Ezra Vogel: Well, it's my great pleasure to welcome you now to an international session, connecting Moscow with Harvard University. And we're very fortunate to have with us today, two leaders from Moscow, Alex Lukin and Olga Puzanova who will talk to us on the issue of whether completing the Russian Chinese border issues can be useful for dealing with the Russia Japanese issues. Now that we're in a Zoom era, it makes it much easier for us to connect with Russia. We were hoping that Alex and Olga were gonna be here in person, but then with coronavirus, we had to transport them, let them return, be in Moscow and get to us by Zoom. I would like to start off today by welcoming the Director of the Fairbank Center. Mike Szonyi who's been a great supporter of our series and the programs of Fairbank Center. We'd like to say a few words on behalf of the Fairbank Center. Mike, it's yours.

Michael Szonyi: Thanks very much, Ezra. We can hear me?

Ezra Vogel: Yes.

Michael Szonyi: Great. Thanks, Ezra. Ezra asked me to what to say a few words and I'm actually really happy that he did. I just wanna just take a moment to, first of all, say hello to the Fairbank Center community, ordinarily we would be meeting in person with sort of end of semester events. And since that's not happening, I thought this would be a good chance just to give my best wishes to all of you for continued health, continued good spirits and for good wishes to manage as best we can in these difficult circumstances. I also wanna say a really heartfelt thank you to Ezra Vogel, to Bill Show, and to Bill Overholt, the coordinators of the critical issues in contemporary China series. They were very, very quick to respond to the demands of this complicated circumstance situation and recognizing how important these programs are to work with us, to get them online. And I also especially wanna thank the Fairbank Center staff in particular, Mark Grady and Nick Drake who have really gone above and beyond to sort out the technical issues that make events like today possible. We are trying to move as much programming online as possible. These are difficult times, but certainly important times for public engagement on China, on the US China relationship, on Chinese responses to COVID-19 and so on. And you can look forward to a busy summer of online programming from the Fairbank Center in collaboration with other centers at Harvard and beyond. Olga was just saying that we can't, it's not quite the same as meeting in person, but one of the nice things about technology is that it does allow us to address a larger group address, a larger audience, Olga and Alex just got off a Zoom conference with a speaker from Australia. I just got off a webinar in Beijing. So we're able to communicate more globally as a result of the use of technology. We're also able to communicate to a much larger audience and the very large audience for previous Fairbank Center events has really been very heartening in addition to saying hello and giving my best wishes to our community, I also wanna welcome new viewers who are joining us virtually for the first time and hope that you will continue to participate in our programs as they develop. These really are, as I said, difficult and challenging times where knowledge about China and knowledge about China's role in the world is just so important. We
are happy to do our bit to draw together experts and get them in conversation with one another.
And so we hope that you will appreciate this and benefit from this and join us. That's all I wanna say. I am so looking forward to hearing Alex and Olga, speak to us from Moscow, let me now turn things back to Ezra to give them a formal introduction. Once again, please, on behalf of the whole Fairbank Center team, except my best wishes for good health and continued engagement with the important work we're all doing to better understand China. Thanks, Ezra.

Ezra Vogel: Thank you so much, Michael. I think those of us at the Fairbank Center and somebody like me has been around for a long time realizes how lucky we are to have Mike Szonyi and assisted by Dan Murphy in the Fairbank Center. Mike is a fine historian of the Ming dynasty, especially, but also a great deep interest in that contemporary field. So we're very lucky to have his support for the program. There's also today kind of an Oxford connection because our speaker Alex Lukin got his PhD at Oxford and Olga is just completing her PhD at Oxford, and Mike Szonyi got his PhD in Oxford, so we're linking Oxford and Moscow and Harvard today. The first time I visited the Soviet Union was 1980. It had been Fairbank's idea to keep very much in touch with the scholars of China around the world. And he made a special point of trying to keep in touch with the leaders of Chinese studies and felt it was very important, but those days we operated by mail, before the internet, didn't have Zoom. And I think it's really a great advance that we will be able to realize with Zoom, a kind of dream of having closer cooperation between scholars in China around the world. And I think we're very fortunate for that. The first time I visited the Soviet Union was 1980. And at that time, Robert Scalapino and Primakov had a headin annual session where they invited a number of Russian and number of Americans scholars together, working on Asia to be in to exchange views. And I was privileged to be part of that in 1980. And there I met a young scholar, one young scholar named Vladimir Lukin who is very promising. I thought that he was very open and one of the bright young stars. And then he went on to be ambassador to the United States and also head of the foreign policy committee of the Duma. And he had a son named Alex and he wanted to make sure that Alex got very good training in Asian studies. And Alex, he did, he studied in Moscow, got a PhD there, he got a PhD at Oxford. And he spent, got an MA at the Kennedy School. And so we were very privileged to have him at Harvard. And he is now a key link between Asian studies in Russia and the rest of the world. And we feel very fortunate that he was willing to take the time to join us today. The topic we're working on today is the experience of Russia and China working over the border and how that might affect, or be a model for relations, that and discussions that Russia and Japan are having over their border issues. So without further ado, Alex, it's yours.

Nick Drake: Ezra, I'd like to jump in just briefly to describe-

Ezra Vogel: Mark, I should call on you to explain how we'll do the question period. Yes, Mark?

Nick Drake: So, so-

Ezra Vogel: Oh, yes, yes.
Nick Drake: If you've all joined us before for critical issues, you're aware of how we do questions and answers. If you have a question, please submit it view via the Q&A box, which should be in your menu bar for Zoom. If you have questions during the talk, please feel free to send them otherwise you can send them during the Q&A section. If you wish, you can send questions anonymously, if not, please provide your name and any affiliation that you have. And I'll read that out as I read the question. We usually get more questions than we can ask in the allotted time. So my apologies, if we don't get to your question, we'll be kind of just picking them randomly from the total ones that come in. Thank you very much.

Ezra Vogel: Thank you, Nick, and now, Alex, it's all yours.

Alexander Lukin: Yes. Thank you very much. It's a great honor to be a speaker at Fairbank Center. I have not met Professor Fairbank, but I remember that his book "The Chinese World Order" was the major book that I used for my graduation thesis in university. Also, I met some other people whom Professor Vogel mentioned like Robert Scalapino, once even met him in Los, I remember. So let me tell you some things about the idea of a talk. First, we are not going to speak about the pandemic. Not because we're not interested in it, but because we prepared it before it and we wanted to present it in person, but we decided to do it now because such various unlucky circumstances should not infringe our, or some somehow block our academic activities, I think. So we should disregard them and go on. So our idea was to study if the experience of solving of Russian Chinese or before the Soviet Chinese, or before that again, Russian Chinese territorial dispute, which was being there for more than 100 years and finally was sold into the 2004. If it could be a model for solving other territorial dispute, namely, in this case, a Russian Japanese territorial dispute or at least suggest some ideas for solving other territorial dispute. So first, I'm going to talk about saying the Russian border dispute settlement and suggest some ideas or lessons of it. And then Olga, who is an expert on Japan is going to talk about Russian Japanese dispute and the possibility of using this Russian Chinese dispute. So here you see the map of the two countries. Let's see, this is the map of what it says, Manchuria Soviet Union boundary, but it's, well, you can call it China, but at that time, and when the map was done, it was majority probably Manchuria, but it does matter because it shows the two major pieces of land that were acquired by the Russian Empire in the 19th century in the second half according to Aigun Treaty and Beijing Treaty. Well, this like grayish part is the Aigun Treaty, and the red or pink part is where Vladivostok is, the city of Vladivostok. This part was acquired by Russia in 1860 according to Beijing Treaty. Well, you can say that it was acquired from China or not. It was seen empire at that time. So this part actually was not a part of, for example, Ming China, but it was part of Manchurian. Well, the Manchurians used to claim that it was kind of their territory, but because there was no concept of border or clear concept of border that time, it's not very clear, but anyway, Russia acquired it from somebody, let's say. This is the picture, actually a Chinese picture of signing the Treaty of Beijing in 1860. So you see all these foreigners here. And this is the map, unfortunately I couldn't get it in color because it's about the so called red line. So what is the red line? Which became the major problem between the two countries. The treaty itself did not, well, it talked about the border, but it didn't say where the border exactly was, namely, it didn't say which bank of the river or where in the river or the two rivers the border was. So it only said that the border was, that the two rivers were the border, the Amur, or Heilong Jiang river, and the River Volga. But it was also drawn or somebody you drew a red line on the map, which was on the
Chinese bank. So Russians after that claimed that this was the real boarder on the Chinese bank. And the Chinese position was that this red line was not part of the treaty. So the border should be somewhere between the Russian and Chinese bank. So the delimitation of the border which started immediately after signing the treaty was not completed by 1917 before the revolution in Russia happened. After that, this were very kind of unstable time in both Russia and later the Soviet Union and China. So during this unstable times, the Soviet Union took effective control of the river and the islands of the river claiming that the actual border was the Chinese bank on the The Amur, Heilong Jiang river and the Ussuri, see the Chinese name here. And so later when communists came to power, before communists came to power, China was too busy with many things and various Chinese governments were too busy to have border talks, but after communists came to power in China, their relations with the Soviet Union were very good. So first decade, they were not ready to have any talks about border issues, but later when relations became worse, which any side put, decided to put some questions to the Soviet side. In 1964, the border talks began. And it is interesting that already then during the first period of the talk in 1964, not many people know that, the Soviet Union already agreed to the thalweg principle, which means that the border is not the Chinese bank, but the middle of the primary navigator navigable channel or over the waterway, which is well inside the river. It could be in the middle of the river. It depends on where the water is, but it's surely not by the Russian or Chinese bank. And this was the most usual, usually used international principle, but not the only one, because there are various kinds of settlements, but the Soviet Union basically agreed on that. But unfortunately, the talks collapsed because of Mao Zedong made this famous statement during, well, not during the talk, but at the time of the talks. And when he met a Japanese delegation of the Japanese Socialist Party famously said that the Soviet Union has not paid the check for getting China's territory in the 19th century. So it was not a direct claim on the Soviet territory, but kind of a hint that such a claim can be made. And Khrushchev, the Soviet leader at that time was very angry and he stopped the talks. So basically the talks collapsed. So the situation was very interesting that on the one side, the Soviet Union basically agreed on the Chinese demand, but because the talks collapsed, there was no way of doing the delimitation of going ahead with the delimitation of the new border line, which led to clashes and the famous clash was on Damansky island, there were other clashes. or Zhenbao Dao in Chinese. There were other clashes in Kazakhstan, but because Kazakhstan now is Russia is not Russia. It's not relevant for us. And so the this is... This is the picture of Damansky or Zhenbao Dao Island. So you can see that actually the clash was absolutely unreasonable. It is very clear from this picture that it should have gone to China anyway. Because if you say that the board, if somewhere in the middle of the river, surely should go to China. And the Soviet Union, basically they agreed to that. So if it was not for Mao Zedong and the talks continues, the agreement could have been reached already in the 1960s, but for political reasons that could not happen. So the Soviet Union effectively controlled this island and Chinese wanted to get it. And it led to clashes. Here, you see, on the other map where it's actually situated. So here you see on this pictures, the Chinese troops, which were trying to get the island from the Soviet Union and you see the Russian troops. There's other interesting wooden forks that the Russian border guards used at first, because there were no shooting the first stage in early March, 1969. So they kind of push them with posts, the Chinese soldiers from the Russian territory, with this forks. Something similar happened in Bhutan not long ago with, but without the forks, it was like pushing battle, but then it came to shooting, finally, and here you see Soviet tank captured, and they're BM-21 Grad rocket launcher, which was actually a secret weapon. And the Soviet Union used it for the
first time during this clash. So because Soviet Union had, of course a superiority in military superiority, the clashes did not lead to any result for China, but there were casualties. The Soviet Union lost 58 people. This official figure. Here you see in the funeral of them, which was a big event in the area. And here these are Chinese soldiers, and very brave. Before the battle, it says yi qie fan dong pai dou shi zhi lao hu. So all the counter-revolutionary forces, paper tigers, reactionary forces. So, but here you see the grave of Chinese heroes. We don't know, perhaps some of these people are lying there. There is no exact figure of Chinese casualties, but there are estimates. It's something between 100 and 300. So in 1969, Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin famously stopped at Beijing Airport and had talks with Zhou Enlai, Prime Minister of China. And they agreed on ceasefire and basically easing of tensions at the border, and a new round of talks started, but because of bad relations between two countries, nothing happened during these talks until the normalization of relations. So between 69 and late '80s, of course a lot of things happened. First, China began normalization with the United States and called for a united front against China and because of the, against the Soviet Union. And because of that, of course, relations even worsened and talks also formally were going on, they could not lead to any positive result. Then, but in '82, China launched independent foreign policy became kind of the idea was that it was not trying to form a united front against anybody. And because of that relations with the Soviet Union, with Moscow, began to improve. Also at that time China put three big obstacles as the precondition to normalization with the Soviet Union. These three obstacles were deployment of Soviet troops in Mongolia, the excessive militarization of the Soviet Chinese border in China demand the demilitarization of it. And the Soviet support of Vietnam and Vietnamese occupation of Campuchia at that time. The Soviet occupational Afghanistan or invasion of Afghanistan was another obstacle. You might call it fourth obstacle. So at the same time because of a new course of Beijing, foreign policy, the border was slowly opened and there were some exchange of goods. And three big obstacles after Gorbachev came to power were removed. Not because Gorbachev was making concessions specifically to China, but because this was kind of in line with his general policies. So between '88 and '99, the cross border commerce between Russia and the Heilongjiang province increased threefold, and the number of legal Chinese workers in the Russia increased to 18,000. So the bilateral trade and economic cooperation was growing. In '89, Gorbachev famously went to China and met Deng Xiaoping, and Deng Xiaoping said that we should close down the future, forget about the past and open a new perspective for relations. When the Soviet Union collapsed after some hesitation in early '90s, the cooperation between Russia and China continued. I just listed several important agreements that were more, of course, at that time, for example, agreement on border management system intended to facilitate border trade and hinder criminal activity was signed in '94, there was an agreement on confidence building measures, actually two agreements of '96 and '97, which led to the demilitarization of border. Then a joint declaration on a multipolar world, and the establishment of a new international order was signed in '97. We showed that China's Russia's worldview were becoming similar. There were similar positions on regional conflict. Shanghai Cooperation Organization was formed in 2001, which became a platform of discussion and coordination of the policies of the two countries in central Asia. By 2023, China became Russia's full fourth trading partner and Russia, the eighth partner of China, bilateral trade quadrupled from about $6 billion to more than 21. Finally in 2001, a framework Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation was signed. So according to this treaty here, the strategic corporate relations of good neighborliness, friendship and cooperation were established. Both countries agreed that
they did not have any territorial claims, it's expanded and deepened confidence building measures, and many other things. So against this... A Soviet agreement on the eastern part of the border were signed in '91 in May '91, just before the collapse of the Soviet Union. So the thalweg principle was again confirmed. Islands between the thalweg line and the Chinese bank were transferred to China or were bound to transfer to China. Freedom of navigation in the bordering rivers. The border rivers, Amur, Heilong Jiang, Ussury. Ussury jiang in Chinese and Tuman tumanjiang was established, and the problem which was left unsolved was the problem of three disputed islands, which are Bolshoy Ussuriysky and Tarabarov in the Amur River and Bolshoy in the Argun River. So this is the picture of how Zhenbaodao or a formerly Damansky looks now, is absolutely Chinese. We have this Chinese buildings and Chinese probably passport, or some other control. So Zhenbaodao went to China. And now we come to the 2004 solution. It took from 1991 to 2004, 13 more years, just to discuss these three islands that were left. And here we can see Russian and Chinese islands. They were basically, there is a general idea that they would divide it 50/50, but that's not exactly correct, because there were really tough talks on every square kilometer. So we can see that the two islands, well, one island went completely to China and another, other two were divided. So Tarabarov island, 80 kilometers, square kilometers and went to China, and 174, this is the biggest, this Bolshoy Ussuriysky island, the Bolshoy Ussuriysky island, the biggest part of it went to Russia, which is 164 kilometers, but 80 square kilometers of it. Plus the entire smaller island after Tarabarov which was 43, went to China, which is a bit less than 174. And why is that? Because another island, the third island, which is Bolshoy island on the Amur River was divided and the largest part of it went to China. You see 57 square kilometers and a bit more were divided between the two countries, 34 went to China and 23 went to Russia. So it's about 50/50 but not exactly. the talks were tough. And here that these are pictures of these divided islands, the Bolshoy Ussuriysky islands or Heixiazi in Chinese. This, you see a Russian part, Chinese part. Russian bridge and Chinese bridge. Chinese bridge of course looks more impressive, but Russian bridge is also not that bad. So here I come to some conclusions, well, first the territorial solution became the result of the general improvement of relations. Not the other way round. Second, talks were going for a long time four decades from '64, and brought results only when relations became close while the territorial issue turned into a minor... When the tutorial issue turned into a minor unwanted obstacle on the way of further cooperation. So it is probably difficult to solve such a big issue first, but when it becomes a minor obstacles, both countries decide to solve it somehow. So every time relations improved, it has positive influence on border talks, but every time relations worsened, the talks stalled and it had never of course had negative impact on them. But when we compare both situations with Japan, of course, there are also several differences. First Russian, Chinese dispute, is a result of a long history of relationship while the Russo-Japanese dispute is a result of the Second World War. China was an ally of the Soviet Union and Japan was an enemy. Second, Japan is a close ally of the United States and China world was closed at the time to the United States, but has never been an ally of the United States. Third, the Southern Kurils, or Northern territories, have significant Russian population while those disputed islands between Russia and China did not have population, a permanent population at all, just several dachas of some leaders, of local leaders. Then the fourth, since Russia clearly stressed that the islands belonged to its territory, in case of a compromise settlement. It cannot claim that it is not transferring territory to Japan, but just delimiting the border. In the case of China, the Russian position was that it were not actually talks on the border, but on the delimitation of the border. In the Japanese case, it would be very difficult to
claim that because the border is very clear where it is now. So, and also there was a war between the US and Japan. They have never been border clashes between the two countries, just like the clashes we saw in Zhenbaodao. In Zhenbaodao or in Kazakhstan. So I'll stop here and now Olga's going to continue.

Olga Puzanova: Thank you very much. May I ask you to continue shifting though?

Alexander Lukin: Okay.

Olga Puzanova: Thank you.

Alexander Lukin: But then you'll have to tell me every time what to do.

Olga Puzanova: Yeah. Okay. So thank you very much, Alexander and good evening, everyone. Good evening. I say evening 'cause it's eight p.m. in Moscow and I'm having an evening coffee. Thank you very much to the organizers for the opportunity to present at this seminar. It's a great honor for me. I'm not going to talk about my life story as it's unremarkable, apart from the two episodes when I met Professor Vogel in Harvard and in Washington, I believe. And we also had a seminar of our own with Professor Vogel just the other day. So now it almost looks like there's a sort of exchange going on. I can also see some familiar names among the participants, but I can't see your faces. Thank you all very much for your time anyway. I'll try to be more concise in order to leave more time for discussion. So Russo Japanese border dispute. Vladimir Putin and Shinzō Abe met, I believe 27 times altogether, and the last one was at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok. The long standing dispute between the two continued to be an issue, but the dialogue also showed that the two are willing to emphasize strategic importance of strengthening political and economic relations between the two countries and work on the joint projects and so forth. The territorial dispute didn't really come up to an extent that the issue became that the populations of both countries have lost faith in the matter ever reaching a productive resolution. So according to recent polls, three quarters of the Japanese do not believe in any progress achievable in negotiations, yet they think that the negotiations should be continued in order to either return the territories to Japan or compromise on the transfer of the islands of Kunashir and Iturup immediately. And the talks continuing over the other two islands in the future. So that's 40% of the population. At the same time, the overwhelming majority of Russians against even considering the transfer of territories to Japan. And as Alexander pointed out, the actual population of the Kuril Islands is itself almost wholly united against the notion as they're all Russian, and, or mostly. So experts have argued that putting an end to disagreements with Russia over the islands, so would enable Abe's government to pursue a more independent foreign policy line. This has indeed been one of his key goals, especially when he was proposing a referendum on article nine. It could have resulted in all sorts of interesting developments. However, now there is a likely change of leadership in Japan with Abe possibly withdrawing his candidacy from the next election, a transition to power should have happened when he stepped down in the fall of 2021, but obviously the pandemic and the resulting postponement of the Olympics have drastically altered all the calculations. But nonetheless, regardless of who becomes new leader, a strong relationship with one of the region's largest actors would certainly help balance out nearby growing China and its worrisome influence that Japan is concerned about. So this is something
that Tokyo has voiced concerns about, particularly in recent years, especially after China, overtook Japan and became the second largest economy in the world, ending a four-decade long reign and taking the number two spot that Japan occupied. So Russia for its part could also potentially use a solid partner in Asia in order to counter the accusations that it's turned to the East is in essence, actually turned to Beijing. So the reality is that both could actually benefit from this partnership. However, ending this territorial tug of war wouldn't necessarily lead to a breakthrough in bilateral relations. We're not sure who the new leader will be. And a lot will depend on that obviously, but the current dynamics between Russia and Japan present this kind of chicken and egg dilemma, is it the territorial dispute that holds back the two from strengthening and diversifying cooperation? Or is it the ties themselves that need a major boost and a series of mutual concessions before they can be any progress? So Alexander and I argue that it's the latter. So the relations need a boost. And in this respect, it's quite meaningful that Alexander drew on a case of another long-standing dispute in the region, which was successfully resolved. Now, I'm by no means suggesting that there is a sort of triangular dynamics going on here. However, I suppose it can be used as an example. So the Russian Japanese territorial problems certainly has differences with the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Russian one. So just to look at history a little bit, so due to the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda which established the borders between the two empires, Japan officially used to have control over, Kunashir, Iturup, Habomai and Shikotan, while the remaining Kuril Islands, they went to Russia and the status of Sakhalin was undetermined. The Treaty of Saint Petersburg of 1875 confirmed that Sakhalin was Russian territory and that all the Kuril Islands including the now-disputed four islands, once again belonged to Japan. Now, this wasn't a great trade deal using Trump language, because Sakhalin was practically Russian territory anyway, but either way. So according to this treaty, Sakhalin de jure now belonged to Russia. And there was the treaty of Portsmouth as well, obviously at the end of the Russo-Japanese War that gave Japan the southern part of Sakhalin as well. So I think it's the next line there. After the defeat in the Second World War, Japan had to renounce all its occupied territory under the Treaty of San Francisco, 1951 with the Allies. They renounced all claim to the Kuril Islands as well as the other possessions that included Sakhalin for instance. And the Soviet Union incorporated the Kurils including the isles of Kunashir, Iturup, Habomai, and Shikotan into its territory, deported the existing Japanese population. However, Japan did not really recognize this four islands as being part of the Kurils and claimed them back. So the diplomatic ties between the two were restored by the Soviet-Japanese joint declaration of 1956. I believe it's the next slide as well. And there was a few clauses. The first one clearly express the joint will of both countries to end the war. It said the state of war between the USSR and Japan on the date on which the declaration enters into force. This fact is quite frequently left out when experts provide historical background on the dispute, implying that the state of war between the two countries has not formally finished. And there was an article nine as well of the document that also express the will of the USSR to cede the Habomai islands and the islands of Shikotan, but the states, that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will only take place after the conclusion of the peace treaty between the USSR and Japan. However, as we know, the treaty was never signed, the main reason for that was the treaty of mutual cooperation security between the US and Japan, according to Moscow, that changed the strategic situation in the region and made the original pledge void. The US put pressure on Japan as well, and advised against a territorial compromise with Moscow under the threat of terminating economic aid and retaining Okinawa. Now, another reason was arguably growing nationalism in Japan. The Japanese government is
often accused of not being very consistent in denouncing its military past, oftentimes at the expense of healthy relations with its partners in East Asia. Experts claim that certain anxious episodes of wartime history are understated or covered up. And there was a Russian diplomat called Vitaly Vorotnikov who participated in the Sino-Soviet, sign a Russian border dispute resolution who argued that a dominant narrative in Japanese post-war policymaking was the victimization of Japan at the hands of the rest of the world. So the territorial dispute in this sense fits well in this framework. And it has sort of become a national symbol of unfair treatment by the winners of the war. This explains why Japan often uses the phrase returning the isles and restoring justice in the world order. For Russia, as a successor of the Soviet Union, ceding the territories would obviously mean the opposites of justice. It would be revising the results of the war as a potentially dangerous practice and could lead to problems. That is not only with Japan, that is, but also other places of the world. So I think it's the next one, yeah. At present, Russia is, seems to be ready for a compromise. Its official position is to hold dialogue based on the joint declaration, the Sino-Soviet, pardon, Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956. And the Sino-Russian model here actually shows that specific border arrangements can be negotiable depending on the circumstances. But one thing is clear. Nobody gets all or nothing. Therefore this, yeah, this is what Putin referred to as the hikiwake principle on multiple occasions as well, which means that it's a draw. Nobody gets everything. There's no clear winner or loser in this situation. Japan's position, however, so I think it's the next slide as well. Japan's position here suggests quite little desire to compromise, and Tokyo demands that Moscow, well frequently demands, that Moscow recognizes Japanese sovereignty over all four islands all transferred to Japan immediately and continued negotiations on the remaining two. So the position has already resulted in failure on multiple occasions, the most recent one being in December, 2016 in Yamaguchi. Now more recently, it seems that the general approach under Abe has shifted slightly. So there was a statement in Osaka during the meeting with Putin in 2019 was another indication of that. Tokyo seemed at that point, more inclined to support Moscow's approach and Lavrov was also, well Lavrov clearly formulated his position in 2019 when he said that any agreements should be supported and accepted by people in parliaments of Russia and Japan. And he also said that the path to improving. The path to improving relations between the two countries, allies in comprehensive development and cooperation in all areas. And so this is the kind of approach that also enabled Russia to resolve its issues with China. And according to some, it might even influence other border disputes such as the Sino-Indian one, and it already led to significant growth in bilateral trade. For instance, and prudent political dialogue between Moscow and Tokyo. The two country's leaders. They continue meeting, well, not in the current circumstances anyway, but they used to continue meeting and talking about fostering political dialogue in all spheres, including security and well, as I said, but bilateral trade was growing as well. The situation is still, even though there are all of these developments is still rather far from the ideal, but the overall trend is encouraging, I would say. When I presented in Tokyo in January, there were lots of participants who expressed a lot of hope regarding the potential resolution of the issue. But now, as I've said multiple times with the potential change of leadership in Japan, the prospects remain a bit of a mystery for us. But I would say with the current general stalemate in bilateral relations, settlement is unlikely to happen very soon, but we can hope for the best and we can ask the audience what they think. Thank you very much. That will be all.
Ezra Vogel: Thank you so much to both of you for giving us a very clear presentation. And I think I speak for many of us saying that we have not studied these issues in detail at all, and they're very appreciative that you laid the things out so clearly and so informative, and in such a scholarly way. I have two questions. One, I take your point that the improvement of relations is what lays the background for territorial disputes rather than the other way around. And given the fact that Japan now has begun to have doubts about the United States-led world order. Do you think that that context, that Japan being able to be less reliant on the United States will lead them to be somewhat more flexible in opening up and expanding relations with other country including Russia. And do you think that's a major factor in making the changes that would lead to border disputes? So that's the first question. The second question is, why is the border itself so important? Is it really a major geo-strategic issue or has that just become a symbol for other relationships or are there important geo-strategic reasons why those four islands are so important? So we'll start off with those two questions and then we'll throw it over to the audience.

Olga Puzanova: Can I start with the second one? Sorry. It sort of seems like it's more of a, it's a secret suggestion rather than a question. I think history always- Pardon? Oh, sorry. So yeah, so I think there's more often than several times in history it happens that certain disputes are being used for certain purposes. Let's put it this way. And I think it could be argued that this has become a symbol in the bilateral relations in a way, however, because of the negative connotation it's so closely associated with, I do think that both countries should work towards a possible resolution and maybe get rid of this sort of even stigma in a way I don't, I'm not even sure how to phrase it properly, but I think we should move towards overcoming this, whether it's a symbol or not. If Alexander has anything to add on that.

Alexander Lukin: Well, border issues sometimes are important and sometimes are not. It depends on the government, quite a lot. For example, in Japan, I'm quite sure that all these issues could have been solved right after the Second World War, but then Japan kind of, Japanese government began this kind of propaganda saying that because it basically lost the war, it had to fight for something. So, and it made this small issue, a big issue. And now it's very kind of part of Japanese national thinking. In Russia, it's the general idea that gaining more territory is good is still there. But I think that a strong leader like Putin, for example, can explain to its people the necessity of a settlement of he really wanted to, but he could not lose his face as Chinese people say, so he cannot give everything to Japan. There should be a settlement, right? like in the case of China, because in the case of China, there was a lot of criticism in the Russia of the deal, and even some criticism in China. Well, of course in China, it's difficult to find out, but still some people criticize it and you can, if you check the Chinese internet, you still can find some criticism over that deal. But democracy is not good here for solving such issues. Japan is probably too democratic for that.

Ezra Vogel: We're now open to further questions. So Nick, do you wanna take over and accept questions?

Nick Drake: Sure. I'll jump in here. So our first question that's common is from Don Wong, would the Åland Islands solution help solve the Russian Japanese border dispute? Both Japan and Russia played a role in that episode of history.
Olga Puzanova: That is the dispute between Sweden and Finland, right? No, I'm afraid we're not, especially some of that, but I believe it had mostly Swedish population, right?

Alexander Lukin: Frankly, we're not great experts on that. Also I know Olga lived in Finland for some time.

Olga Puzanova: Maybe do it as well. If I'm not mistaken, is that right? Or can we not hear the participants? I don't think.

Nick Drake: Yeah, we can't hear the participants, but I do have a notice in my chat that says that yes, this, that you're correct into which situation and my pronunciation may just be totally off too.

Alexander Lukin: You're a teacher actually.

Olga Puzanova: I think so. Yeah. So I spent a year in Finland as well, so. Unfortunately we didn't really study that subject very well, sorry.

Alexander Lukin: We wanted to use it in this Russian Chinese example for other disputes, like between China, India, for example.

Olga Puzanova: Oh, I thought maybe Professor Wong has a suggestion as to how exactly it could help. Maybe if we could ask her to speak or would that not be an option?

Nick Drake: We may be able to get something like that going here. Let's see.

Olga Puzanova: It's a shame because this is material for another article right there.

Nick Drake: Well, while we're figuring that out, I'll move on to another question and then maybe we can circle back. Peter Dutton says to what degree do you ascribe China's willingness to complete border negotiations with China, or with Russia to China's internal decision to advance in the maritime direction and to resolve border disputes, to shift resources from land power, to begin to develop naval power. What might your answer suggest about Japan?

Olga Puzanova: So do I understand it right that the essence of the question is that China's border dispute resolution was in a way an excuse for it to develop militarily? is this what Peter means?

Nick Drake: These are excellent questions.

Alexander Lukin: Well on it...

Nick Drake: We're trying to pull people in to ask questions. And so Peter says to shift resources here about, oh, he's just correcting a typo. Yeah, we're trying to pull people in to ask
the questions live since there's obviously some, it would be easier for them to respond here. But I think we're having a few different audio issues.

**Peter Dutton:** So this is Peter- I can explain.

**Nick Drake:** Peter, can we can hear you.

**Peter Dutton:** Okay, thank you. Yeah. So Taylor Frable at MIT wrote, did some really good work on sort of a, an array of border dispute resolutions that China made in the 1990s and early 2000s, and one of the potential drivers of that array of territorial disputes that were resolved may have been China's desire to shift resources toward the maritime direction. Since that time they've developed quite a lot of naval power and then focused on their maritime disputes. So I'm wondering if you see that strategic shift, if you agree that strategic shift was part of the driver that led China to resolve its disputes with Russia, and might it take a similar kind of strategic shift of some kind for Japan to be in a, depending on Russia, to be in a position to resolve their disputes. Thanks.

**Alexander Lukin:** Well, do you mean that, I'm not quite sure what you mean by shifting resources. Do you mean that the China wanted to settle disputes with some countries like former Soviet states to support its expansion to the south?

**Peter Dutton:** Essentially, yes. So China resolved almost all of its border disputes, obviously there are a few remaining in particular in India, but they shifted, they have decreased the size of the army and increased the size of the budget for the naval component, both the navy, the coast guard and other maritime approaches during that time. One of the theories has been that the reason that the Chinese resolved all those border disputes was to be able to stand down territorial tensions and the army that was required to support them.

**Alexander Lukin:** Well, I am not sure if it was a kind of strategy, a longstanding strategy by China. I would rather say that there's a difference between the Chinese policy change. It was much eager to settle disputes in the 1980s, 1990s when it was a weaker. And basically when it was more modest, according to Deng Xiaoping's ideas. And it managed to settle a lot of disputes, which were easier to settle with Russia, with Central Asian countries and several others. But because the dispute with India was much more complicated and especially the south sea one, they didn't have time to do it at that time. And then China's policy became much more assertive. China became stronger, and there were not that much fever to settle this, to settle this dispute. So it was not, I would say, a strategy, but it kind of was a process, a natural process. And now it's much more difficult for the Chinese leadership to make concessions like they made to Russia, because they made some concessions, they did not lose everything, but they lose some of, or like abandoned some of their claims. So now for China, they again made this South China sea claims, their claims. They made it like included into the principle issues of basic issues where there can be no retreat just like Japan did. So it's now would be much more difficult. Also the, and they did not shift their resources. They just became stronger. and now they have much more resources than in the 1990s, or even beginning of this century. And for Japan, I'm not sure what you mean that Japan can do something like that because Japan is not planning to expand in any direction as far as I know They have a lot of internal problems. So I
don't think Japan can do anything like that. Japan needs a settlement with Russia for much more
different reasons. Japan wants to pursue a more independent policy from the United States.
Also not completely independent, but kind of more nationalist and more independent. And
Japan needs some balance against China's influence. Of course, the United States is the major
ally, but to have some more like Russia would not be a bad thing. I think Olga said about it, but
much more kind of in a more cultured way. Right. So it wouldn't be bad for it. So the tendency
is that both this nationalist tendency and raising China would work in the direction of
settlement, but it will be difficult for Japan because it made it such a principled issue.

**Peter Dutton:** Okay. Thanks.

**Nick Drake:** Thank you. Professor Wong. I think you should be live here. If you can unmute
yourself, you should be able to ask your question.

**Professor Wong:** Okay. Thank you so much. Can you hear me? Hello?

**Nick Drake:** Yes.

**Professor Wong:** Hello from Northwest Germany. Thank you so much. Yeah. My question is
actually, is the sign of a Russian territorial settlement. Could it be a comparable model for the
Russian and Japanese territorial dispute? This second question. Of course, it has to do with the
very famous islands solution in international law and international history. So I'm just
wondering if our speaker of honor could share the insight on this?

**Ezra Vogel:** I think I'll rule at that. We have so little time. I think that they've already addressed
that first question, so I hope they will concentrate in the second question.

**Professor Wong:** Yeah, thank you.

**Olga Puzanova:** So I was just going to say that since they're so extremely different, when it
comes to the matter of the Åland Islands, I was wondering what sort of insight exactly is,
Professor Wong is offering us, in what way could this potentially be useful? So this is
answering to-

**Alexander Lukin:** Let me answer this very, very short. Our idea is that the main principle,
well, there are two principles or two lessons from the settlement of Sino-Russian territorial
dispute. One, the first is that nobody gets everything. There should be mutual concessions or in
the territorial sense, a division of the territory, or some other settlement for example, territory in
exchange of something. And second is that the territorial settlement comes after the general
improvement of relations. It cannot come first. You need first to improve relations to the level
when you think that is the last or one of the last major obstacles to further improvement of
further development of relations, and then it becomes a small but kind of a small irritant in your
relations and then you're inclined to settle it somehow sometime soon. So this is the general
idea we can give, but of course, we don't know the details of this European conflicts. And I
think there are not very, I mean, within the framework of European Union, they are not that
serious actually. Oh, there are some serious disputes, like there's between Spain and England, for example, Spain and Britain. But not many.

**Ezra Vogel:** I think we have time for just one more question who would like, Nick?

**Nick Drake:** Yeah. So since we've been pulling in people to ask their own questions, we're gonna pull in Noriyuki Shikata from the US Japan program here at Harvard. So Nori, you asked two questions in the chat. If you could just pick one of them since we've only got time for one more, that'd be great. We're gonna make you a panelist here and you should be able to ask your question momentarily.

**Ezra Vogel:** Shikata's son is a Japanese diplomat.

**Alexander Lukin:** Okay. So is he going to-

**Noriyuki Shikata:** Can you hear me?

**Ezra Vogel:** Go ahead, Nori.

**Nick Drake:** Go ahead.

**Ezra Vogel:** Nori, you got it?

**Nick Drake:** We may be having some technical difficulties.

**Ezra Vogel:** Well, here's the question. You have the text of the question, Nick?

**Nick Drake:** Yes, sure. As I said, there were two questions asked, so I'm not sure which Nori would have I would chosen, but I'll go with the first one. As was referred to in Olga's slide, The Treaty of Shimano in 1855 confirmed the border between Etorofu and Uruppu, northern territories consisting of four islands, which had never been held by foreign countries, including Russia before August, 1945. Does Russia reject this historical fact?

**Ezra Vogel:** Just this second, hey, Nori's on. Nori, can you talk now?

**Noriyuki Shikata:** Yeah, so I had some difficulty. And so this is as related to the Treaty of Shimonoseki. And Olga's slide actually mentioned it and I think it's a very important treaty and that there was no basic conflict between the two governments at that time in 1855. So I'm curious about the Russian view regarding this as well as of course, northern territories, the Russian forces came to northern territories after, in the end of August and September of 1945, after Japan declared the defeat. So I'm curious about Russian view and at the same time in recent days, foreign minister Motegi has been stressing the importance of continuing negotiation with foreign minister Lavrov. And of course the corona is making it more difficult to meet. But I guess Japanese side is saying that we are willing to continue negotiation, the Prime Minister has been, really is spending a lot of political capital for this negotiation with Russia.
**Olga Puzanova:** Thank you so much. These are all great insights. So actually I think, I believe the slide was referring to the Treaty of Shimoda rather than the Treaty of Shimonoseki, right?

**Noriyuki Shikata:** Ah, Shimoda. Excuse me, Shimoda, yes.

**Olga Puzanova:** I was a little confused.

**Noriyuki Shikata:** Sorry, sorry. Yeah.

**Olga Puzanova:** So the treaty establishing the borders between the two empires, right? And Japan officially used to have control over Kunashir, Iturup, Habomai and Shikotan, right? So the question is whether...

**Noriyuki Shikata:** So with the Russian viewpoint is there's a lot of Russian people have complaints about these legitimacy of Treaty of Shimoda. Which is a basis for the Japanese government argument.

**Olga Puzanova:** I think the issue is that Russians don't look that far back when they are negotiating because the official position and Lavrov keeps stressing, as well as Putin keeps stressing the fact that the negotiations should be based on the Sino-Soviet, pardon, Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956 rather than the Treaty of Shimoda, right? Alexander can correct me.

**Alexander Lukin:** Yeah. Let me add something. Well, first of all, there's no official position on the Treaty of Shimoda, but it doesn't matter because the Russian official position is basically forget about history. The fact that those four islands belong to Russia is the result of the Second World War. And we're not going to change the results of the Second World War. And they actually said that. And there was another slide there that because if we begin to change the results of the, undermine the results of the Second World War, Russia have a lot of other questions, problems, border problems with other countries like Estonia, like Germany, and others. So you can, in Japan, base anything you want on Shimoda treaty or any other historical treaty, but Russia would tell you that we don't care basically about what happened in 1855. Position.

**Ezra Vogel:** I am afraid that time is up. I've let the session go a little longer because of the little technical issues. But I think all of you can see the form of it is to have somebody who really understands the situation from the Russian point of view and has very high quality scholarly standards to explain these issues to us. And that we're very appreciative of Alexander and Olga. And I hope that this link up now will enable some of you to have conversations outside of our forum. In a way I think one of the functions of our session today is to help open the channels for more scholarly exchange between Russian scholars of Asia and our Western scholars. And I hope that some of you will continue these contacts as you can see what outstanding scholars we have to work with. So thank you all for your participation. Thanks, Nick and Mark for your technical work and let's continue these conversations.