a number of cases. So people ran into bureaucratic obstacles. And so Hatano Kenichi was one of those. He was at Tokyo University, he was sent to China to try to develop a teacher education system, but he often was quite frustrated. He went first actually during the Boxer Uprising, and he was most disturbed to find that Japanese were regarded as foreigners, just like
everybody else. I think that works both ways. But there was some
disappointment, in other words, in the period I've looked at in that fact.

Paula Harrell: The other thing that's interesting, I think, is that the individual experience, and
we don't really, I think, know enough about various individuals. For example,
there's the story of Zhou Enlai and Matsumoto Kamejirō, his teacher who was
devoted to him. And you do read accounts and it seems that there was a real
closeness there. That probably made a real difference in Zhou Enlai's life and the
decisions he made, and so on, his view of Japan. I don't think there's any doubt.
There's a famous Lu Xun incident where the Professor Fujino was talking to him.
And so, and that may be apocryphal. But there isn't-

Ezra Vogel: No it isn't. You know-

Paula Harrell: Yeah?

Ezra Vogel: I've seen, when I was in Sendai visit the school-

Paula Harrell: Did you see the Sendai school? Yes?

Ezra Vogel: And there are papers there in written in hand by Fujino, on manuscripts.

Paula Harrell: Right, Right.

Ezra Vogel: That Lushen wrote.

Paula Harrell: That's right.

Ezra Vogel: And so That's not apocryphal. And Fujino ready did... And then, of course,
Lushen wrote that the story about Fujino.

Paula Harrell: That's right. Exactly, exactly.

Ezra Vogel: And it's real.

Paula Harrell: Yeah. And the other person who did have a real impact, a real passion to
develop education for Chinese students was Kanō Jigorō, who's known better as
a judo expert. He's the one who took Japan to the Olympics in 1912. But he was
really passionately involved from the beginning in establishing, first of all, a
special program for the 13 who went to Japan in 1896, and then after that,
really setting up an entire school for Chinese students. And I think many of
those students, likewise, regarded him as somebody who was on their side, who
really wanted to improve the relationship.

Paula Harrell: So I think more we know about the individual stories, the more subtle a picture
we'll get of this relationship. There were also a number of Chinese students I
think who were quite disappointed when they got to Japan. Those with a diplomatic mission, particularly, let’s say in the 1880’s, and they didn’t understand the street signs. They knew the characters but it didn’t make sense to them. I remember reading that too. So the comfort level wasn’t always good.

Elizabeth Perry: Do want to add to her?

Ezra Vogel: No, I think we're good.

Elizabeth Perry: Okay, so we probably have a couple of microphones around, is that right? There's one over there. Just one. Okay.

Speaker 6: Oh, there's two.

Elizabeth Perry: The two. So what I will do is call on several people and I will ask you to stand up and give your name and just a very brief introduction of where you are, and then to be very disciplined in your question because we have a lot of questions already. I see I'm developing here. If you want to direct them specifically to one of the panelists, please do that. Or if it's more general. So why don't I start right down here.

Abas: Do I need a microphone?

Elizabeth Perry: Yes.

Ezra Vogel: It's coming. It's coming.

Elizabeth Perry: It's coming to you.

Speaker 14: Yeah, it's on.

Abas: Okay. My name is Abas Muell 01:06:07 and I'm a teacher. I'm sort of absorbing all of this wonderful information. The question that comes to mind, the United States is also heavily involved in China and Japan, both in terms of trade and cultural exchange. And I'm wondering what influences the United States has now, and going forward, to the relationship between China and Japan.

Elizabeth Perry: Okay, thank you. So the impact to the potential impact of the US on Sino-Japanese relations. All the way in the back there. It's coming that way to you.

Ling: Okay. Thanks for all the professors for the wonderful and fascinating talk. My name is Ling Chen. I'm assistant professor in Johns Hopkins University, and I'm affiliated with Fairbank Center this year. I want to ask Professor Vogel a question about whether it's possible to compare the influence of Japan with the influence of Soviet Union on Northeast China, especially some of the later works, and discover that people tend to think... For example, SOE, state owned
enterprises, tend to derive Soviet Union, but it's surprisingly, they also find it a lot of influence from Japan as well in terms of its bureaucratic structure and setting. So I would appreciate your comments on that. Thank you.

Elizabeth Perry: Okay. Another question right down here.

Cindy: Hello everyone. My name is Cindy and I'm from China. I am a prospective student for Harvard Divinity School. And thank you for your impressive lecture. My question is about who Japanese want to learn? Because in the ancient time it seemed that Japanese learned a lot from China in terms of everything; religion, civilization, language, culture, and etc. But it seems that in the modern world, which is Western culture led world, Japanese seems to be a little bit, I would say, very conservative to be very open minded to learn the Western culture. Because, I would have say, it seems that Christianity and a lot of Western culture are not really prevailing in Japanese society. So my question is, what's the reason behind that? They were very open minded to learn in ancient time from China, but they are not that open minded that you learn from the West in the modern society.

Elizabeth Perry: Okay. So why Buddhism but not Christianity?


Elizabeth Perry: Okay, we could take one more question. I think maybe two more. And then, one right there on the edge. And then, where's the microphone? So one over here please.

Cindy: Wait til it goes there.

Elizabeth Perry: Well, all right, we'll just go if you have your hand up there. I did want to go that way but we're losing... Yeah, it's okay. Sorry.

Satoshi: Thank you for your presentation. I'm Satoshi, a first year student at the college. And from my name I'm Japanese and I'm ethnically Chinese. So really interested to hear all of your stories. My question is that, so in order for the Sino-Japan relations to go forward, I think the attribution of the responsibility of the World War II is a very big issue. So my question is, so what Japan can right now do in terms of policy, in terms of education, to kind of settle this historical tension about the responsibility of the consequences of the World War II.

Elizabeth Perry: Okay. So I think a final question over here and then we'll turn back to our panelists.

Nuri Skata: My name is Noriyuki Shikata. I'm a Japanese diplomat. I was based in Beijing until three weeks ago. My question relates to the period that Professor Vogel was talking about, especially as related to the last period, the most modern one between 1978 and 1992. And my question is what do you think is the reason
why it ended in 1992? And there is some reference in your book about the
issues of the end of the Cold War and the concerns inside Chinese Communist
Party about the impact on the Chinese society.

Nuri Skata: In the meanwhile, as is referred to in the book, there was a reference to
Japanese diplomatic engagement in terms of trying to lift sanctions, Western
sanctions, against China, and also preparation for Japanese Emperor's visit to
China that time. So it was 1990 to 1992. So what do you think were the major
reasons which may be originating from the Chinese societal or governmental
backgrounds that kind of finished that period? And delve into this patriotic
education and so forth.

Elizabeth Perry: Okay. Thank you all very much. So I think I'm first going to-

Ezra Vogel: Can I jump in on all those?

Elizabeth Perry: Of course. You can answer whatever you want Ezra. But I thought I would give
you the last word. So maybe letting your colleagues first jump in and then-

Paula Harrell: I think we all could jump in.

Ezra Vogel: Paula's not going to let me do it.

Elizabeth Perry: Go right, go right ahead.

Paula Harrell: So we'll just jump if we have anything to say.

Ezra Vogel: They're all great questions and I could go on for all the rest of the time on any
one of those. But the role of the United States, I think that, and this also
answers Skata's question, what happened in '92. I think that after the
Tiananmen incident, Deng felt we needed patriotic education. And there was
patriotic education. It wasn't particularly anti-Japanese when it started in the
early 90's. It started by 1992. But then I think people found that what was most
effective in patriotic education was the anti-Japanese because there were so
many vivid memories of World War II. And so many people who hated the
Japanese, and the Japanese had done so many horrible things that people knew
about, that in the 1990s, I think the anti-Japanese mood took off because of
that.

Ezra Vogel: And so I think that the anti-Japanese mood, say if you're a leader and worried
about the loyalty of your people under you, whether they're going to be unified,
having an anti-foreign, anti-Japanese, feeling is not such a horrible thing. It's not
the worst thing in the world.

Ezra Vogel: Now, of course, what's happened is the US-China relationship is so bad. That in
a sense we're taking the place of Japan. And I think if you were at Chinese
patriot now and you wanted to stir up patriotism, you could talk about some of the things that the United States is doing and you don't need Japan quite as much. So I think-

Paula Harrell: And you can show movies of the Korean War instead. And that's what's going on.

Ezra Vogel: That is what's going on. And so, for patriotic education in China now it's more turned at the United States, and that in a way relieves Japan.

Ezra Vogel: You know, the, there's so many questions now how Japan is going to survive in this very complicated new era. My own thinking is that China is bigger and stronger militarily, and has 10 times as many people, and Japan can never have enough people to match that. And I think they will, therefore, keep the security relationship with the United States. They will try to find the thing that would cause the Chinese not to want to attack them and have preparation for that. But I think that the Alliance with the United States will stay there.

Ezra Vogel: But in the trade war now, a lot of the products that China has trouble getting the United States without big tariffs have Japanese components. So if you're a Japanese manufacturer in China, you have a lot of goods now that are in Chinese products. So your identity is with the Chinese because your products are being taxed by the United States.

Ezra Vogel: So I think that many Japanese intellectuals have wanted to play a go-between between the United States and China, and we've had so many direct contacts, and we think we are so important that Japan really hasn't played that role. But I think that there is a little bit of a role now that may be emerging where Japan could begin to do some things to sort of work with China and work with the United States. I think that they're not going to be as anti-Chinese as we are at this stage unless something really big happens.

Ezra Vogel: On the question of learning from Russia and learning from the Japan. One of the interesting things is, of course, in the Manchurian period after 1949, because a lot of the factories in Manchuria, of course, had been built by the Japanese. I mean they were built by the Japanese, overwhelmingly.

Ezra Vogel: And those factories then became the basis for Russian industry. The First Five Year Plan was very heavily in the Northeast and a lot of those factories. And a lot of the big race after 1945 was who's going to take over those factories, and the implements, and the technology that were left in the Northeast by the Japanese. Was it going to be the Communists, the Nationalists, or the Russians, who carried a lot of this stuff back there? But I think that by the 1960's and 70's, after the Chinese felt so upset at the Russian advice, that it wasn't...
evaluation by the 1970’s is that it was a terrible thing, the Russians were all awful. And I think that for a lot of those people who wanted the market economy and a more modern, higher technology, that Japan seemed far superior to the Soviet Union. And the technology by the 70’s and 80’s when they really began learning from Japan.

Ezra Vogel: And the question of whether why Japan has not learned from the West way they learned from China. I disagree with that one. I was in Japan in the late 50’s and 1960’s and everybody was learning from the United States. Everything, all ages, everybody wanted to get the latest way of doing things from the United States. So, as Liz says, they didn’t adopt Christianity in a big way, but I think American way of life, technology, markets, television, and so forth was very heavily influenced.

Ezra Vogel: The question of 1992, what happened? That year was really more interesting than... I think not enough historians have given the fact that one time the Japanese emperor visited China in the whole history of these 1,500 years, 1992. And that was the year and it went very well.

Ezra Vogel: You know, the emperor during World War II, of course, would never be welcomed because so closely associated with that. But by the time you have a new emperor come in after, then by 1992 a new emperor had come in and that was the first time it can be done. And for the Chinese who were trying to have closer interaction with other countries and knew that Japanese guilt over what they’d done in World War II and desire to establish relations, that Japan was more willing to have close contacts than many countries of the world. It was a useful ploy on the part of Chinese leadership, to be more part of the international community, was to get the emperor to visit. And the visit did go very well. I think it got lost in history because the relationships became worse again not long thereafter. But it was a very important milestone and a really very helpful thing.

Ezra Vogel: And as I say, there were a lot of things that happened in the 90’s that made that initial period... I mean the Japanese aid did not stop. But the reason I use that periodization is because it was so heavy and so critical in that early period from 1978 to ’92. And after that, the anti-Japanese moods became much more pronounced. And so that’s why I use that periodization.

Ezra Vogel: Thank you. Paula, you want to?

Paula Harrell: Oh, just one point on learning from the West. But this was really the hallmark of the Meiji period, using Western models. And it’s kind of interesting because it’s usually characterized as students going to Japan and Japan acting as a channel for Western knowledge. But I think it varied tremendously. There were a lot of young people who realized that what they should learn, and they were told this by their Japanese mentors in many cases, was open-mindedness. In other words, don’t do as we did necessarily, but that imitation always involves in
innovation, to use the title of Eleanor Westney’s wonderful book, and that what people were impressed with, many of the Chinese, was the fact that Japanese had managed to experiment with a number of different models and come out with an Asian Western model, say in education and many other fields. I think that’s one point that some very important to remember. It’s too easy.

Paula Harrell: There were perceptions on the part of some Chinese that, well, they could surpass Japan very easily and it was just a question of picking up some knowledge. There was that attitude too. But I think more subtly, many realized that these innovations, particularly in the school system, were after a period of experimentation on various models.

Paula Harrell: You didn't talk about the question of the history problem and how to overcome it. Well, I have a good suggestion.

Ezra Vogel: Okay.

Paula Harrell: Your book should be mandatory.

Ezra Vogel: That will work. That will work.

Paula Harrell: It's going to be translated into Japanese, right?

Richard Dyck: Yes.

Ezra Vogel: A Nikkei is coming out very shortly.

Paula Harrell: Yeah.

Ezra Vogel: The Chinese version is coming out in the Hong Kong with the Chinese University Press.

Paula Harrell: Right.

Ezra Vogel: We don't know what Mainland is going to do.

Paula Harrell: Yes.

Ezra Vogel: Their censors will have to examine and decide what portions are worthy of publication. So we don't know that yet. But it will be in Chinese and those who want to read it in Chinese will find it from the Chinese University Press. Rick, did you want to?

Richard Dyck: Yeah. I might have a slightly different perspective. I'm on the board of Hitachi Chemicals, which is a large Japanese company. By the way, our footprint in China is bigger than our footprint in Japan. We have four employees in China-
Ezra Vogel: Our Hitachi, Our Hitachi.

Richard Dyck: What?

Ezra Vogel: Our, meaning Hitachi.

Richard Dyck: That's right.


Richard Dyck: Well, it's a global company. I'm a director.

Ezra Vogel: Yeah, yeah.

Richard Dyck: So in one way the Japanese business community is sort of rooting for Lighthizer and what's happening in Washington, because it is true that, for example, the Japanese automobile investment in automobile-related investment in China is huge. But the automobile companies all had to do joint ventures. They couldn't go in 100 percent. If they could go in 100 percent it would be much easier.

Richard Dyck: But in general, I think, and I go to China almost once a month visiting various [inaudible 01:24:10]. In general, I think that whatever the problems are between China and Japan, that on a corporate level, where local governments are so important, that we are treated fairly. It hasn't always been true. But I think we are not necessarily discriminated-

Ezra Vogel: Are you meaning Japanese companies?

Richard Dyck: Japanese companies. I'm talking about Hitachi. If I were an Indian here talking about Microsoft, would you be confused? So why can't an American talk about Hitachi?

Ezra Vogel: I just want to make it absolutely clear.

Richard Dyck: I will say one place where it sort of... We have a large factory in [Muchaka 01:24:54] and I was visiting there last year with three of my Japanese colleagues. I was there and our Chinese manager of the factory who was there, who happened to be a Chinese lady. And she said, after dinner, "Let's go out for foot massage." And so we all go out and we're on these chaise lounge. We're getting our foot massages. So there, there's the Chinese lady there, the three Japanese, there's me. There's a big LCD screen in front of us. And guess what they were showing? They were showing us one of those Japanese dramas, the aggressive invasion by China. And we're sitting there and everybody's shutting up. I couldn't do it. I asked, "Would you please change the channel?" So now
they're going to be Korean invasion and maybe Japanese will get off the hook. But they were so pervasive.

Richard Dyck: But I will say for our foreign operations... One thing you have to think about in Japan is there's another, like, 60 percent of the Japanese economy that's not in the Japanese archipelago. And you can go to the Bank of Japan website and then you get a chart that shows repatriation of profits and dividends for overseas. That will give you some idea of the Japanese footprint outside of Japan. It's huge.

Richard Dyck: So if you go to Indonesia, if you go to Hanoi, if you go to... Usually in the industrial parks, they're mainly Japanese companies. Very few Chinese companies are yet manufacturing overseas, except for some white good companies.

Richard Dyck: But one thing for our subsidiaries in China, a surprising number of our staff have studied at Japanese universities and we can hold meetings in Japanese in China. That's not true in Malaysia. It's not true in Indonesia. In Thailand, the Japanese presence is huge, but generally meetings are held in English. It's difficult to hold.

Richard Dyck: So you know, the presence in China is big. It used to be that when... what was it? The American economy sneezes and Japanese catch a cold. But I noticed yesterday there was a pessimistic report about the China economy that came out and the Nikkei Dow went down today. And the companies that went down were like Shiseido and so forth that depend on the Chinese market. So that relationship now is almost like the relationship between the US and Japan, say, in the 1980's. Just China's overwhelmingly important.

Elizabeth Perry: So we all have to keep healthy economies. So thank you all very much for your attention. We've had, I think, very stimulating presentations. There were lots of questions that I wasn't able to get to. So again, you are all warmly invited to join the speakers just outside in the concourse here for a reception. Please join me in thanking Ezra-