

Authoritarian Environmentalism and Chinese Ecological Civilization
with Judith Shapiro and Yifei Li
November 6, 2020

Ling Zhang: Okay. I think I'm going to start so people can then keep coming in as I'm introducing the events everything. Is okay? Great. All right. All right. Hello everybody. Welcome. Welcome to another environment in Asia event at a Fairbank Center for Chinese studies. My name is Ling Zhang, Zhang Ling in the Chinese way. I am an environmental and economic historian for pre-modern China. I've been teaching at Boston College. At the Fairbank Center, I convened the researcher series environment in Asia so I am very glad to see many friends and many new friends to show up at this event. I'm so inspired. So I would like to encourage you to keep following us. We will have many new events coming up in the future. So if you are interested in environmental study, environmental issue explicitly related to China, and more broadly related to East Asia, please follow our events. You can look for our events from the website of Fairbank Center for Chinese studies. All right.

Ling Zhang: So before I move on to introduce today's events and our speakers I would like to quickly remind you a new event, a forthcoming events for the environment in Asia series. So on Friday, November 20th at noon, 12:00 PM we will host a panel to talk about the issue infectious diseases and the public health management in China from both historical and anthropological perspectives. We're very lucky to be able to invite four awesome women scholars to join the panel. They are Nicole Barnes from Duke University, Mary Brazelton from the University of Cambridge Miriam Gross from the University of Oklahoma. And I can tell actually Miriam is right now in our audience. The fourth speaker will be Elanah Uretsky from the university of Brandeis University. So November 20th, Friday at noon, infectious diseases and public health management in China. Please join us to hear what our four amazing women scholars can offer.

Ling Zhang: So, all right, without further ado let me introduce today's event. We are very fortunate to have two wonderful scholars of Chinese environmental studies to be with us. Yifei Li right now is in the early morning in China, thank you for joining us and Judith Shapiro. So let me quickly introduce them and also introduce our, my co-host for tonight's events. So Professor Yifei Li is assistant professor of environmental studies at New York University in Shanghai and also global network assistant professor at NYU. This year Yifei is a residential fellow, however, currently in Shanghai for the Rachel Carson center for environment and society in Munich. Yifei's research concerns both the macro-level implication of the Chinese environmental governance for a state society relations, marginalized populations and the global ecological sustainability as well as micro level bureaucratic processes of the China's a state interventions into the environmental realm.

Ling Zhang: Professor Judith Shapiro is the Director of the master's in natural resources and a sustainable development for the School of International Service at American University. And she is also the chair of the global environmental politics program. Judith's research and the teaching focuses on global environmental politics and a policy. The environmental politics of Asia and also Chinese politics and the Mao. Among Judith's many books, *Mao's War Against Nature* published by Cambridge University, press two, Selden one. And *China's Environmental Challenges* published by Polity in 2016 are the must read for students of Chinese environmental

studies, including myself. So together Yifei and Judy they've just published a fantastic new book which is called *China Goes Green: Coercive Environmentalism for a Troubled Planet*. So you can tell, I have my copy here. I just finished reading, it's awesome so, So, you'll check out. This is, I learned a lot from this book.

Ling Zhang: Then we are very lucky to have a co-host today to join the conversation. Professor Arunabh Ghosh is a historian of a modern China, his research and teaching interests lies in social and economic history, history of science and statecraft transnational history and also China-Indian history. But at the same time, Professor Ghosh is also moving into the realm of environmental studies. He's currently working on a very interesting project which regards history of a dam and a reservoir construction in 20th century China. So welcome all three of you.

Ling Zhang: So without further ado, I'm just going to move, leave this platform to Yifei and Judith. So you'll have about 20 minutes to introduce your joint research. Let me quickly remind our audience. So we will begin with a joint presentation by Yifei and Judith, and then Professor Arunabh and I will run a short discussion conversation with them and then we will open this event to our audience. So if you have any questions, please type down your question in the Q and A box. So Arunabh and I will try our best to convey your question to our speakers. So please.

Yifei Li: All right. Thank you so much, Ling, for the very, very generous introduction and thank you Arunabh for serving as our moderator today. It's such a great honor to be on the same panel with all of you. Today we wanted to talk about our research on authoritarian environmentalism or just in general, the kind of coercive measures that China has taken in the name of environmental protection at home and overseas. We wanted to focus a little bit on our book but the seminar is by no means just about the book. It's about sort of various kinds of observations that we're making many of which did go into the book. But Judith do you want to start by telling the audience a little bit about ourselves and how we came together in writing this book?

Judith Shapiro: So I wanted to start with this image. I don't know if you know who that is. Do you? Haven't changed a bit, have I? Actually, what I really wanted to start with is to say that speaking at the Fairbank Center is always special for me. This is not the first time for me. And when I was about the age of this girl, getting her hair pigtails. So she would blend in a little better. I was already good friends with Holly Fairbank. Holly and I had been to Andover summer session together, then we went to Woodstock together, and then we became dancers together. And because of Holly, I knew John and Wilma pretty well. So speaking here feels very intimate to me. I like this picture because, shows that I've been involved with China for a long time. So that's what I have to say about that picture and now little Yifei...

Yifei Li: Okay, well basically I grew up in China, grew up in Shanghai. The picture to the right is the house in which I grew up. That's on the intersection of Nanjing road and Henan road right there in downtown Shanghai. Both of these pictures are really just to show that Judith and I have been thinking about and living in China for a very long period of time. And we're fortunate to be able to come in together to write this book. And we wanted to share with the audience, some of our observations that really motivated us to write this book together.

Yifei Li: And for me it's really the observations about how there seems to be an awful lot of foreign admiration for this idea of ecological civilization. The idea that democracies seems to have been not particularly effective in producing good responses to climate change in particular and environmental challenges in general. And because of the frustration with the ineffectual democratic responses to our environmental challenges many people seem to be speculating that authoritarian responses to environmental catastrophes may be warranted. Every time I hear these comments and these observations I just began to question them because they don't seem to be premised on very solid empirical understanding of what actually goes on in one of the most durable authoritarian political contexts in China when it comes to environmental protection. And I think it's just very, very important that before we entertain any speculations about this whole idea of quote and quote authoritarian environmentalism we actually have a full systematic understanding of how it looks like on the ground. But Judith would like to talk about another impetus for writing this book.

Judith Shapiro: Yeah, so in addition to the feeling that we have that maybe democracies are not up to the job of dealing with our planetary challenges and yet the authoritarian solution is not the best one. I want to go back to the sense that I've had over a few decades now hearing about ecological migration. And on the surface of it, ecological migration sounds really inspired. It sounds like people on coastal areas are not rebuilding after hurricanes because they realized that the sea levels are rising or something like that. But as this audience knows well ecological migration is actually a way for the state to centralize nomads and to achieve its goals in pacifying the border areas. And it makes it that much harder than for nomads to resist this kind of centralization if it's done in the name of environmental protection of the grasslands because your little hooved animals are tearing up the grasslands together with those pikas who are also making holes in the grasslands. So yeah, so this is an overview of the book. This is actually our table of contents.

Judith Shapiro: And I wanted to say, to give you a very fast overview of what we did in the book, we focused initially on the more developed Eastern areas we moved into the borderlands. We went out on the state on the Green Belt and Road and then we went into outer space. And for each of these spatial regions we identified certain tools that the state tends to like to use, in order to achieve its environmental goals. So we're going to give you a couple of examples of these, not all of them. But for example, campaigns and crackdowns, there'll be a campaign all of a sudden to have like a blue sky or there'll be a campaign to try to achieve a certain kind of pollution target. And there'll be targets that are set that are very, very strict. And just to give you an example of how this can go awry come one of my favorite examples from the book is in Henan, last summer they were trying to meet a certain kind of pollution target. And there were artificial spikes in the pollution readings, whenever these farmers turned on their grain threshing machines. And as a result, the local leadership forbade the farmers from using these threshing machines. And of course the farmers ended up losing their whole summer crop. So that's just one type of example. In chapter two there you can mention green grabbing as a form of impetus for more dam building. So in the name of renewable energy in the name of needing to achieve certain kinds of targets for hydro-power. The state makes it that much harder for people who are being dispossessed or dislocated because of dams to resist. Yeah, and I think Yifei is going to give some examples as well.

Yifei Li: Thanks Judith. Yes, I wanted to talk about one of the examples which we covered in the book. That's about recycling in Shanghai, the city I'm currently in right now. Recycling certainly is something that has tremendous environmental merits. But when it comes to recycling, particularly how it was implemented and pursued in the city of Shanghai we wanted to point out in the book that there are a number of notable features about the recycling program that came into effect last summer here in Shanghai. First is that it became such a major intervention that everybody in the city of Shanghai was talking about starting from last summer. Because the city imposed a very strict window of opportunity essentially for everybody to dispose of trash between the hours of 7 to 9 a.m. in the morning and 6 to 8 p.m. in the afternoon. So everybody can only dispose of trash within these four hours every day. And as you can see on this picture people sometimes can't make it back home before 6 p.m., before 8 p.m. at night. What do they do? They throw away trash right next to the garbage bin as opposed to in the garbage collection center. And each residential compound which however big or small it is limited to having only one garbage collection centers regardless of how many they used to have.

Yifei Li: And one of the things I wanted to point out is that before the implementation of this recycling mandate in Shanghai, it wasn't like there was no recycling going on in the city at all. In fact, on the contrary there was an awful lot of recycling. As you can see on this right-hand side image these mom and pop operations on these flatbed tricycles they move around the city to collect all kinds of recyclables that they could gather. And that basically was their primary source of income for many of these migrant households living on the margins of the society in Shanghai. And yet since the introduction of this new recycling mandate the government has tried to formalize all of these recycling activities to be placed under the arms of Shanghai local government. To such an extent that these mom and pop operations basically are pushed outside of the city. They don't have a means of income and means of livelihood anymore. We don't see nearly as many of these tricycles anymore. Even the ones that you do see today on the streets of Shanghai are either contracted by a certain local government agency or that they in fact work directly for one of the government agencies.

Yifei Li: So this intervention, once again, to environmental merits of the intervention, notwithstanding, we argued that the enforcement and implementation of it has had a lot of draconian impact on how people got their everyday lives how the Chinese and society and economy are organized and the environmental footprint of these enterprises. We've got many, many other examples, both domestically and internationally along these different lines. But we wanted the reader of the book and perhaps the discussion in today's seminar as well to be able to consider two conclusions that we're making. But Judith, do you want to begin by talking about this formulation of authoritarian environmentalism or environmental authority.

Judith Shapiro: Yeah, actually I want to give Yifei credit for this insight. But you know, a lot of times people say that they're that the Chinese state is using authoritarian means to achieve environmental goals. But through the work on this book we discovered that more often than not the state is using environmental justifications or excuses to achieve authoritarian goals. And that in so many ways, they're in the wrapping them wrapping these state mandates in the cocoa green is if anything intensifying state control over ordinary people. So this is very troubling and it's quite interesting to think about it in the context of as I'm sure we'll talk about in the Q and A. The context of say the carbon neutral commitment by 2060 or a whole other series of environmental

promises. Also China on the Green Belt and Road, what are the implications of that? And China modifying the weather on the Tibetan plateau to make sure that it rains,

Yifei Li: Right, indeed. And we also discuss in the book, a lot of interventions that the Chinese state has pursued outside of China, whether it's on the Belt and Road or into the Global commons, like Judith alluded to or even in the US-China trade war how environment actually also figured in the waste import ban that does have once again a lot of environmental merits, but we actually question many of the non-environmental consequences of these interventions. And the reason why we're suggesting that it's more like using environmental means to justify authoritarianism or authoritarian rule, as opposed to the speculation of using authoritarian approaches for an environmental end. Is because in many of the cases that we document in the book, there are questionable environmental gains. The pursuit of afforestation in Northern China, for example, Inner Mongolia in particular have very questionable environmental outcomes. And yet across the board, we're seeing the various kinds of Chinese state actors have gained more very substantial authoritarian leverage over its own citizens, its ethnic minorities, its partners on the Belt and Road, as well as the global commons. Another conclusion we would like to draw everybody's attention to is how... We're in fact, finding somewhat of a counter intuitive result which is that the success of China's brand of state led environmentalism hinges not on the strong state, but on the contrary it hinges on mechanisms that place state power in check.

Yifei Li: And once again, we admire and we praise the Chinese state's decisiveness in pursuing many of the environmental interventions. But we also wanted to point out that the success of these decisive moves is premised on a broad base of support from journalists, from scientists, from filmmakers, from even student activists, from NGOs and all sorts of actors outside of this state. These non-state mechanisms are pivotal in holding state power in check and does in producing effective outcomes in environmental governance. So that's what Judith and I have in terms of an opening presentation to orient everybody to our research agenda.

Judith Shapiro: Yeah, actually, there's one more thing. Yifei we should talk about ecological civilization a little bit I think. We skipped over that and that's so important. So why don't you-

Yifei Li: Yeah, okay, I'll do that. And yes, indeed. Thank you, Judith for pointing that out. And ecological civilization is also in the title of the talk. So it definitely is something we should talk about. A lot of observers--at least the ones that I've talked to--seem to have the tendency to just dismiss ecological civilization as yet another Chinese propagandist invention in the recent years. And that may well be true, but at the same time I want to point out two unique features with regard to ecological civilizations that I don't think should be just swept under the rug so easily. One is that ecological civilization represents a very, very major intervention on the part of Chinese Marxism. It's what many of the scholars in Chinese party schools are pointing out that that seems to be something that they're very proud of. Is a unique intellectual contribution of Chinese Marxists to Karl Marx stages of development theory. These scholars are suggesting that, Marx basically described the evolution of societies from agricultural to imperialism to capitalism, and then socialism, ultimately to communism. But Chinese Marxists are pointing out that in China's transition from a socialism with Chinese characteristics to communism there is this middle stage of ecological civilization. They are arguing very, very vigorously that this ecological civilization is a transitional stage that quote on quote China's experiencing. And at the

same time by virtue of China's experience it's contributing to refinement and even advancement of the classic Marxian formulations. So that's why it's just such an important intellectual and innovation quote on quote to Chinese state backed thinkers.

Yifei Li: And two is that China is very fixated on this idea of a century of humiliation since the Opium War and all the way till the end of the second world war. And the argument being that prior to the arrival of the British Imperial forces China was a glorious civilizational presence on the planet. And yet because of the British intervention China fell into this state of messiness. The Chinese communist party very much sees itself as an actor that has the capacity to quote on quote rejuvenate the Chinese nation. In other words, to bring back the former glory. Now this is why ecological civilization is so important because Chinese state ideological thinkers are saying that China isn't just going to come back as just any random form of civilization, but it's a very particular kind of civilizational leader that is ecological in quality. So ecological civilization, in other words, ties into an awful lot of intellectual and ideological baggage on the part of the Chinese state to such a point that we just don't think it should be something that we can just dismiss out of hand.

Ling Zhang: Thank you Yifei and Judith for this a wonderful opening. So this gave us an overview of your joint research. So now let's turn to our first round of our discussion. So how about we turn to Arunabh to lead our discussion? And I will say how I can pop in to contribute my few two cents.

Arunabh Ghosh: Right, thank you Ling. And delighted to be here delighted to meet Judith and of course to see Yifei again, and really, really impressed by the book. I have to congratulate you guys. I think both thoughtful and thought provoking in equal measure. So it's been ... Part of my attention is going to be how to sort of discipline the different kinds of questions I have so that they make sense both to you and then to our audience. But I thought maybe we could start off by talking a little bit picking up on some of the threads that you ended on with Yifei. But in order to do that, maybe I should point out to our audience that one of the things you do in the book is you say that the book is in three registers. You know, you're talking about sort of the sort of you trace like historical evolution. You talk about them in a contemporary moment and then you talk prospectively about what is sort of going on. What are the possibilities looking ahead? And in your historical sort of what you trace historically you've talked essentially about the systematization of the exercise of authoritarianism and the role the environment has played in that. And I wanted to link that to the discussion that you just had about ecological civilization. Wherein the framing really seems to be that this is something special and exceptional of China both as a theoretical contribution, but also as something that China is now experiencing it's in this stage and then it's going to make innovations.

Arunabh Ghosh: Sort of the question that emerges then is: Is this something that is China's alone or is this something that's much more universal? And how do we think about that in a contemporary context but also since both Ling and I are historians, when we were talking about this earlier in the week, but thinking about sort of other earlier historical moments where you can think of similar kinds of crises and then similar or and a response that might be interesting to think about. I have one obvious one that comes to mind, of course which is the *Population Bomb* and Paul R. Ehrlich and all of the discussion around that but I'm a modern historian. So I

normally think only about the 20th century. When Ling responded by saying, well she was thinking about it much longer durée. So I don't know if you want to provide, add anything to this link. But I was wondering what your thoughts are on this question.

Ling Zhang: Yeah, thank you so much Arunabh for bringing up this a historical dimension. So interestingly, in the past few days I was just revising an old article by myself and it was painful, but it's interesting, as I'm reading your book and I'm writing my own thing and I realize aha! Actually I'm a writing sort of an environmental authoritarianism as well. But I was dealing with something several years ago, right? So it would be wonderful to hear from you. So in a sense, you see applicability of the concept and then the way of thinking for other kinds of historical framework or have you encountered any other studies right. To say there, actually, this is unique and it's also unique to this particular circumstances to China in this proposal, socialist the circumstances, right?

Judith Shapiro: I like to say ironically I've written another book a while ago called *Mao's War Against Nature*, which in some ways Chronicles the authoritarianism of that period's destruction of nature so it's quite the reverse. It's not an all positive example. When you were talking Arunabh yeah. I was thinking more about how as a globe, as a planet there's a lot of search for another paradigm because we've messed it up. And so a little bit unlike Yifei sometimes the way I see ecological civilization is that I see some Westerners misunderstanding the phrase and getting super excited about it. They say, it sounds like, you know it was trying to suddenly become Bhutan or, you know everybody's talking trees or something like that. And it's that misunderstanding because it sounds so good that, I would think, "Wouldn't it be wonderful if America could put ecological civilization into its constitution the way Xi Jinping has done for China." But when we unpack and see what ecological civilization implies and all the sort of jingoism that goes along with it and the reassertion of Chinese superiority it has quite a different flavor. So I think we're trying to get some corrective to that. Yifei you have some,

Yifei Li: Yeah. My mind is still on the first part of Arunabh's question about how uniquely Chinese is destroyed, right? I think in a book we pointed out, a number of cases in which, we wanted to say that the world bank or some of the other international development agencies have been pursuing very similar approaches of development without consultation or development with token participation from the bottom. And in that sense, China merely adopted the same playbook that has characterized many, many decades of international development and even domestic development. So in that sense, it's not new. What seems to be new in what we're documenting is first of all, the Chinese state is not even apologetic about many of the side effects of environmental governance. Whenever they force these ethnic minority groups to resettle these nomadic groups, to resettle, they try to impose this discourse of, of urbanization being self-evidently good. Or centralization being self-evidently good, that development as the Chinese state sees it is self-evidently good. So that discourse is so overpowering and unapologetic and that level of sort of imposition seems to be rather unprecedented.

Yifei Li: But there seems to be another aspect of it, which I think is more interesting, is the Chinese state's dependence on technocratic tools in pursuing many of these changes. Technocratic tools that are used not only in China in monitoring citizens, in pursuing all kinds of technological advances, dams, and what have you. But also internationally on the Belt and Road,

China seems to have a ready audience, a ready market, that is not only in the want of these kinds of technocratic controls but also in, they're hungry for the kind of tools. I mean this year, because of the pandemic I was stranded in Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates for a very long time. And right there, I saw a lot of Chinese technologies whether it's the QR code based phone apps that enable government authorities to track people's movements or surveillance cameras, facial recognition surveillance cameras, once again, in the name of order in the name of environmental management has a very hungry market right there in the UAE. And certainly not just limited view into the UAE. So I think those are sort of, you could say maybe it's just a matter of degree but I also think that China's pursuit in fact, it seems to be qualitatively different in many areas.

Arunabh Ghosh: So that's really fascinating. And I want to come back to this idea of, the solutions that are being offered on the nature of technocracy and how it's being exported. But before that, just a sort of follow-up question. Because you talked about, you know, when you trace that of different models of authoritarianism if we use the political science terminology authoritarian resilience. you had the Andy Nathan, what if you call it 1.0 then you mentioned both of these, you talked about, authoritarian resilience 2.0 as well. And then you, one of the main arguments that you highlighted in your presentation right now, was the need for checks in some ways, right? That it doesn't really work in the absence of checks but we seem to also have entered a period when the checks really are no longer present. So do you think that this is constitutive is this authoritarian resilience to use another, to throw another sort of moniker onto this period the authoritarian resilience 3.0, in some ways. I mean it harkens back to the years, maybe 2017 marks the end of, end of the reform era, that stuff that was there was some conversation on those lines also, right. So would you say that this is a new era altogether, in some ways?

Yifei Li: I, maybe Judith has different ideas on this but in my view, I don't think we are entering an area that warrants a new label, that is qualitatively different from anything in the past. But one of the things that we really want to pay attention to is that in documenting Chinese environmental governance, we aren't just writing about failures, by no means. In the book, we also try to be careful about documenting successes. As we want to understand why they succeeded, right? So in suggesting that we needed these mechanisms that can place state power in check, the basis of that suggestion is precisely these success stories that we documented in a book. Whether it's the rehabilitation of the lowest plateau which I think this audience probably is familiar with.

Yifei Li: But for those of you who weren't, it's a story in which a group, a very diverse group of intellectuals and government officials and scientists came together to study the lowest plateau for two years without any intervention. It was just a two year fact-finding mission in which economists and scientists and ecologists and government officials came together, just to understand what was going on. In terms of the livelihood choices, in terms of people's collective memory of the past almost an oral history kind of intervention just to study the people. And after that two year fact-finding mission this interdisciplinary group of scientists, put together a proposal which the government endorsed and pursued which really was the reason that led to the initial success of the lowest plateau rehabilitation. But then the government in its haste to quote on quote replicate or scale up that's initial success. They wanted to just pursue one element of that proposal which was planting trees. And they didn't understand why planting trees or planting

what kind of trees to suit the local ecological condition in people's livelihood choices. In the end, they pursued monocultural forest. They planted the same kind of tree. And in that initial phase they planted an awful lot of poplar trees that grew up very quickly formed forests very quickly. But because these poplar trees have very deep root systems they ended up sucking up so much underground water and thus, intensifying desertification.

Yifei Li: And we wanted to use that story to quite simply to illustrate how important it is for the state to fully sensitize itself to these various kinds of inputs from society which produced the initial success. And in the second stage of that project because they tuned out from these various inputs they pursued something that they thought could work but it didn't, and it created so much ecological damage. That simply, is something that was very, very unfortunate.

Judith Shapiro: I would add that even though the space for environmental activism has shrunk under Xi Jinping, and it's certainly harder for foreign NGOs to operate and domestic NGO's have to be very careful, it's not as if the space has disappeared. It's a question of civil society groups partnering with the right kinds of authorities within the state. And in some ways the civil society groups can be the eyes and ears of the state. So another example of sort of supervision from below or citizen science or citizen engagement is this Black and Smelly Waters app, which I love the name, right? So if you have this Black and Smelly Waters app on your phone and you see some black and smelly waters you can take a picture, you can put your own GPS coordinates into it, you can upload it and then the government can come and investigate. You know, so this kind of cooperation, it's not as if it's like some kind of multi-party democracy at all, but it involves a kind of unleashing of what really is old school malice, right? It has to do with more trust in the masses and less mistrust, which has been more the pattern recently.

Ling Zhang: Can I quickly actually interrupt a little because I can see in the Q and A section, actually professor present Javier Duarte asked exactly related to question what's happening to the ten thousands of environmental NGOs that flourished until 2015? And I think Judith, you just answered this question to some extent. But I really actually wanted you to talk a little just a little of it more related to environmental civil society. And that there's certain special mechanism you just talking about, the collaboration. But does a collaboration only reach a certain limit, right? Certain point. So, and I think in this book you talk about some very interesting cases. So when you were responding, two of you were responding to non-China entities trying to say, 'Hey we have a funding here, we have sources here, what happens?' Right? Can you just quickly say a little bit more here?

Judith Shapiro: Yeah, in another book or another article I wrote there are certain characteristics about this cooperation. Actually, let me start with like an anecdote. At one point, The Prince Claus Fund which is some prize in the Netherlands they approached me secretly and they said, "We're considering giving a prize this prize to Ma Jun from the IPE, the Institute for Public and Environmental Affairs. But some people on the committee are worried that he's not sufficiently independent of the Chinese state. I said, this is the wrong question for the Chinese context, right? For the Chinese context it's does this person have the savvy to be able to achieve environmental goals despite the limitations of the Chinese state? And how effective is this person? And this person is so effective because this person has taken government data put it into an app, made it accessible allowed the state to then achieve its environmental goals. Sometimes the

environmental offenders are not out of Beijing. They may be middle level people. They may be lower level people, right? So sometimes the state needs that kind of freedom. That kind of--those kinds of eyes and ears the state can't be everywhere. So it's a very, very different model of civil society than we have in the US.

Judith Shapiro: Another time I was approached by I think it was Oceana one of these Ocean O groups and they said, "We're going to go to China, we're going to open up an office, we're going to do campaigns, we're going to be totally independent of the state, we're going to mobilize people." I'm like, "No, no you're not." You've got to find partners whether at the university level or within, some kind of state ocean management bureaucracy otherwise it's not going to happen. So that's just a very, very, very different model. And I still think there is space. I still think there's space.

Ling Zhang: Thank you.

Arunabh Ghosh: Great, fantastic. Thank you. I wanted to shift a little and ask, question that I guess it's partly about how do we understand what constitutes a radical solution? And this is in some ways tied to sort of senses of temporality. How the kinds of targets we set what we want to achieve, whether it's at 2060 carbon neutrality or something else like that. So what sort of in the ethnographic work that you have done what sort of sensibility about what constitutes radicalness do you encounter? And I'm thinking of this as, not just in terms of, the environment has become a planetary crisis. So, that itself I think becomes an interesting question. At what scale is something radical or not? But I think in some ways I'm interested because I think it applies to a political moment also in as much as what we we're seeing in the US right now, where there's a real sense of such a strong cleavage but also a tremendous desire to come up with quick solutions and sort of a quick fix in some ways. So I think the sensibility is perhaps it's pervasive, it's not just limited to our sense of the environment. But I was wondering if you have any reflections on that. So the idea of radical quick fix solutions or radical solutions and how it relates to temporality.

Yifei Li: Right, thanks, Arunabh, great question. You know, I really agree with you that we need radical solutions. And for those of us who are in the field of environmental studies I think there's a general consensus that this is the moment of what we call this all hands on deck moment. Where we can't afford to lose any opportunities that we may have at this point to tackle all of the environmental challenges we have. So we need, in other words, all the help that we can get. And this is precisely an opportunity to actually challenge the kind of state led environmental leadership that we're describing in China. Now you might think it's weird. I just said that we need all the help that we can get. Why is it that we don't want the Chinese States help that we can get? The argument is that empirically what we're documenting in China seems to be a situation in which the Chinese state doesn't just want leadership. The Chinese state wants monopoly to a point that it's pushing out many of the help that we can get. We're documenting situations like the recycling story that I just shared with you all. Is a situation in which the Chinese State tried really, really hard or at least the Shanghai local state here on the ground tried so hard to formalize an entire sector to a point of marginalizing, if not completely excluding other actors from participating in environmental sustainability. And that's very much detrimental to the overall long-term durability of the planet's habitability for us as humans. Because these mom and

pop flatbed tricycle recyclers had a very real and urgent economic incentive to recycle as much as they can. And yet these newly hired or newly created government employees for recycling they don't have an urgent economic incentive to do that.

Yifei Li: And the same goes for many other areas of environmental intervention in which we see the Chinese government is saying that, okay these independent journalists are quote on quote insulting China. Or these filmmakers are not telling China's story well. We're not at least according to the specifications of the Chinese state. Or some scientists as we have seen in the initial outbreak of COVID-19, they were saying that scientists, if you want to publish a result of any of your studies on COVID you have to get a rubber stamp approval from a higher level of authority because your story may not be in line with what the government narrative happens to be for that moment. And in all of these cases we're seeing that the state not only dominating a field but essentially domineering a field in the sense that they really don't want voices to the contrary. And that's very bad for the environment because we really are at a moment where we cannot afford to lose any help that we can get.

Judith Shapiro: Well, let me just add. I don't think we use the word radical in the book at all. I don't think that's part of our, that never occurred to me but we do talk about these campaigns and the campaigns have been from the map here in on and they'd never been a good idea, right? All of a sudden, all hands on deck, let's do this let's fill in this Lake. Let's make grainfields where they didn't use to be grainfields whatever it is. Or let's get the sky's blue for the Olympics or for APEC or whatever. And then the weak get caught up in the net and they suffer and then in the long run it's not sustainable. You know, the goal that was supposed to be achieved is not achieved because the people are not on board and it's so focused on a target and it's, one of the killing the chicken, scare the monkey kind of thing. So, yeah.

Arunabh Ghosh: Great. So, I mean, in some... This is really fascinating because in some ways underlying this then one could argue is sort of this crisis of capitalism, that really is about growth. So if we set aside the sort of words that generate all kinds of anxieties amongst people, capitalism, socialism, so on. The idea that there is a consistent sort of commitment to growth is in some ways the engine for a lot of these crisis. So do you see any sort of possibility of whether pro-ecological civilization or other kinds of concepts and attempt to reassess that sort of fundamental given in some ways? So this because it speaks to some of the things that you talked about in terms of redistribute of justice but who sacrifices first in order to achieve some kind of more environmentally sort of sustainable future and so on. Do you see that as part of the conversation at all anywhere or is that really a pipe dream?

Yifei Li: Well, not that I am aware of, I wish that that becomes part of the political mainstream or at least part of the political discourse even on the margins, but, but now that's, I don't think that's something to my knowledge has happened yet. But also just on the note of growth, I think we need to pay attention to the kind of economic growth imperative not only in China, which certainly is very strong particularly in this post COVID recovery. We see that a very, very central part of China's post COVID recovery plan is to in fact suspend environmental impact assessment, suspend a lot of the environmental rules for what they consider to be pillar industries in this economic recovery phase. Whether it's a six month exemption or even a full year exemption, we don't know but it seems to be the case that many of these industries currently at

this phase don't subject themselves to environmental monitoring anymore. So that certainly is a very strong domestic economic growth incentive.

Yifei Li: But also internationally, we're seeing that a lot of the surplus of Chinese economic production being shifted overseas to coal fired power plants in Sri Lanka and deep water, seaports in Djibouti. And these sort of surpluses of Chinese economic growth overseas have very, very serious ecological consequences. Whether it's damaging do Marine ecology of Djibouti or whether it's producing more carbon emissions along the entire Belt and Road. All of that have not only short term but also long term ecological implications that we need to be paying very serious attention to.

Judith Shapiro: Yeah, and if I can add so much of the Belt and Road is about this mega infrastructure, whether it is deep water ports, high speed rail, highways, big dams these all carve up habitat. There's a question in the Q and A about non-human beings trying to, because of this technocratic orientation, let's quantify the carbon right? But no understanding of island biogeography for example, and what it means to fragment the habitat and what it means then in terms of extinction rates and the possibility of these creatures to survive. I don't see that.

Arunabh Ghosh: It just occurred to me as I was listening to both of you that I think in the latest, the memo for the 14 five-year plan an actual GDP target has been dropped which is sort of one of the big things that people are sort of wondering about. But I don't, it's sort of a small thing, but when one does, that's linked to a non-medical considerations or it's much more the more mundane drivers of all of its legitimacy in some ways. I know we have a lot of questions and we probably should transfer to that to that section of the evening.

Arunabh Ghosh: But maybe one final question that is much more contemporary about sort of what's been happening over the past few days in the US and the likelihood that we're going to have the new president elect very soon. In a recent *South China Morning Post* op-ed you sort of concluded coauthored by the two of you, you concluded that one of the things that new president Biden might want to do is sort of revive the kinds of things that Obama was doing. So the 2014 meeting with Xi Jinping and so on. So could you perhaps talk a little bit about what you see now that it seems more likely what kinds of things should immediately be done by the US perhaps as one of the two major players on the global environmental scene, along with China?

Judith Shapiro: Well, maybe I think that was my sense in the op-ed and maybe I'm naive because my students were all asking me who do the Chinese want to have win? And I heard from some Chinese people that they really wanted Trump to win because they see Trump doing so much damage to US reputation, silver power status and so on and so forth that we would continue to be in this chaotic situation which would allow China then to further its goals. But purely on the climate change point of view I think some people are saying it's going to be more of a competition, but this maybe my naive take. I'm seeing more of a potential for what we call environmental peacemaking right? So US-China relations are so fraud on so many levels but this is one area where they ought to be able to agree. Environment is often a kind of wedge issue where people can understand that they need to come together. And that could be the basis then for dealing with a whole raft of other sorts of issues. So, yeah, I think we should go back to 2014. Xi Jinping Obama committing to trying to deal with climate change.

Yifei Li: If I could add to that, I completely agree with Judith definitely go back there go back to that bilateral agreement. The United States rejoined the Paris agreement and recommitted itself to the kind of cuts that Obama administration committed to. But at the same time, there's another aspect which I think has a lot more potential to get into which is that many of the discussions at this point has been about how the Biden presidency could potentially try and hold China accountable for many of its international pledges or even domestic punches about carbon emission reductions, energy intensity pledges, and various kinds of environmental goals. So hold China accountable to these environmental goals. But to me, that's just the first step.

Yifei Li: The second step is to see that okay if China indeed fulfills these goals to the greatest possible extent, and we have a third party verification mechanism to make sure that China has indeed accomplished these goals but we need to be asking, at what cost? Both domestically and internationally. If achieving these goals mean that Chinese citizens and China's Belt and Road trade partners be subject to even more centralized control of the Chinese state or internationally be subject to more geopolitical leverage on the part of China. And in placing its trade partners in an even more disadvantaged position then we need to be asking whether achieving these environmental goals are equitable or even worth the while if achieving these goals mean that we are sacrificing so much individual Liberty and global balance of power. So that I think is a long-term conversation that has not yet happened yet but it certainly should begin to figure in international politics a lot more prominently.

Arunabh Ghosh: Great, thank you.

Ling Zhang: Thank you. Yeah, well, so I think we should open this up for a Q and A, a broader Q and A because we can see many questions come in. And I just want to quickly mention that since this last round of conversation about the changing political landscape in the United States. I meant to but I forgot to thank all of you, both our speakers and also all the audience actually to show up at this particular hour to participate in this conversation. I know all of us have been living through this chaotic days and so thank you for being here with us. I hope our event have been serving a wonderful distraction to you all. So we will look at the questions how about, let me pick up a first question first and then I think Arunabh you can look through the list so we can try to go through as many questions as possible.

Ling Zhang: So there's a question from our friend Michael Hathaway and he's asking this questions related to my own concern I guess, a part of, because I'm a historian. So this question is a more for Judith. So Michael said, "Yeah we all love your book *Mao's War Against Nature*, so based on your new book here, collaboration with Yifei, do you have any diverging reflections on environmental dynamics during the Mao era? Would you write the same book now about nature under Mao or have your views changed on that era? So in a sense, what major parallels and divergence do you see with the era under the Mao and a contemporary era?"

Judith Shapiro: Thank you for reading my book. I think the *Mao's War Against Nature* was so much based on field work and interviews, and that book wrote itself. I wouldn't change a thing, right? Because those were the stories that people told me. That's what they experienced during that time. I think what was more challenging for me was like another book in between which is

China's Environmental Challenges, which was about the sort of roots of environmental degradation today. And the fact that in *Mao's War Against Nature* I was making this argument that the Mao period had caused all this environmental degradation. And yet, as soon as the Mao period was over the environmental degradation got a thousand times worse right? So how was I going to explain that, right?

Judith Shapiro: And so for me what was interesting during the Mao period was almost the discourse of human conquest of nature, this oppositional kind of warlike imagery that was so dominant throughout that period. And now it's not so much, although in in this recent book we have a number of make war on pollution kinds of images. But I think that the market capitalism all of this kind of growth has been much more destructive for the environment in sort of absolute terms. Maybe not in any ideological terms as compared with the Mao period. I mean, during the Mao period they didn't have all that packaging. You didn't see piles and piles of trash everywhere, all of those kinds of things. And even though the water was highly contaminated it wasn't black and stinky in quite the same way. So yeah I think it's ... I would definitely love to go back to China as it was in the eighties just looking at the Hunan countryside with those, that mix of palm trees and evergreens and the rice paddies and that was a lovely scene. It was a lovely scene and so much has been lost. So I don't know, I guess, Yifei you can't answer that question. It was for me.

Arunabh Ghosh: Great, we have a question from a namesake of yours Yifei but xing Sun, Sun Yifei who I think it's useful because we didn't hear you talk much about sort of your methodology. So perhaps we could get a little bit about how you went about. So the question is, did you talk to government officers about why they made the choices they made and was this Shanghai specific or is that sort of more broader kind of picture that you can describe? And he had a second question about geographical variation which I think is more straightforward because you've covered that in the, when you talked about the table of contents. But yeah, a little bit about the methodology in terms of how you went about.

Yifei Li: Right, perhaps just very quickly. So to this other Yifei, Yifei Sun in the audience, I think we would like to think of the book as a collection of case studies at different levels that registers at different levels of analysis. So like Judith alluded to, when we showed you the table of contents of the book, we begin with the industrial East, East of the country, we then moved to the Western borderlands and then to the Belt and Road across the Eurasia continent and beyond, and then ultimately into the Global commons and even outer space. So that's sort of the spatial organization of the book. We followed the Chinese state as it progresses as it expands into the Global commons. In terms of the composition of each chapter each chapter has a number of case studies quite a few case studies in each of the chapters. And for some of the cases Judith and I derive our descriptions from our own personal experiences. In some of the cases I took materials from my own dissertation field work. I am an ethnographer of the Chinese state. I talk with Chinese state officials all the time and it looks like this Yifei from the audience might be interested in my second book which is coming up with the MIT press hopefully if everything goes as planned. That book, thank you, that book will have a much more detailed methodological discussion about how I come to gain the knowledge that I have about these various officials into bureaucratic decision-making processes that defines the apparatus environmental governance. So be on the lookout perhaps that other Yifei hope to be friend with you.

Ling Zhang: Fantastic, yeah. So can I follow up with a question I think is slightly related to here? So we have a member here, Natalie Ballo. Well, Natalie says she really enjoyed this lecture as a wonderful distraction. Yay, we did it—so wonderful. So Natalie says, "I know you discussed a great deal about how NGO and environmental activists have increasingly limited and a narrow space to operate in China." Although Judith repeatedly emphasized that there is a space. "So I am wondering in this case for scholars like yourself if you also face increasing difficulty in researching publishing on Chinese environmental issues?" And I think in the past several months especially due to coronavirus we've been hosting many people institutions hosting research event to educate ourselves and our graduate students on how to do research, given all these constraints, right? So what's your experience, what's your solutions?

Yifei Li: Great. What a great question. I mean, and also, my mind explodes when I hear questions like that because there's so many different levels of concerns that are registered along these lines. One is that research whether we can even get to research access anymore. I alluded to I'm ethnographer of the Chinese state. I was actually granted unlimited access to one of the central Chinese ministries in Beijing for a full year of ethnographic observation in their offices. I sat with these officials. I had full access to their archives and all the documents even in their draft form. That was a level of access that I can't even imagine today. It was also towards the end of my yearlong observation in Beijing that there was an internal government order that came down to the unit where I was working in that that began to actively discourage officials from using iPhones because of worries that Apple phones were more prone to manipulation from foreign actors or foreign institutions. So there were a number of other things at that level, just because of access.

Yifei Li: But then I think Natalie's question is also about how we talk about our research in China. This event is not the first event that Judith and I have been doing. We've also been doing events with NYU Shanghai my own home institution. And when we did that we made it absolutely clear to the event, organizers that we didn't want promotional materials to appear in mentoring Chinese. We wanted the event to be exclusively in English as a measure of precaution. Simply because we didn't want people to misinterpret. You know, we don't want a situation where some member of the audience, or maybe a member of the general public take a sentence in Chinese out of context and then begin to misinterpret what we mean in the book. So that was something that we were trying to be very careful about. But also it's not just research, it's also teaching, right? Because of many of the recent events and we all know that there's the Hong Kong national security law. We want it to be a little more careful in how we present our materials to our students and how our students access materials. And once again, before the beginning of this webinar we were talking about just in the group of four that we have here about how sort of NYU Shanghai exists in a bubble within China. And the real worry is that the bubble could burst, right? To what extent can we protect our students? To what extent can we protect our faculty members in terms of academic freedom? Those are real questions now, Ling unfortunately, I don't think I have a sort of a definitive answer to many of the questions but I guess the upshot is we try to be very careful in navigating the landscape.

Judith Shapiro: And for me, it's just about people to people ties, people I have known for decades. And so that's, what's so sad about the status of US-China relations now. You see these

young people coming along who wanted to have the chance to go study in China or Chinese who wanted to have the chance to come study in the US, and those ties are being broken. And so we're not getting that kind of mutual understanding. I think actually Chinese people and American people understand each other very easily on a people to people level there's a natural fit. And so I, anyway that... My research, it has to do with the people I know really. So always has.

Yifei Li: If I could just add to that a personal anecdote that I think people will like hearing on that note. My wife was a schoolteacher in a public school district in Wisconsin. A friend of hers from Wisconsin and American friend who doesn't speak a word of Chinese visited China while we were still in Wisconsin. And that guy visited my father-in-law, who, by the way doesn't speak a single word of English. And the two of them managed to have a dinner together for five hours. They drank so much and they became best friends. They kept talking about each other via us. And we felt, you know, that's precisely to Judith's point of how it's not so hard for the people of China and the United States to actually come together and understand each other and begin to have meaningful conversations and begin to even build very robust friendships. And that level of connection I think, is something that we definitely would love to see more of.

Arunabh Ghosh: Great. There's been a few different questions that I've tried to sort of address the legacy of the Mao era in different ways, but I'm going to read out portions of Miriam Gross's question, because I think that, and sort of piggyback on that as a way of asking you to maybe reflect on the legacies of the Mao era. Miriam writes that I found she's talking about the first conclusion about ecological efforts end up addressing authoritarianism. And she says, "I found a similar exploitation of public health to gain non-health political goals during the Mao era. For example, co-operative management of night soil in the name of controlling parasitic disease had negligible impact on the disease. However, it was very effective at forcing people into producers' cooperatives, because without access to fertilizer, they couldn't do solo farming. So disease management was also used as a mechanism to try to force settlement of previously uncontrollable migrate rate fisherfolk. So do you think your observations are an evolution of these earliest stages or is this something that has been created a new?" Or any other reflections you might have on sort of the legacies of the Mao era broadly speaking?

Judith Shapiro: That's a really interesting observation. Yeah. I mean, when you first used the phrase legacy of the Mao era to me that has to do with the deal that the Chinese people made with the communist party of China after they'd become disillusioned under Mao. And basically they said, "Okay, as long as our living standards go up, we'll let you stay in power." And so that, that's the whole story of how China became the manufacturing capital of the world and why we have such intense pollution. But this willingness to not so much question authority, at least that was the deal. And I think that that deal has been a dangerous deal, right? Cause that kind of intellectual flourishing and freedom of the eighties before '89. Now you go to a bookstore and it's all about how to get an MBA right? So, and parents don't want their kids to go into these thinking fields. They want them to make money. That whole way of thinking is I think supported the intensification of authoritarianism under Xi Jinping. I don't know if Yifei agrees with me or not.

Yifei Li: Yeah, I definitely agree on that note but I want to thank Miriam Professor Miriam Gross's question on that score. But I think, if we could just think a little more broadly about whether side effects of policymaking or whether intended or unintended whether foreseeable or unforeseeable, I just want to stress that these side effects are by no means unique to the kind of environmental policies that we're describing. If you think about zoning policies or nuisance laws in the United States. I mean, they have the manifest goal of creating urban order but they also have an implicit enough and oftentimes a very strong implicit goal of racial exclusion or socioeconomic exclusion or even segregation in many cases. So for a policy to have a set of manifest goals and a set of sort of implicit and an unstated goals, I don't think that's in any way unique to the circumstances that we're discussing.

Yifei Li: So, to your specific question about night soil management and disease control, I think it's just a fascinating example of yet another instance. But to your specific question about whether there's an evolution of these earlier strategies I think, the hard part, I'm still trying to process is the level of intentionality. Whether the state actors actually observed earlier instances of these political gains out of whether it's public health management or environment environmental management, and that they wanted to scale up these political gains through more interventions. I don't know. I mean, I can't I just honestly can't tell whether there is an element of intentionality in that, and yet that sort of level of unknowable intentionality aside I still think that what we're documenting is that these non-environmental consequences in Chinese environmental policies are becoming more and more systematic over time. And I think that's just very clear. Judith and I were just talking a few weeks ago about the use of facial recognition technologies in these trash collection centers in Beijing. That already is a thing. There has been new stories about how these facial recognition cameras can and quote and quote catch people who aren't recycling properly. And that seems to be just an escalated level of gaining more citizen control through what seems like an environmental policy.

Ling Zhang: Wow, that's fascinating. So you would have better sought your trash carefully right? Well, our speakers graciously agreed to stay behind for a couple of more minutes. So I wonder Arunabh how about we both pick questions, so at least we can put in two questions, so two to finish up. So if you don't mind, I'm going to go ahead first. So I think a Professor Hai Ren I believe from University Arizona if I'm correct, Professor Hai Ren asked, "How does your theoretical framework address non-human aspects of the environment, both inside and outside China?" And Arunabh.

Arunabh Ghosh: Should I ask it too now? Okay.

Ling Zhang: Yeah I think then we can wrap up maybe in a few minutes.

Arunabh Ghosh: Okay, so then I think the one that sort of we haven't really touched upon it's from Muming Choi who says, "Thanks for the presentation and the book. I'm a human geographer working on environmentalism in South Korea and see a lot of commonalities here. I have two questions. Another and more prevalent trend in environmentalism is the market led approach to it. Do you see the intersection of the market led and the state led approaches to environmentalism? For example, like state sponsored the mandated payment for ecosystem services, ecotourism and so on." And the second question is, to what extent do you think your

argument on an environmental authoritarianism can be applied to the countries in East Asia which have experienced similar authoritarian governments?' Thank you.

Yifei Li: Well, that's a lot.

(all laughing)

Arunabh Ghosh: But so as you see fit, I guess or engage as you see fit.

Yifei Li: No these are all great. I guess I'll try to be short. Okay, non-human aspect? Yes, we didn't really touch on non-human aspect in the book explicitly, but I think one of the things we ought to pay attention to is that the Chinese state actors that we document in the book seem very fixated on imposing a Han ethnic majority ways of life on ethnic minorities. And that comes oftentimes at the cost of a lot of ethnic minority ways of life. And by implication non-human actors figure even less prominently in that formula right? So it's not only a human centric view of development, but it's an ethnic majority centric view of development that's being imposed. So in that sense, I would think, yeah I'm with you that we need a non-human aspect, a non-human perspective, but we just are sort of very far from getting there at this point.

Judith Shapiro: We do talk about non-human issues with respect to the wildlife trade though, is a kind of success story. So particularly with respect to the shark finning issue and on the way towards the success, maybe the ivory trade and of course not so much pangolins and coronavirus. But as it's interesting in our theoretical framework because I think about having an argument rather than a theoretical framework, but I don't know maybe we have a theoretical framework. Yeah. And the South Korea thing is so interesting. Yeah. I wish I knew South Korea better.

Arunabh Ghosh: What about the sort of the broader question about sort of market based versus sort of more state led and multiple intersections. Do you see that?

Yifei Li: Yeah. Definitely, especially in the context of the carbon neutrality pledge that came out I want to say maybe three weeks ago a very central mechanism for the Chinese state to approach them go is in fact the carbon cap and trade mechanism. So that perhaps is a great example of what Professor Choi is suggesting in terms of intersection of state led approaches and market led approaches. I think everybody should beginning to be thinking about is the fact that carbon is the fact of life on the planet. Everything we do produces carbon everything an organization does produces carbon.

Yifei Li: If China, in order to achieve the carbon neutrality pledge the Chinese government is now increasingly placing all the economic activities under the accounting mechanisms of the carbon cap and trade markets all over China. Does that mean that everything that a company does or an organization or a university does, will be subject to that level of accounting? And accounting itself doesn't worry me, but what really worries me is the allocation of carbon credits through the carbon trade mechanism. Every organization, every group will be allocated a certain amount, but on what basis? It essentially gives the Chinese Government sweeping power in allocating what activities are worthwhile in the Chinese economy. And that carbon, that carbon

trade mechanism, has a real, real potential in becoming more of a draconian authoritarian tool than what it sounds like.

Ling Zhang: I can see the time is 8:22 already seven minutes, behind our schedule. And I can tell there's so many other wonderful questions in the list. So unfortunately we cannot cover all the questions but I will make sure to copy paste all the questions of yours and send them to Judith and Yifei. And also, you know, where they are. You can easily Google them to look them up or to look for their emails and getting touch with them. So Judith from American university Yifei currently NYU Shanghai, so you can look them up, right? So I think we should thank our speakers, Yifei and Judith and for participating and gaming as a such a thought provoking and extremely, very rich informative conversation. And I thank you Arunabh for channeling following all these thoughts and wonderful ideas and open the conversation up. And I really appreciate all of you for participating in this event. Let's hope we will live through the rest of the night, to get some good news, that can serve as a stabilizer for the global political and also environmental stability. So everybody, audience thank you for being here.

Ling Zhang: Let me quickly remind you if you are if you are interested in learning more about our events Fairbank Center in regard to the research series environment in Asia please follow our website information. Our next event will be on Friday November 20th at lunchtime. It will be about infectious disease and public health management in China both from historical and anthropological perspectives. So thank you for being here tonight. Thank you. And I'm going to ask all of you to check out from the zoom first so that will leave us the speakers just one minute for us to wind down and to connect with each other for a minute. Thank you everybody. Good night.

Arunabh Ghosh: Thank you, Ling and Arunabh. Thank you for the great opportunity.

Judith Shapiro: Thank you all for being here.

Arunabh Ghosh: For people who're still here, and haven't bought the book, they should go buy it. It's a fantastic book.

Ling Zhang: It's a really—a really wonderful read. Thank you.