Ezra Vogel: I wanna welcome everybody to our regular series of Critical Issues Confronting China and our speaker today is a Suisheng or somebody will call him Sam Zhao, who is editor the Journal of Contemporary Training. I will ask Nick to say a few words about how we do the question and then I will introduce a session. Nick.

Nick Drake: Thank you, Ezra. For those of you who have been with us before, you'll be familiar with Zoom. If this is your first time, there is a menu bar that you have access to, usually at the bottom of your screen and it has a Q&A tab. This is where you should enter your questions. If you'd like to enter them anonymously, you may do so, but if you choose to not enter them anonymously, please include your name and your affiliation, just so that me know who's asking the question. We'll try to get through as many as we can at the end of the session. Thanks.

Ezra Vogel: The first time I visited China was 1973, I had the good luck of being on a delegation, The first scientific delegation. At that time, Zhao Suisheng was just entering Beijing University and that's where just at the time when I was starting in 1973. At that time of course students were [Indistinct], but by the time he went to get his M.A. in economics at Beida, that was already gaokao. So he had to take the examination with the gaokao at the Beida for Economics. And then he came to the United States, he got an M.A. in Sociology. And then he went to San Diego for a PhD. And PhD he did in Political Science with Susan Shirk and with others there. And the amazing thing is that, while he was still a graduate student, he started a little, a small little journal, The Journal of Contemporary China, which is now in volume 29. So to start a journal as a graduate student is pretty amazing. And now that we're in the 29th year of The Journal of Contemporary China, some people rank it above the China Quarterly as a leading journal. It's certainly a leading journal. So in the meantime while he was starting that journal at the University of Denver, where he's been for the last few decades, he has also written a lot of books on all kinds of topics. He's written about China-Taiwan relations, he's written about local society, he's written about foreign policy and his title is- I won't take any more time, Is China Re-examines the Post World War II Order. So without further ado, Suisheng it's yours.

Suisheng Zhao: Okay, thank you Professor Vogel and also the Fairbank Center which has been my admire so many years and it's really a great honor to be invited and to have this opportunity to share my works at this very prestigious forum. Let me put my... So do you see the screen there?

Ezra Vogel: Mark, is the screen turning on?

Suisheng Zhao: Do you see the screen?

Mark Grady: Yes, the screen is showing.

Suisheng Zhao: Okay, good. So the subject I'm going to discuss is China Re-exams the Post World War II Order, which I just published the article. In fact, I published two articles on the subject. The most recent one is The Rhetoric and the Practice of Reality of the China's Global
Leadership Implication for the US-led World Order and Liberal Globalization. So the talk is based primarily on these two articles. If you are interested in those articles, let me know, I can send the links of those articles to me. So this question is raised about China re-exams the Post World War II, because China is a rising power and China has told her total various own interest and values in the context of the current post world war II order. To understand the issue, let's look at first the... Okay, lets define what is the order?

Suisheng Zhao: What are the conceptualization of the order? There are three points I want to emphasize. When we talk the world order, we are talking about dominant values, rules, and norms that define the terms of the global governance and give shape and substance to international society at a given moment. The global order has been evolving all the time. In fact, that has to be constructed using the constructivist Nance constructed and reconstructed constantly in history. Now who are the constructors or the rule makers of VRC? Those are the powers and those weak States are best can be the rule takers. And the emerging powers, not China, often the challengers that try to find profound roles and norms. They find desirable to align with their own values and interests. So in that context, a very important, several very important issues, questions, are raised using this conception. China is a rising power. Is China content to preserve or discontented to overhaul the post World War II order, which has been constructed under the US leadership? So then what is the challenges? What are the challenges of China to the US-led post World War II order? The another very important question is, is China ready to replace the US-led order with a China-led order?

Suisheng Zhao: Unfortunately, there are no consensus agreement. There are lots of writings now about China and existing international order. I divide them into three different positions. When is the liberal view like, "I can bury those people." Liberals arguing that the possible vote to order is a liberal, open, laws-based and non-discrimination. Creating opportunities for a child to advance is expanding interests within an order and it's capacity now when we talk about globalization. Those kinds of Negro-globalization has produced a so called International Interdependence and increased common stakes for China to collaborate with other countries on those important global issues. In fact, the China sought interest in this case would constraint China's involvement in the international affairs to make sure it becomes a stakeholder. All responsible stakeholder, that's what the people talk about. The second view I look at is the so called alarmist view, which is the most rudest-based argument. They argue that China is discounted and discontented over the liberal order. And they have challenged, not only the predominant position of the United States, but also try to challenge the liberal international norms and intuitions.

Suisheng Zhao: These argument has gained momentum in nasty mass in this year in amid pandemic, because people are talking about the post American order, because the US has not been able to lead the world or the so called Liberal International Order, taking responsible positions and China has step in. And the third view I used him The Wait and See, but that minute, these alarmist view, they argue that is overblown and is for now. And China has challenged but does not amount to existential threat to the world order because China still is far away from the position to do that behind the US in every aspects. And also China does not have enough soft power and hot power to place to put yourself in a place of leadership to reconstruct the world order and China only tactically exploited the vacuum left by the US. So how do you...
think of these three different positions? What I see is that the liberal position has lost ground. Why would the alarmist position has gained ground?

**Suisheng Zhao:** Because China has been increasingly proactive to reshape the norms of world order and US as a founder of the order now is unready to defend and even pay for the order. So that's the constitution, but still I think from my reading of the literature, most scholars have continued to hold a "Wait and See" position, which is my own position too. Let me tell you why I think so. Who start? We have to understand, what is the US-led world order? Which I think is mostly the UN charter system based upon a hybrid. When fed in principle and a globalist aspiration of transnational norms. The other part of the US-led world order is the US-led in the state nine system, and which is used mostly to contain China's rise. In this context, China is of course not a stakeholder. In fact, they went China for week, the newly founded PRC was even a revolutionary state at that time, then gradually became a stake holder after Xi Jinpin started economic reform in 1980s.

**Suisheng Zhao:** And, but a rising China has regarded the US-led order at this time, unfair and unreasonable, and have challenged the current International Order as a revisionist power. In fact, from my readings of the China's complaints, I said, we would need the power focused on the three aspects. First, the post World War II order was creative channel was not on the table, was created by United States as a predominant power to conform American values and protect American power. So in that case, China has been an outlier, but not being a democracy. So China has not been very comfortable in this order. The second, the complaint is that China started for quite a while complaint about US Promotion of liberal values has created a lot of chaos, conflict, counterrevolution in the world. And the China has been very nervous about what US has done to promote liberal values as a top talk in the international system. And then in the last several years, especially since Trump came to power, China has criticized US as a founder of this New liberal order, has been a destroyer of the order. That's what the really interesting reading the Chinese literature. Can I say, you want to have a laws-based order, but we don't know what the laws you are asking us to follow you because there are no rules you respect.

**Suisheng Zhao:** Now the third aspect of China's complaint, are US has hold a double standard, because US has build International Laws to guide the actions of only other states and resisted submitting itself to the rules, it hopes others will follow. There are so many examples you can see China has had. The most side example is that now in a South Tennessee example. This setup, the US has claimed that UN class, a UN convention on a sea of no is a part of the customary international law for the freedom of operation in the South Tennessee, but US has not signed, not ratified the UN clause. So Washington has insisted others to abide that treaty rules that us has refused to accept. So China has a lot of complaints about the current world order dominated by the United States. And China therefore has become a challenger for sure. Re-exams the current US-led world older. And these challenge has also come in the three aspects.

**Suisheng Zhao:** First, China has proposed its own vision for the future of the global order. In fact, you can see, especially since President Xi Jinping came to office. He has called to show Chinese characteristics, Chinese style and Chinese ambitions and also provide Chinese solutions or Chinese wisdom, put a reform of the global conference and world older. And for this purpose, he has to present the Chinese vision, which is very interesting called The Community of Shared
Future for the Mankind. Renming bing yu gongtong ti, which was translated into English as the community of common destiny for mankind at first, then they changed the destiny this term and becomes ineffective, I talk to them, people in China, implies a lack of choice and pre-determined trajectory. So that could cost resistance. Therefore they have a translator now standardized as the community of shared future for mankind, which is much more benign from the Chinese perspective. Then what are the essences of these Chinese vision of the community of shared future for the mankind? I see that is a three aspects also.

Suisheng Zhao: First, they tried to reject the Western universal values, which you don't think could represent Chinese visions, Chinese values. Second, if it calls for all sorts of political system to be respected as equal valid. In other words, democracies are not a model of superior to authoritarianism. Third, all political systems, all given the values should peacefully coexist, no attempting to re-transform the others. So I think that's the Chinese vision of the future of the world. What a peacefully coexists of all different political systems. That's the vision. Second China, they have their own vision to channel the Western values. The second aspect is that China has competed, challenged the US dominance in a global institutions and demanded a greater representation and the voice and the voting shares in outside the UN system.

Suisheng Zhao: Let me give you some examples, they we have criticized, for example, when the financial crisis started 2009, that dollar-based a single current system was a cause for the global financial crisis, and therefore they proposed that renminbi to be included in a basket of key international currencies, the dollar, Euro pound, and UN as what they call the special, SDR Special Drawing Right. And it was included 2015 and China also requested and demanded the rise of the Chinese voting share in the IMF, which also approved, adopted 2015. And China has held a lot of important positions in the UN agencies and organizations. In fact very impressive that among the 15 special agencies of UN, China now held helm, Chinese nationals have had leadership of four, almost one third of those positions.

Suisheng Zhao: Let me give you the decent names of this organization, one the Food and Agricultural Organization, FOA, the other is International Telecommunication, [murmur], then UN Industrial Development Organization, and International Civil Aviation Organization. These important positions helped China, not only in the economic terms, but also to serve is a political objectives. Most often sign example here is that, China has used that position to exclude Taiwan from even observers position. For example, in the aviation, I mean, International Civil Aviation Organization, which is a very important for the aviation safety, but Taiwan not even included as a observer, that'd be fuel for many years. Taiwan was included when Mai Ying-jeou was elected at that time a Chinese national from Hong Kong. She was the head and they admitted Taiwan as a observer. And Tsai Ing-wen was elected 2016, Taiwan was excluded again up to now, not only because China held that position, China has a huge influence on that organization.

Suisheng Zhao: So in that context the most recent march in action of the UN International Property rights Organization, China bid was blocked by the US and some western countries, even China got that one will be one third, five positions side of a UN system, China also have credit Beijing spot International Economic Intuitions, such as the new developed bank, also brick countries, which is hardhearted in Shanghai, which you can tell the influence of China. And also AIP is a very good example that China started, and it has become very powerful international
organization, headquartered in Beijing and headed always by a Chinese national. Third aspect of China challenge is that, China has tried to impose its sovereignty center, the value to the global governance by promoting a state enhancing globalization. That's what China has to... In fact, for not observers, they have been kind of puzzled by the China emerging as a Championship for globalization, since the present Trump came to office, which caused a huge backlash against globalization.

Suisheng Zhao: But globalization that China has promoted is very different from the globalization once promoted by the US and others. According to the Chinese scholar volume eight, in fact, I read his article. He talk about each country must make a choice of globalization that is good for itself. China has molded economic globalization supported by political multi-polarity and multiculturalism while liberal nationalism promoted by the West emphasizes political democratization, economic privatization and the universalization of liberal values. China has criticized the Western promote liberal globalization for the a lot of problems is disparity income distribution, inequality. All those problems globally, originally inside of countries. And that they argue that you can read Chinese scholars scholarship. In fact, I think this also very popular now in a Western scholarship, talking about inequality globally and they blame the globalization and new liberal economic source for responsible for these type of problems. So when the resentments against the liberal globalization is on the rise, China has posed its own vision of globalization, that's what I call statist globalization and leave small leeways, rooms for States to conduct itself as the place to do back.

Suisheng Zhao: Those are the [indistinct]. So these statist globalization expressing many expects, economic need, you'll see the state capitalism, industrial policy to compete in a global economy in the national arena. This statist approach protects the sovereignty against the monitoring by the external forces, emphasize consent in the international affairs. These statist approach, Chinese sovereignty centers a norm of the global governance has guided China's participation in international organizations. For example, China demanded two essential precondition for UNDP, UNDP's peace keeping operation, endorsement by the UN city council and consent by the government of the host country. But for many years, China was on a defense safe side of his statist values, but China has become much more aggressive in asserting his values in recent years. Time to give you some examples. In a cyber, this gonna Frontier of the Global Providence, for example, in a cyberspace rulemaking. The US and the West countries for many years have advocated so-called a Decentralized Multi-stake Holder Model to have a civil society and government working together have an open system. But Chine has insisted the cyber sovereignty to regulate cyberspace, its own cyberspace and build the independent internet with separate system of Chinese technology and a great firewall.

Suisheng Zhao: China has basically wired his own internet into an internal net, separate from the global cyberspace. Some people may use the cyber's totalitarianism to describe Chinese model. And this competition now has been ongoing. China has been very aggressive on this. And also on the human rights, France, China has its own vision of human rights, basically they see a priority of human rights protection in developing countries. It's different from the priority in a West, that economic development rights and social rights are more fundamental in their case than individual and civil political rights. The proper balance is to be determined, by the State according to their so called national conditions state. That's what the Chinese often said. And so
in that context using that for quite a while, these kinds of concepts are in a defensive side, but now China has been very offensive on this because US withdrawal from a UN Human Rights Council, for example, gave China a lot of opportunities.

**Suisheng Zhao:** And China has a very often in that case, China has been member of UN Human Rights Council and the poll that the Democratic Western countries in a minority coming into the vote. China has introduced quite a few of his own resolutions to the UN Human Rights Council since 2007, which were having adopted. The Chinese resolutions have emphasized the rights of States and did not have any balancing references to the rights of individuals that you have Civil Society Groups and demanding for the monitoring process. And so China basically taking human rights out of the individual rights out of the picture. And the frame human rights as purely a matter for the state. And this position has been enhanced in the UN Human Rights Council. And China has also used the UN Human Rights Council to protect his own behavior. For example, this year, July at the 44th UN Human Rights Council, 27 countries supported UN-led joint statement to criticize China's action in Xinjiang, and it's National Security Law in Hong Kong. But 46 countries dismissed, they have a statement by 46 countries dismissed the criticism of China in Xinjiang.

**Suisheng Zhao:** And another statement signed by 53 countries defend the China position in Hong Kong. So that's really, I think, amazing. See how the Chinese offensive being a successful and a supported by an international arena. And China statist venues has also, I think gained further ground during the pandemic this year, because for many Chinese, they have claimed they are essential Knight, a state of power to handle, to cope with the pandemic was very successful. And the many Western countries, western democracies have copied, and they used this term 'total year". They have a copied the Chinese way. I mean, China's state centric way to deal with the pandemic. For example, while, although some Western countries, I mean, US have a criticized the China's surveillance technology as a cyber or surveillance country. China use that technology to track people's contacts with the virus successful. Now see, the Western countries, UK and some other countries, Israel, those countries, Singapore, nothing about Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea, they all did the same thing.

**Suisheng Zhao:** And the US has not found that. So US has become the epicenter of the pandemic. And also another example people have talked about is that many Western countries have now immunated China state capitalism and adopt the industrial policy. And the Trump have mentioned using tariffs, not only tariffs and also policy tried models, the US domestic manufacturer and certain sectors and the band folding companies, even the state and especially a Chinese competitors. Most ironically, they also pointed out that the US now in view of an internet sovereignty, because they try to block, ban the Chinese and they have a clean network program to ban virtually all Chinese information technology products. Now we all talk about TikTok. And so even not only the [indistinct] I just read an article this week of Foreign affairs by Henry Clinton talking about national security ranking and how Washington should think about power. We should also emphasize the importance of an industrial policy, the state-led industrial economic policy. So, I mean, really a must that have happened. So that's why China has been this kind of taking this type so serious.
Suisheng Zhao: Finally, now let's talk the final question, Is China ready to replace the US-led World order with a China-led order? And the answers to these questions depends on your assessment of the following three developments. When you say, if China has enough power to dislodge the US power and provide global leadership and sweeping global public goods? The second assessment and development is, could China provide alternative values, universally accepted? Third, what is the China's cost benefits to replace or maintain the order? So let's look at each of these questions. In fact that my answers is the going back to the very beginning of talk. We have to wait and see, because China I don't think China has, we have a clear answer or positive answer to all the three question. Let's look at the first question. I don't think China is in a position or even close to the position to dislodge the US power. I think my former advisors and Professor Vogel mentioned my book, a fragile rising power is still the case. Although China is much more powerful, but still fragile. And a fast enormous, I think, external and internal hurdles for his continued economic growth. People talk about a so-called Mid-income Trap. There has not been a large economy passed over.

Suisheng Zhao: I mean, became entered the rich country club from the income naval without having a political liberalization so far. So we don't know if China couldn't become the first authoritarian state to avoid this trap, because there are so many problems internally and externally, and people talk about the demographic change in my mental and destruction, overcapacity, and local government days and all those problems. I don't know, I mean, we have a economist, he can answer that. Even people are good that the China economy has come to the peak. I don't know if I would go that far, but slow down has been very real and it can turn out China's environment. External environment, I think has become really challenging. The China leadership has realized that when after another country has tried to coast themselves to the Chinese products and many other things.

Suisheng Zhao: So Zhi Wu, the Chinese scholar, he used that term 10 year, told you there's risk of a strategical overdraft for China. I think it's a very real, we have to wait and see. So in that context for China to mobilize resources, to provide sweeping global public goods, to take global leadership, to reconstruct international order, I don't think we can have a very positive answer. And two days question, China has been pretty much, kind of a double hedge and a too fast is, they talk a lot rhetorics, but in action, they have hesitate to tackle responsibilities to even take obligations, the climate changing, is a better example. Even during the pandemic, China so called "the assistance" are not really assistance.

Suisheng Zhao: They are not global popular goods. They are those goods serving China's strategic interests in the name of popular goods. Second, I don't think China is in a position to provide alternative values universally acceptable by the world. In fact, the vision of the community of shared future for mankind has often been confused with the tianxiao, all the texts and color, vision or the order, which it's based upon power and hierarchy instead of freedom and equality, which will be very difficult to be accepted by other countries. I put article in my journal by June dryer, he lists Chinese's three conditions that the China order could be accepted. One is that China is the largest and most powerful state. Second is civilization sobriety is why that is acknowledged.
Suisheng Zhao: Third, in absence of a competing paradigm. None of them exist today. So given choice in this case, most countries will still want to navigate in a World order were either US going to continue taking leadership. So to compensate for the strategy of soft power, or target value China has a promoted, have took branding campaign, confusion tools, and also as a media campaign, none of them have been accepted successfully, doubting the China story of course, have not been accepted because they don't appeal to the universal values. Third, I will argue that China still is a beneficiary of the US-led World order economically, except the Trump. The US for so many years have tried to maintain free trade system and free open economic system. China benefited dramatically, it's still benefitting. Today on a security arena, China is also a beneficiary of US maintained regional and global order. Just to give an example, if a US is totally withdrawing from Asia, is that good to China? Japan will become nuclear power and some other countries will follow Japan. China will face a very nightmare of environment in Asia. I don't think that's in China interests.

Suisheng Zhao: So given that the situation China is not ready to take a global leadership and reconstruct the world order, but China is making challenges. China has that other complaints about the order, what should we do? Here are the two questions I don't have answers. To conclude, how should the US and international community deal with China as a revisionist power? Many people have said, "Oh, we should accommodate China's legitimate demands and try to abandons the encouragement and discouragement. We should welcome China to sit on the table of a rulemaking system." And that's another people are talking about that, but opposite view has a so strong argument. China's vision is a power, not only vision power, some other people even argue that China is revolutionary power to overthrow the US-led order. How can we co-exist with China in that context?

Suisheng Zhao: The second question is that, where we go? Where do we go from here? Many people have argued that we come to a global disorder because we don't have a leadership. US is no longer waiting to pay or defend the system. China is not ready. So is global disorder, which in a pandemic, we don't see the global collaboration, which is a non-security issue most urgent need of cooperation. So we come to the global, I mean, zero world, which is very dangerous, everyone for themselves, and some what the pen and a weak suffer what they must. If that the situation, how can we find ways to deal with those problems? So those are my conclusion questions. Okay, I will stop here. We can go to where our next stage is.

Ezra Vogel: Thank you for... And okay. Okay, everybody can hear me now? You're gonna hear me now, Bill?

Mark Grady: Yeah, we can hear you.

Ezra Vogel: Okay, well, thank you very much for that very comprehensive presentation of the most fundamental issue we face. And that is the challenge of China to the US position around the world. In my view, the United States has done things to block China's rise. I mean, encouraged other countries, not the join the bank, the AIIB, and it is not welcome Chinese riots and international organization, number international organization. Now supposing that after the Biden, if Biden becomes president, we have a somewhat new perspective. Posing, we realize that the Belt and Road Initiative is really good for many countries in the whole Euro Asia peninsula
and the United States would express interest in cooperating with China. China has announced that it wants to have shared future for mankind. Do you think that China would welcome US participation in some Belt Road Initiative? Could we have some cooperative projects or would is China now getting so confident that it would not accept such initiatives? What's your thought on that situation?

**Suisheng Zhao:** I think China still at least in a rhetoric, welcoming the US and the Western multinational corporations who joined BIA because it has a lot of problems so far, and the transparency and the date issue and the conflict of interest of China, and then some local host countries, which cannot be and also the rule-making many problems. So in the second BIA summit, 2009, I think Nazi year, Xi Jinping already, I think, re-thought about these issue and talk about are coming the West and companies to join them. But in a deep heart, I don't know how the Chinese leaders would think about that because that will make these Scott Initiative very different from what the have imagined. The good example is AIIB and China started try to make AIIB a Chinese foreign policy, just like China development bank, China export-import bank for China abandonment projects.

**Suisheng Zhao:** And when they opened up, the Western countries come in. It's a total different animal now, it's a much more like multinational or international institution, which is not a Chinese institution, although Xiaochnuan still is the governor, a Chinese national, but he has followed international practices, international subject to the Green Environmental Protection and all of those things China would not have control. So I don't know if that's what China wants, I don't think that China wants. The difference between AIIB and BII is that AIIB now is a truly multinational, and BII is a multi bilateral agreements. There are a hundred countries, they all signed bilateral agreements with China. So China is still the center. China controls this project. So that's what I think the dilemma, the contradiction China has in the relationship with US Western countries.

**Ezra Vogel:** AIIB was not what they originally envisioned, but in a way China has adapted. And the fact that they have retained the same president and they've adapted in a way that AIIB in a way is an example of a shared future.

**Suisheng Zhao:** Yeah exactly theoretically, but in practice BIA is that signature of cheating this big power diplomacy. AIIB is a different animal. So in that case, I don't know how much, how flexible Xi Jinping would be on that BIA to follow the example of AIIB, which I think is a great success.

**Ezra Vogel:** Another question you didn't go into deeply in Chinese leadership is, not only the question of whether the values could be acceptable, but whether China allows enough openness, that countries could go to China. I mean, now the United States, as you know, we have a large number of foreign students. And before the Corona virus, we had 365,000 Chinese students in United States, but now China has a propaganda department and certain ideas cannot be discussed, and certain ideas are closed, and given a world leadership. Well, is it possible that system can still provide the leadership when it doesn't allow the open discussion and is not attractive to people to go to China, to take part in that discussion? How do you think China can
adapt? Or do you think that foreign countries can accept leadership without taking part in discussion?

Suisheng Zhao: No, I don't think so. I knew is that under Xi Jinping tenure, there was no hope. China would open up political discussion on open on all those sensitive issues. In fact, I see a backward movement since Xi Jinping came to office. And the example, the publications, because I'm involved in the journal, I can tell it that for quite a while, the Chinese universities encouraged their scholars to publish international journals, meeting English language journals. But now they have discouraged their scholars to publish overseas. Especially, I mean, mostly in the social sciences and humanities, they give more emphasis to domestic journals publication, which is..

Ezra Vogel: And also foreign scholars are not publishing by now. I mean, they made it difficult for publishing.

Suisheng Zhao: They will not allow you to have those, they will censor. So how can China be a global leader and accept it as a global leader?

Ezra Vogel: So is...

Suisheng Zhao: If China has continued that.

Ezra Vogel: Yes, so that would require some adjustment on the project side?

Suisheng Zhao: Right, but I don't see that adjustment coming.

Ezra Vogel: You don't see that in the near future. So the question is whether they could play that role in the future.

Suisheng Zhao: No, I don't think so.

Ezra Vogel: Nick, I'm gonna have to have figure out a way to look at...

Nick Drake: I think Professor Shaw has raised his hand several times.

Ezra Vogel: Bill Xiao, it's your, we'll see, let you erase the question early. Bill go ahead.

William Hsiao: Well, I have a burning question. I've found your talk is very interesting. It really touched about this fundamental issue, Chinese in the world and China. You talk a great deal about the values, can you elaborate more values based on ethics and philosophy? Can you elaborate more, what is the philosophical base of Chinese values? Because in my view, a great deal of this rhetorics China give out is ad hoc to serve their current international position, whether that go back to what is a common universal value that China embraced or hopefully the world embraced?

Suisheng Zhao: I think you right, China has been very irritated currently in terms of values. And they just see everything in a lens of utility. If it's a useful for the Communist party, stay in power.
If it's useful for China's economic modernization, that's what the China has constructed. I mean, the lens China has looked through in terms of values. In that context, that China has not been able to offer any long term vision for the world. Even the community of shared future for mankind is so empty other than to serve the commerce parties lead to resist western values. So that's the problem for the Chinese value system at this time.

Ezra Vogel: Bill, do you wanna raise a question too? I can't hear you Bill or you push the unmute. We can't hear your Bill. Okay, here is one question from TK Xu, within your framework, if more rising economies take the China route, like will it that increase or decrease the rivalry between the existing world order?

Suisheng Zhao: So the question is given the current development.

Ezra Vogel: I'll repeat the question. If more rising economies take the China route like Vietnam, will that increase or decrease the rivalry between [indistinct].

Suisheng Zhao: Okay, so I think if more countries, people talk conversions, conversions of values, political system in the past, but what the talk mostly was the Chinese system and the authoritarian values will converge called liberal values. But now what we have seen is a both sides of Chatman or China has insisted authoritarian value. And the Western countries having changing the Western countryside is all concerned about China influence, authoritarian influence in the Western societies. So the cover convergence has not happened and the conflict between China and other parts of the world is based on the conflicts with the United States has based not only on the economic interest, but I think that a value conflict has been real. So if China has changed, not of Vietnam or beyond Vietnam, I think these kinds of confidence will be reduced. And China could work with US much better in, although there are still some conflicts in issues, but in the overall environment will be different.

Ezra Vogel: Here's a question from William. Given the current development, the decoupling US withdrawal from a number of multilateral institutions, is it likely the Chinese United States were created by furcated system of local institutions? In other words, do you expect some decoupling in certain areas? It looked like Trump was moving in that direction, but if you look at the business institution, this is my addition to the question. You look at the business institutions, interesting survey by the Shanghai American Chamber of commerce, companies intend to stay, and only something like 3% of them are planning to move out within the next year. So decoupling business-wise is not going very far, but what about, what's your estimate as to how far and what areas decoupling might take place and that the strategic or political level internationally?

Suisheng Zhao: Decoupling. I think it's a real word this time, for quite a while I was very optimistic because of the global economic interdependence, but now we have seen the real decoupling taking place, especially in the technology and technology front. We will see two different, examples in a cyberspace, we'll see two different ecosystems for sure. And China would have created his own standards, own systems. And US would have, and Western countries will have their own standards in a 5G all those kinds of systems, we'll see a decoupling for sure. And also in some other economic of production chain, for example, is another site redundance
has been increased now because of the pandemic, for example, medical equipments and supplies. A lot of countries try to have their own stocks and amongst our own production. In fact, I read Hillary Clinton's article. She argued that the US over over-reliance on Chinese supplies have rendered US vulnerable. So US have to build his own a supply system, which is redundant with China and China hustle. Xi Jinping has talked so much now about self reliance on the technology. Those kind of critical technology, you can not buy them. You cannot rely on other countries. You have to produce yourselves. So in this case, I think to separate the Coupled technology systems will be very real and production chance system. Although on the second part of the question, although is still at this moment, very difficult because the established production and value chains have been to be changed to change them the cost is very high. As the Shanghai-US chamber of commerce survey tell now a company to move out of China, the cost is very high. They cannot do it. So you can see the economic interdependence is still working, but the political wheel has intervened at this time. So decoupling is a real threat now for the globalization.

**Ezra Vogel:** You ask questions as one role, I'm thinking about in the American election, if it's Trump, then what do we expect? If it's Biden, what do we expect? So in terms of the issues you've been discussing today, what effect do you think that election, how would it be if Trump continues another four year? How do you expect it might go if Biden comes into power?

**Suisheng Zhao:** I think many everyone will have their own answers to this question.

**Ezra Vogel:** Today, we're giving you your chance, We'll have our view [indistinct]

**Suisheng Zhao:** My own, my shot on this. I think if a Trump is elected, he will continue this chaotic policy, very ad hoc. And somehow have two branch to do at the Myer-Xi Jinping's power and to use whatever he can use to enhance his own power. In the meantime, he is a business person, and he has so many real complaints about China, which are also, I think, is real supported by many facts. So he will continue the current confrontation against China. In fact, that is so clear for me that if Trump is elected right, China and US will continue the so-called Cold War with China, the new Cold War II. There is a strong sentiment among US allies against China's a threat. And they have somehow being closing closer to the US position. Not because Trump because their own interests. So US would use that to build contaminant against China. So these confrontation will continue. If Joe Biden is elected, I think the overall confrontation direction will not be changed, but the strategy will be very different. I don't think Joe Biden is going to continue a Cold war, although he will not continue going back to old good days, which you cannot go back, but he would find what areas US can collaborate with China, but also what areas US should roll back, China working together with not allies and other countries who emphasized more on a value issues. Human rights are all those issues, he will return, I think, should return to those international organizations Trump withdrew from, and so it will be very different. Personality, and a final question here, personality, I hope Joe Biden will win, so I think he will win for sure.

**Ezra Vogel:** I think you'll find a lot of people probably in your audience today who had had the same choice. Our next question is by professor Naval War College at Colonel Steve shingle, he says you were discussing China's surprise in the US challenges there. The EU seems to be
concerned with China's efforts to change the international order. Can you discuss how other players will counter or support China's move to change the order specifically EU? And I might add to that say Japan and Korea, which I think are also very important players, but why don't you start with the EU?

Suisheng Zhao: I don't think EU would support China's challenge to the existing order. In contrast, I think the EU countries have post-back in not several years, 2019, that the outlook for the China for the first time as a systemic rival. I think China has been very unhappy about it, but I think most of European countries have taken that position. You mean Italy, which has been part of the BII. I don't think they happy on the China pressure on these countries even during the pandemic, China use those masks diplomacy, tried to pushed them to support a China positions, which I think backfired. And globally, I think the only country supported China unconditionally, only two countries, two countries I would say, one is Russia, the other is Iran, excess of evil! If you can use that term and even North Korea. I don't think it's very clear on the China side. Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada, and all those are democracies in the world. I think now got some problems with China. That as I said earlier, that the Trump has tried to build contaminant, the Trump administration has tried to build contaminant against China. Although most countries don't like Trump, but has been successful by default because these countries have a problems with China. So China, I think at this time, if I were China leaders, I'll be very concerned internationally because China has to be very isolated at this time, I'll argue that way.

Ezra Vogel: A related question. This is from Grant Wrote at Boston University, will Europe be a contested football between China and the United States? And will the competition accelerate the demise of the liberal order? What will the competition between China and the United States look like over Europe?

Suisheng Zhao: I don't know if it is a test ground to the extent that both US and China have tried to pull Europe to their own side at this time. But I will say Wang Yi's visit, for example, Chinese leadership visit, Wang Yi's visit to Europe last month was not successful at all. And compound pair has met many trips. A US diplomat have made many trip trips too. And there are problems between US and European countries. But the European countries, I don't think they want to make a choice between China and US, but if they have to make choice at these time, it seems like they are in a position. I think they will make choice more part of the United States, than China. So that's the issue now facing European countries and also only European countries and Japan and South Korea and Australia. And Australia, I think, has given very clear answer, they stand with United States and they have, now pushed-back so hard against China. So there are these kind of taking sides as a test ground. And when you do ask the question, do you talk about global order? Partially because of these countries have identified with US liberal values. Although Trump has not carry out, have not recognized these, followed these values, but this value themselves, I think, has to be recognized accepted by those countries.

Ezra Vogel: Another question here is about Africa, which we haven't talked about and the China's governance methods and say no to enterprises, support of economic development is quite prominent and widely accepted in Africa. And does this undermine the West liberal message? Will it contribute to the development in Africa? And we had a speaker on Latin America recently points out of it in South America. Many countries are also receptive to the need for economic
development and will China have more appeal to those countries? And will it be more successful and more helpful to those countries and their development than the United States has been?

**Suisheng Zhao:** I think that this is a very important question here. I did not mention that. In fact, that is so clear China appeals have a mostly taught, the global South, including Africa, Latin America and those Non-Western countries. They have to a great extend sympathetic and also benefited from the China model of modernization. And so they have, those are third [indistinct], neither have to a great extent accepted the Chinese vision of global order here as a shared future. That's what the share a future here also base them that has also taken place in the context of denying all backsliding of the Marxists in the West. So these countries high of seeing China as an increasingly powerful partner for their future, for their development. In fact, certainly they make sense because for these countries, the fundamental issue of instability, all those problems are poverty and not a democracy or political liberalization. So they think, if a child, I could have them to eradicate, eliminate poverty. And they don't think that in that case, they will follow the why's the models. And so if there's a new emerging Cold war, I will say it that China, Russia is wrong and also global South. And the other side is a US and European countries, Australia, Japan, even maybe Japan, South Korea is in the middle. They don't wanna make choice at this time. So it's a such a clear line, strong that on a side China, and global south.

**Ezra Vogel:** The final question, we haven't talked about internal developments within China, but the question is, and it's very hard to do, of course, for anybody to try to answer, what is the kind of support within China for a more liberal open, transparent structure, something in the return to what I like to think personally is a Deng Xiaoping [indistinct] and even though we have Euro bond, when there was more openness and what would, how would you go about trying to evaluate the possibilities of that in China's future? Or what are some of your thoughts about that? That'll be the final question for the day.

**Suisheng Zhao:** There's no future, if a current leadership continuously in office, which I think will be quite wild. So the openness and the liberal ideas in China has been silenced. In fact, there was a small hope when the pandemic started because of the mishandlement, mismanagement of the pandemic virus. At the very beginning, we saw those internet postings against naive Xu Zhangrun and Ren Zhiqiang And those people, who their views for a couple of weeks, I think was a circled naked, very viral in Chinese controlled state controlled in the night. I was very excited. Some people also in the West, predict that that was a China's Chernobyl moment meaning the beginning of the ending of the Congress party and the rising of a liberal movement. But unfortunately that has not happened because a Chinese government has been very successful using their state power to control the virus and also control the voice, that dis descent voice, arrest them even to put them jail, fired them from office, from their jobs that's successful. And the popular sentiment today is so strongly aligned with the government and this is from my own personal experiences, those are even wise and educated scholars in China, in Beijing university, in Miami university, you mentioned Wuhan university, all those faces you can see, I don't think it, they pretend it. Yeah, very strong supporter of the authoritarian government. They think that this time authoritarianism is the only way for China to maintain strong and to keep rise. And the liberal ideas so will create a problems like we have a lot of a criticism of the liberal system in a US Western countries. So in that kind of sentiments and the political environment, I don't see any hope any time soon of liberal development in China, I think I'll pin here to come back.
Ezra Vogel: Cause you know, there are a lot of Americans who hope that if a Biden administration comes in, we can still exist as of a liberal order and some advantages to China. But we really appreciate your very broad, broad brushed.

Suisheng Zhao: Let me add one sentence here on this subject. I think we now really should revise and license a theme or third time resilience and now the research is not no longer. And when China will become democratic is why China would not become democratic?

Ezra Vogel: Yes, and last year, you published between him and Joe Smith.

Suisheng Zhao: Yeah that.

Ezra Vogel: Very interesting debate on that issue.

Suisheng Zhao: Right? That's the exact question to ask today.

Ezra Vogel: With that issue. Next week, we're gonna try something different in order to go to Asia. It's very hard to ask people to get up at the middle of the night and address us. So next week we have somebody in Asia and they've kind of agreed to talk to us today, eight in the morning, that will be 8:00 PM our time. So we're trying the unusual experiment next week of meeting at 8:00 PM. And the speaker will be Wang Gungwu. Many of you will agree with me that he is, if not the meeting historian of China, outside of China, at least one of the very handful. And he's been a wonderful, thoughtful person about thinking what history has do with the contemporary period of China. And so he is kindly agreed to address us. He will get up at speak at 8:00 AM and Singapore time. It will be 8:00 PM our time. I hope many of you will join us. Thank you all for joining us today. Bye, bye. And bye bye Zhao.

Suisheng Zhao: Bye thank you.

Ezra Vogel: Thank you so much.