

November 17 Benno Weiner – This Absolutely is not a Hui Rebellion!

– Okay, great, so hello and good afternoon. Welcome to the Fairbank Center's Modern Chinese Lecture series. My name is Arunabh Ghosh. I teach modern Chinese history here in the history department. I also convene this lecture series, so welcome of course to all of you in the room, but our audience members online as well. Before I introduce our speaker, I just wanna quickly flag our final talk of the semester on November 29th, which is a Tuesday at 4:00 PM, we welcome Linh Vu from Arizona State University. We'll be delivering a talk titled The Politics of Martyr Commemoration in Modern China, and Contemporary Taiwan. So please look out for the formal announcement of that, which will be up in over the next few days. Today it's a pleasure to introduce and to welcome our speaker. Benno Weiner is associate professor in the history department at Carnegie Mellon University. He's a historian of modern China, Tibet and , and much of his research focuses on China's contested and as he would likely argue, incomplete transition from empire to nation state. In particular, his work explores the processes, and problematics of 20th century state and nation building within China's ethnic minority regions. And in keeping with those themes, many of you probably know his first book, "The Chinese Revolution on the Tibetan Frontier," published by Cornell University Press in 2020 is among the first major studies of nationality of a nationality minority region during the formative years of the People's Republic of China. It is also the first to examine early efforts by the CCP to integrate the vast region known to Tibetans as Amdo. Benno is also the co-editor along with Robbie Barnett and Françoise Robin of "Conflicting Memories, Tibetan history under Mao Retold" which was published in 2020 by Brill. Benno received his PhD from Columbia University. And before joining Carnegie Mellon, he also taught at Appalachian State University. He's now working on a new monograph tentatively entitled "Imperial Borderland to Socialist State, "Territorialization and Minoritization "on the Margins of Republican and Early Maoist China." And I believe the talk is in many ways related to that larger project. So look forward to hearing more about it. Before I hand things over to Benno, a few words about format, Ben will speak for about 40 minutes, thereabouts. We'll then follow that with Q&A for about 30 minutes. We can stretch that a little bit more if need be. For those of us who are joining us online, please feel free to use the Q&A function to type up your questions. I'll give priority to the people in the room, but I'll do my best also to get to your questions to the extent possible. So, Benno we very warm welcome and over to you.

– Thanks so much. Thank you Arunabh for the invitation, first of all, for the very kind introduction, I wanted to thank Mark Elliot, who I think recommended me for the series initially as well to Mark Grady, who did all my arrangements and is manning the slides as well. And everybody at the Fairbank Center that makes not just this talk, but

all the things that you do here so wonderful, so important. And as always, you've had some great speakers. You're gonna have another great speaker this semester, and I'm really honored and humbled to have the opportunity to participate, to be one of 'em and to speak with all of you about some of the new work that I've been undertaking. And to be honest, in a sense, I'm a tad bit nervous and that's not just because I'm at this sort of esteemed venue, but that as Arunabh was suggesting, most of my research to this point has been on Tibetan communities. and this is sort of, this paper which I'm gonna get today, which is kind of a bridge from that book to my newer work is really the first time that I'm putting another ethno-cultural group at the center of my focus. And other people maybe in this room, maybe online, but certainly out there who have spent their careers studying Chinese Muslims and Islam and China. So I get this paper knowing that there's a lot that I still have to learn about these topics. But also I hope that by focusing on the Hui, or Sino Muslim populations during this really important fundamental transitional period of the early Maoist State, it adds to our understanding of State, and Nation building on ethnocultural margin borderlands during the early PRC more generally, and of course about the Hui more specifically. And I'm certainly happy to receive critiques, and corrections, and criticisms, and hopefully some kind questions if you will as well either at the end of this talk or in private, and at some point in the future. So I think I'm gonna stand up 'cause I think I maybe feel a little more comfortable doing so. So one of the things that really intrigued me as I was researching my book, although I didn't really pursue it in a sustained way in the pages of that book, was a different approaches that the party, the communist party of China took to conceptualizing Tibetan versus Hui Muslim communities in the Northwest, and then towards incorporating them into the new socialist state. And today, of course, the state considers Tibetans to be one of the most problematic minzu in China. And by contrast, at least over the last few decades, at times the Hui has been touted as something like a model minority, a successful example of the harmonious inter-ethnic relations, and the effective application of the Party's Minzu Policies, and ethnic policies and principles. This couldn't have been more different in 1949, however. On the eve of so-called Liberation, Party and Military leaders in the Northwest anticipate stiff resistance, sustained resistance from Muslim communities. On the other hand, they expected that Tibetan Buddhist communities would welcome their forces more or less with open arms. And we're gonna talk about, or I'm gonna talk about the second part of that equation in due time. The first part, however probably wouldn't be, or shouldn't be too surprising to people who have studied these communities, whether it's in the late Qing or in the Republican period. As historians such as Jonathan Lippman and others have shown in China, as in many other places, the state has had a long a tradition, I guess you could say of racializing Muslim populations as insular, untrustworthy, disloyal, violent, and these types of things. In China, this of course was magnified by the so-called great Muslim

rebellions or the Great Northwest Rebellions of the late 19th century, which really devastated the Northwest while furthering Muslim fear of their Han neighbors, and of the state itself, I think. And all this of course is still in living memory in the 1930s and 1940s, 1950s and really still cast a shadow to this day. Of course, minorities are automatically minorities as others have reminded us such as Gyanendra Pandey, excuse me, like the nation itself, they're historically constituted. During the Republican period debates rage both among Muslim intellectuals and between them, and the Han establishment over what type of community Sino Muslims or Chinese speaking Muslims embodied, whether it was religious, whether it was ethnic, whether it was both, neither, something else, without coming to any real resolution as far as I can tell. The Goman Dan and Xing Le Sheed generally considered Sino Muslims to be a religious minority, although of course more recent research has shown that the reality is a little more complicated than that. Communist Leaders seized upon this as an opening. So the time that their soldiers captured Northwest China, the Party had long insisted that the region's Chinese speaking Muslim populations belonged to the larger singular Hui Minzu, and that the Hui were one component of historically constituted, inseparable multi minzu China. Despite these assumptions and despite considerable efforts to overcome them over more than a decade really, by 1949 the CCP had experienced only limited success attracting support from China's Northwest Sino Muslim communities. Meanwhile, in the battlefield, some of its worst defeats come at the hands of prominently Muslim armies. As explanation officials involved in nationalities work as they termed it, repeatedly cited familiar tropes, that identified the co-conservative, and parochial nature of Islamic culture and religion as obstacles to both nationality and class awakening. However, they were also pretty quick to shift the lion's share of the blame to what the Party referred to as Great Nationality Chauvinism Da Minzu Jui were more commonly a spread Han Chauvinism, the Han Zin Jui. The claim was that for centuries, centuries of repression and exploitation at the hands of the Han majority primarily, and particularly the the cataclysmic violence visited upon Northwest Muslim communities in the late Qing had left them distrustful of the overwhelmingly Han PLA and CCP and therefore also susceptible to the manipulation by reactionary Muslim leaders, elites, especially the so-called Mao family warlords who had dominated the Northwest since the last years of the Qing Empire. So what I'm gonna try to do over the next 30, 35 minutes or so is to dive into what this all would mean for the Party and for the people that codified as Hui during the first tense months and years of the People's Republic. By zeroing in, in particular on the party discourse, on great nationalities, chauvinism, and its application in more particularly complex frontier region that we'll be talking about. I'm not gonna be examining the construction evolution, maintenance or complexities involved with Sino Muslim or Hui identity itself. That's been the subject of many very good studies in recent years. Instead, I'm interested in examining the discourse, and the policies that

merged from that discourse as a creative but ultimately insufficient mechanism for tackling one of the most vexing global problems of the 20th Century State Building. And that is how to fit the ethnocultural diversity of the domestic state within the Nation State forum without resorting to ethnic violence. To get us situated, the area that I'm gonna be most focused on is what has been referred to as the Qinghai Gosu Islands when I moved out Hui maybe. This is a topographically, and a demographically diverse Wu-Hang region that today lies in Southern Gansu, and Eastern Qinghai provinces. Or if we look at it from the Tibetan perspective, the area that forms a Northeastern Frontier of the region known as Amdo. Hmm, there we go, North of the Yellow River, you kind of see the Yellow River maybe in there. I'm not sure if this pointer works. North of The Yellow River lies a ethnically mixed, but heavily Muslim districts that stretch roughly from Linxia in Gansu, which even then was often referred to as the Mecca of China, to the agricultural districts that surround Qinghai's Capital of Xining. Well, Tibetan Buddhist communities traditionally predominate in the towns and villages, and monastery regions south of the River. And particularly as you move upward into the grasslands that spread out within the great bend of the Yellow River. Now the CCPs Critique of Great Nationality Chauvinism, which of course drew from Soviet nationality theory, of course wasn't unique to on play relations, but as I'm gonna try to show, its application in the Northwest, to the Northwest play may have been unique, it may have been different from other areas and other groups. The concept itself was first advanced in a sustained way on the Western portions of the Long March where it helped explain the hostility of the Red Army faced, or was facing from many of the Non-Hui communities it was encountering in those difficult days. The need to develop a more cohesive nationalities policy, however, arose after the Party Core reached the relative safety of its Northwest base area. Their earlier flirtations with formulas that allow for some sort of Non-Han self-determination, hardened into a vision of an invisible Multi-Minzu Socialist China. So dispersively at first, but eventually with world altering ramifications, Non-Han groups were transformed into minority nationalities within a Han dominated state. The domestication of the nationality question as they refer to it raises its own existential questions for the party leadership. Most fundamentally, if it's one nation, why then were relations between different Minzu so often scarred by deep division, and distrust and conflict and violence and so forth? And how might these tears in the Zhonghua Minzu, how might they be mended? Into the late 1950s, the CCP consistently asserted that internationality animus, and alienation, first and foremost was the consequence of Great Han Chauvinism, which was described in a pivotal 1941 study of the Hui question as quote, "Thinking principles and behavior "that oppresses weaker nationalities," and it added, "Throughout history, "it has created within the Hui "distrust and hatred for the Han." So having determined that nationality disunity was principally product upon prejudice and exploitation, policy makers were equally, equally clear about how they might go about curing this

problem, curing this malaise. Within the Han majority, and especially among Han's cadres and soldiers who worked in so-called minority nationality communities, an all out effort must be marshaled to eliminate expressions of Great Han Chauvinism. Only then with local nationalism, Defang Jui, or narrow nationalism, which were deemed to be parochial responses to Great Han Chauvinism, only then would they gradually disappear, and this sought out after, the sought after nationality unity be secured, be one. Budin Burlog, who is a leading scholar of Ethno Politics in China, has argued that this formula, and what's the Chinese Communist Party took on the role of what he calls "Good Han", the term to liberate oppressed smaller nations from those it deemed bad Han, introduced a "New Han ethnic sensibility "that was self-reflexive and self-critical, "rather than being simply paternalistic." This is one that would allow the CCP to think beyond the homogenous nation, and granted a prominent place for the non-Han in their critical thinking. Or to put it another way, at least for the time being, it was fundamental to the manner in which the party understood its own legitimacy amongst non-Han communities. This is not, there we go. But what happened when history's bad guys aren't Han? In the, Qinghai Gansu Highlands, the CCP identified the Hui Muslim warlords, so-called Warlord Ma Bufang, and his coterie of reactionary officers and feudal landlords, not Han elites and not Han Militarists as the principal agents of nationality exploitation. And they identified Tibetans, not solely, but largely to be the main target of that exploitation. As such, when the CCP "liberated" the Northwest, it declared Tibetans essentially to be a priority victims of nationality exploitation. And this was a case almost irrespective of an individual's class base, or his or her behavior in previously, or networks or anything. In other words, Lamas and Tibetan Hereditary Edmond were all declared to be victims of this type of oppression. By contrast, regional leaders ordered their soldiers and cadres to separate good Muslims from bad. Yet because Hui were both traffickers, and victims of nationality exploitation, the distinction was complicated. It couldn't be solely based on class status, for instance, as it theoretically was on rural settings. The Hui as a community found themselves positioned somewhere between victims and oppressors. Then this need to distinguish between good Muslims, and bad potential friends from Die-Hard enemies would be made even more urgent by a strain of uprisings between 1949 and mid 1953 would engulf several Muslim majority areas along the Qinghai frontier and beyond before spilling into the Tibetan, and Mongo dominated Grasslands to their South. And I think useful echoes can be found in the Qing states determination during and after its pacification of the Northwest Rebellions to distinguish bad Muslims as again, Litman and other people that have had mentioned, bent on disrupting social order from good Muslims capable of proving loyalty to the the state. And even today, the rhetoric of good and bad Muslim remains. Now it's mostly tied to their perceived loyalty to the nation. However, I think the CCP's mid-century approach to the Hui question, while not unconnected to these currents should not be conflated with either. They can't be

disconflated with these other circumstances. They must be viewed in their own historical moments as an expression of a particular practice of minoritization, and a framework for conceptualizing the New Socialist Nation State that emerges in competition with other actors, and more broadly amidst a global reckoning over the majority, the minority problem in the first half of the 20th century and beyond. So much of this begins to be hammered out during the war years as the Minzu establishment is formed, emerges at Yan'An. And the base area's physical proximity to heavily Muslim populated regions, but also the need to counter Japanese overtures to those populations meant that the Hui, as well as Mongols for similar reasons would become the primary focus of a lot of the Minzu work that was being done in the early years. And what I found striking about it is at the time it was openly admitted that the Hui actually did not conform the Stalin's criteria for nation, for nationality, common language, locality, economy, and what do you call psychological make-up. Instead, excuse me, instead, again, strikingly Islam itself became the defining feature of Hui nationhood for these Minzu Cadres. As one lead leading cadre put it, "The religious difference is the central axis upon which Hui nationality unity hinges." This was true, however, only because of the corrosive, but also the constitutive power of Han Chauvinism, As described in by the newly founded nationalities questions research office in 1940 or '41, Islam was not "Simply a religious belief, "but part of the social fabric of the of Hui society, "and the sacred banner that's united them "in their struggle against nationality oppression." In other words, the Hui "Gradually formed into a Minzu "because of Han's Chauvinism, "because of Great Nationality Chauvinism." Now the Nationality's office may clear that nationality quality itself could only be achieved alongside the elimination of discrimination, and exploitation of course a Han majority, yet as Pen Pandey and others again have noted in the context, for instance, of Southeast South Asia, even when the Nation State champions the idea of coexistence in the form of tolerance, of unity in diversity, groups and communities are placed not only next to but also on top of underneath one another. And of course this was no less true in China, it's no less true today. And not just between the majoritized Han and minoritized others, the nationality question research office shows that the emergence of a Minzu hierarchy, if you will, can be detected as early as 1940. For example, Mongols were considered to be a backward Minzu that had succumbed to both Japanese colonialism, and on semi colonialism. By contrast, even while declaring that the "Hui had yet develop into a modern nationality," the research office also admitted that the Hui come under the influence of the relatively advanced Han. This proximity, at least in their analysis, had exposed to Hui to the particularly brutal exploitation of Han Chauvinism on the one hand, but also a comparatively high degree at synthesization of . While the former was deemed to be the result of of human coercion, and therefore bad, it produced in many Hui an acute hatred of the Han. The latter was thought to be beneficial, a natural process of development. And for party elites, these contradictions at least

helped explain how and why Muslims in the Northwest were not only able to cease power the follow of the Qing, but also to replace the Han regionally, in the national exploitation pecking order, if you will. In areas under Sino Muslim rule, Hui Chauvinism, not Han Chauvinism, but Hui chauvinism now oppressed other Minzu including the Han. At the same time, it helped explain why the Hui masses remain devoted to Islam, their Islamic leaderships, and to the Ma clans. Each of which was viewed as at least by their communities, as bull works against Han Chauvinism. So if we jump ahead now to 1949, as communist armies watched Northwestward after taking Xinjiang in spring of that year, the challenge seemed evident to many of the military leaders. General Wong Jenn, for instance, had ordered his troops on as they were approaching Linxia, he ordered them to remember, "We are not the savaged, plundering, "vengeful Han armies of the past "that conquered the West, and pacified the Hui, "we're the People's Liberation Army "led by the Chinese Communist Party. "We must provide truth so that the Hui people can see "that the PLA truly is a liberator, "and the savior of the Hui people." And that proof will be delivered in many different forms. Among them, pamphlets distributed to grassroots cadres, for example, with instructions for how to avoid transgressing, dietary, religious, gender specific, what they call Hui customs and taboos, orders to safeguard mosques and shrines, orders to respect imams and to provide, they call preferential treatment to captured Muslim soldiers. In particular, this meant a policy called catch and release, which was meant to counter rumors that the communists routinely "Kill Muslims, and destroy mosques, "conscript men and abuse women, "practice communal wives "and communal property and so forth". So the idea was that these captured soldiers would be actually given travel funds, and released and go home to their communities, and show everybody that the communists were not these terrible monsters that they the heard of. outreach for a string of unexpectedly easy victories in late August, and early September, which maybe you can read here, really surprised you as intelligence, which thought that the Ma Bufang and soldiers would fight on indefinitely because of their to antipathy to communism. Instead, the PLA captured Gansu and Qianhai in a month or so in summer of 1949. But now order would need to be restored, and a governing apparatus would need to be put in place. How do we unify this multi nationality region? Peng Dehui asked rhetorically, soon after Qiling's, capture, when he was on a tour of Qinghai. He responded in orthodox fashion by saying, "First we must distinguish enemies from friends." He explained that this meant differentiating the small minority bad elements within each nationality from the vast majority of good people within each nationality. And of course this is squarely within the more general mass line strategy of the Communist Party, and their united crime approach to incorporating ethnic minorities, which I've written about elsewhere. I'm happy to talk about more in the questionnaire, Q&A if anybody wants, but I wanna stress here is that although Zhuang insisted that bad elements, existed within each Minzu, with few exceptions, the CCP leadership viewed to Tibetans and Mongol religious

elite, and hereditary headmen as victims again, of nationality exploitation, and therefore targets to be won over only through political means. The Hui, however presented of course, a more complicated challenge. As Qinghai's party committee explained in, I guess it would be late 1949, the Hui had been the ruling nationality for a relatively long period of time, so from this perch, the Hui had oppressed other Minzu, especially more backward groups like Mongols, and especially, again, Tibetans. In fact, the party remained deeply concerned about Muslim loyalties, and not without reason, there were supposedly tens of thousands of demobilized soldiers and milita men, for instance, wandering the countryside in the first years after liberation. So amidst the celebratory pronouncements, which were of course everywhere, internal documents provide glimpses of what really looks at the chaotic conditions that existed throughout the region. For instance, in Fall, waves of unrest struck Linxia, sorry, this is a long slide. Those are the happy pronouncements. This is the chaos that we're getting to here. One document talked about waves of unrest that had struck Linxia in fall of 1949 that left more than 1000 Han Hui dead or injured, in what are described as ethnic killings very clearly. Perhaps more troubling for party leaders, I better move over here so I can actually get to my slides, this isn't working, completely in front of what I'm trying to show you. More troubling for party leaders was that on November 30th over 300 armed rebels, as they called them, launched an attack on government offices in Qinghai's Huazhong county, which is just south of Xining. Then on December 5th, more than 1700 men wearing white caps and red arm bands, which would've identified them as both Muslims, and as members of Ma Bufang's defunct forces seize two townships in Datong county, just north of Xining. This was quickly followed by uprisings in Menyuan, in Xunhua, and Hualong counties in Qinghai, as well as several areas of the greater Linxia region, and beyond in Gansu. Now these revolts will be put down with considerable violence. Not the violence, there's the violence, however, they proved to be the first in a series of acts of arm resistance that would come to an end only after several years, 98 bandit extermination campaigns as the party called them, and more than 1400 PLA fatalities in Qinghai alone. But the first point of instruction delivered by army leadership cautioned a degree of restraint. While the sources made clear that the rebels were largely Muslim, it's demanded soldiers and cadres, remember that it absolutely is not a Hui rebellion. A report that referred to the revolt in Datong as the Datong Hui rebellion was even appended with a corrective, which reminded readers that Qinghai's Party Secretary had explicitly ordered that it is completely inappropriate to consider this to be a Hui Rebellion. Now the proclamation that the unrest was something other than a Hui rebellion was a message to cadres and soldiers not to succumb to old anti-Muslim prejudices, on one hand. It was also meant to reassure both Han, and especially Muslim residents of the Northwest that the regime was not gonna take sides for one, and that there wouldn't be a repeat of the inner community, and state violence of the late Qin. But if not a Hui rebellion, what was it? According to

contemporary reports, it was a large organized and planned conspiracy by a cabal of senior military leaders, and officials of Ma Bufang's old regime who were exploiting Muslim fears that "the Han had seized power to reinstall the old order." In other words at its core, the uprising was to be treated not as a internationality struggle, not as a Minzu struggle, but as a last ditch effort by its small number of class enemies to exploit old fears and prejudices that were "Created by Han Chauvinism "as a way to reverse the Revolution." But regional leaders made it clear that not all of this chauvinism was chauvinism from the distant past or even the recent past. Contemporary reports are actually rife with often vague admonishments, urging cadres and urging soldiers to correct shortcomings, mistakes, and prejudices in their own work. Sometimes, however, the transgressions were made more explicit. The example most often cited internally was the events that had led to or set off the bloodletting in Linxia, the Linxia Incident as they called it. The spark for that had been the death of five Hui while in custody, but this had only come after "Leading Cadres had not only ignored "plots to annihilate the Hui, "but they had also confiscated firearms "from terrorized Muslims." These are all words that are being used by the party leadership and had engaged in the mass, and arbitrary arrest of Han residents. A second, see if you can follow this, a second large scale bloody incident of an ethnic nature, to the east of Linxia in Pingliang region was blamed on gratuitous acts of Great Nationality Chauvinism committed again by Han Cadres and soldiers, which in this case included raising pigs in Muslim homes and even the near disinterment of a Sufi lineage founder. As had been all too common with Qing armies of the previous century, The CCPs representatives had been unable, or perhaps were unwilling to separate good Muslims from bad. A report in the Gansu Daily even suggested that in the worst cases, Hui may have been arbitrarily shot and killed. And this is in again, the Gansu Daily. To break this cycle of violence, regional leaders doubled down on the need to distinguish the vast majority of good Hui from the small number of reactionaries in their midst. This is not simply means separating those who had joined the uprising from those who had had stayed home. Because Han Chauvinism was considered still to be the root cause of the rebellion, it also meant weeding out the rank and file even mid-level insurgents from the, quote, "Bandit spies and local tyrants "who had either pressed or tricked "ordinary Muslims into taking part." In addition to weakening the insurgency, this offered the CCP an opportunity to demonstrate that it was not targeting Muslims, but those allies of the Mao regime that have been most exploitative, and now hoped to restore the old reactionary order. By October, 1950, almost 30,000 suspected rebels had surrendered according to the documents I've seen, which from the perspective of Qinghai's governor was evidence that that this type of outreach was working. But officials were warned that evil, and unreputed bandits and spies had slipped into pastoral areas and border regions to launch guerilla war behind enemy lines. Now, these areas were mainly inhabited by Tibetans and Mongols, and in several cases, the mostly Muslim insurgents would actually find refuge with forge

alliances among those people deemed by the party to be the foremost victims of Hui nationality, oppression, in other words, Tibetans. The easiest explanation for the party might have been that class interests were proving more resilient than nationality leavages, but that really just wouldn't work within the framework that the CCP had constructed in this region. Instead, Party Leaders cast backward Tibetan and Mongol elites not as class enemies, but as victims once again of their Muslim co-conspirators manipulation of their trickery. The Nangra rebellion quickly became the prototypical example of this dynamic. In summer of 1950, the powerful headman of the Nangra Tibetans, a man named Wangchen Döndrup had begun to stock stockpile weapons, and fortify roads into his wooded, and mountainous Nangra stronghold, which lay right just south of the Yellow River in a defensible area. While giving sanctuary to Hui rebels who had been flushed out of their regions north of the river when their insurgencies had been crushed. Soon after they joined together, the Nangra Tibetans and these outside Hui insurgents to launch what has been called Qinghai's longest, and most interventional rebellion of the early liberation period. Despite the seriousness of the situation, however, or maybe because of how serious it was, Party and military leaders treated this threat quite differently than they had the string of uprisings north of the river when they were in Muslim communities. Over a span of 18 months, 17 separate high level delegations were somewhat famously dispatched to the Nangra region with the aim of negotiating a political solution to the insurrection, which essentially meant Wangchen Döndrup giving up his Muslim allies. An open letter signed by the senior leadership in Qinghai explained why Wangchen Döndrup was being treated with such really unprecedented patience. And it read at one point, "Mr. Wangchen, "considering your crimes, "you already should have been punished "according to state law, "but the People's Government believes "that you have been hoodwinked "by outside spies and bandits." Finally, in April, 1952 that patience actually ran out, and the PLA launched a massive assault on the Nangra region, the base area which they were calling Little Taiwan by the way fell within days. Even then occupying soldiers ordered to distinguish outside bands and spies. In other words, Hui Muslims from hoodwinked Tibetans. PLA officers instructed their men to protect monasteries, and promised Tibetan headmen and Lamas that if they surrendered, not only would they escape punishment, but that their wealth and their status would be be safeguarded. And that pledge was actually extended to Wangchen Döndrup himself, who initially escaped the encirclement, but then surrendered I think, three months later. And when he did, he was appointed head of the newly created Jianjia Tibet autonomous county, a vice chairman of the Huangnan prefecture, and to other positions as well. His Muslim allies were not accorded the same opportunities for rehabilitation. Now, the CCPs extraordinary efforts to woo Wangchen Döndrup amounted in part to a divide and conquer strategy meant to weaken the insurgency by playing members of one Minzu against another. And of course there's plenty of precedent for that, whether it's in China or elsewhere. However it was also a function, I think, of the

CCPs underlying assumptions about nationality relations in Northwest China at this time. The unspoken supposition was that by virtue of their nationality identity, Tibetan and Mongol elites really couldn't be bandits and spies. At worst they were hoodwinked headmen, victims both of cultural backwardness, and nationality exploitation, in this case Hui exploitation. In an editorial published in the Qinghai Daily, Wangchen Döndrup even leaned into this discourse. He claimed that his own backwardness had left him susceptible to the lies, and the bribes of what he called "the Mob Bandit Gang." But of course, Wangchen Döndrup, who had been the head of the Nangra for two decades at this point, so he had decades of experience navigating the region's complex dynamics, and this included a long complicated relationship with Ma Bufang himself. He was hardly some country rube. But the point being is that Muslim elite were not allowed the same benefit of backwardness. This did not mean that all Hui elite were considered enemies by any stretch, but it did mean that the line between enemy and friend was much more muddled than among the more "Backward Tibetans." It also meant that in the coming years that Hui elites would not be afforded the same protections as their Tibetan counterparts. This deserves more research, but while Tibetan headman and monasteries were mostly shielded from socialist reforms prior to 1958, land reform and collectivization drives were conducted within Muslim communities in this area. In Linxia, for instance, the state confiscated not only the large land holdings of the Ma families, another wealthy Hui, but also the substantial properties of mosques and shrines. But in Gannan prefecture to itself, land reform was conducted within Han and Hui communities, but as far as I know, not within Tibetan communities. Now, the CCP's embrace of the discourse of great Han Chauvinism, once again was a self-reflexive and self-critical way to reimagine the nation, to transform an imperial formation into a diverse state of nations without the type of violence that usually accompanies processes of majoritization and minoritization. But the CCP salvational mission to liberate oppressed smaller nationalities, I think was and remains interwoven, and often at odds with a civilizing mission that by its very nature is unchauvinistic. As elsewhere, despite pledges of equality and fraternalism, this always left minoritized, more minoritized people in China vulnerable to what Janet Klein, who's a historian of the Ottoman Empire, refers to as that unique brand of oppression and mass violence when minorities now conceived as such come to be regarded as threats to the territorial integrity of the nation. This violence would be given legitimacy during 1957's anti-rightist campaign, when the causal link between Great Nationality Chauvinism, and Local Nationalism was abruptly severed rather than a product upon exploitation. Party leaders suddenly redefined local nationalism, as an independent, dangerous, and even treasonous political deviancy bent on sabotaging socialism or even dividing the nation. Senior Leaders overseeing China's nationalities affairs went so far to suggest that some Hui were plotting to establish an independent country, Huiguo or a Hui-istan or sought permission to immigrate to "their Arabian motherland."

In effect, the political designation "Bad Han" no longer existed after 1957, and therefore any critique upon chauvinism, or demands for minority particularism were rendered, rendered by Nanhan, meant that they had become bad minorities, they become bad minzu, they had become local nationalists, they had become perhaps separatists, and their Han handlers were now habituationalist on the nationality question. In response to a combination of ethno-religious repression, food shortages in order to rapidly collectivize pastoral areas during the Great Leap forward in 1958, a massive rebellion would engulf the region, particularly many Tibetan, Hui, Mongols, and other minority communities would become engulfed in this configuration of violence. Unlike the early 1950s, this time security forces were unleashed with little restraint. No exemption was given for victims of nationality oppression. No distinction was made between Muslims and other rebels. In Linxia, for instance, unformed reports suggested security forces may have killed as many as 10,000 people and detained another 14,000. Again, more research is needed, but across the region, mosques and shrines, if not demolished, were shuttered, and often turned to secular use. Imams and other religious leaders were jailed, and publicly humiliated and denounced. Public religious life was basically proscribed for the next several years. And at least some cases men were forced to cut their beards, women unveiled, halal dining halls were abolished, Muslims made to raise pigs and and so forth. And as I detail in my book, Tibetan communities became victims of perhaps even greater levels of cultural destruction, of dislocation, incarceration, and death. Among them was Wangchen Döndrup. Like many of his contemporaries, the Nangra headman was quickly arrested in spring of 1958, and he died not long after, officially of a unspecified illness. Across China, attacks and ethnic cultural particularism reached their height, of course, during the first stages of the cultural revolution. The death of Mao in 1976, and the subsequent repudiation of the cultural revolution by successors was of course accompanied by a renewed criticism of Han Chauvinism, which opened within non-Han communities, real, but still limited in uneven opportunities for ethno-cultural revival and reinvention. And arguably in some cases, the Hui may have been better positioned than others to take advantage of these openings. Nonetheless, Hui still occupy, and unserve an awkward ethno-political position, I think in post-Mao China. On the one hand it's loosely connected, relatively well-integrated Chinese speaking Minzu without obvious transnational linkages, so there are some, or recent histories of open state, anti-state activity, and they again have been regarded at times as something of a model minority, particularly in contrast to Tibetan speakers and other more problematic ethnic communities. On the other hand, long term mutual suspicion born in part from communal memory of the history of Han Muslim violence has been elevated in recent years by resurgence of Han ethno-nationalism, and by 21st Century Islamophobia, both of which are intertwined with the state's campaigns against terrorism, and religious extremism and the like. Simply put, Hui Muslims continue to operate amidst good bad dichotomies. They have to prove their loyalty

to the nation in ways the unmarked majority does not. The terminologies have certainly changed, but under Xi Jinping, the CCP again has come to embrace what was once called Hun Chauvinism, pure and simple, while attacking expressions of ethno-cultural difference in ways differences, in ways that echo earlier criticisms of local nationalism. Of course, this is most visibly, and most terrifyingly been manifested in the regime of surveillance and incarceration, and forced labor that has descended upon Uyghurs, Kazakhs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang, including Xinghua. But it also can be seen in the erosion of ethnic minority culture, and religious rights across China, including the end of bilingual education, limitations on preferential policies and family planning, and university admission, so-called synthesization of religion and so forth. Among other challenges, for Hui Muslims, this has meant the closure of centers of Islamic teaching, and publishing, renewed obstacles for hajj pilgrimage. The removal of Arabic letters signs in from public view, most visibly perhaps the demolition of Arab style domes and minarets and mosques, including those in Linxia and Xinning. Left to be determined as whether this return to explicit, if unidentified as such, Han Chauvinism will generate greater identification with integration into the Chinese Nation as the leadership maybe seems to think it will these days, or as earlier generations of party leaders predicted, whether it will strengthen Pan Hui or Pan Islamic identity, intensify resentment of the Hui majority, and sharpen the alienation of Muslim communities from the state and from the nation. So I'll stop there, thank you very much. I think I had more slides, but actually, let's get them, they weren't that great.

- Okay, well thank you. That was really, really interesting. I have a bunch of questions, but I'm gonna actually throw the floor open in case there are people who want to dive in, or if you're formulating your thoughts down, I will, but as you, sorry. As you ask your questions, please make sure to identify yourselves first. So if there is no one, then I'm gonna go ahead, and oh, there is no one, so go ahead. I'll give mine later on, oh yeah.

- [Student] How are you today? And so my question is, I've always approached the contemporary policy in terms of how it sort of is this import of policies, and views and Islamophobia and also this, this sort of global narrative of war on terror, and religious freedom and that kind of thing, and the interaction of the whole narrative importing into China. But I guess from your top, you're providing a different perspective sort of backing out historical roots within China of the similar policies, right? So I guess my question is like, do you see the current as more of a continuation of historical policies like this, and that sort of the narrative of good and bad Muslim, is that sort of, do you see it as more inherent from the history that you were talking about? Or do you think it's more of a, as I said, sort of a co-optation and appropriation of this sort of American led global narratives of Islamophobia and Terrorism?

- Thank you, they're good questions. I guess I don't pretend to really know the answer. There are certainly people, maybe yourself, that study the contemporary period that would be better informed. But I do think that, what I was trying to suggest there towards the beginning is this whole policy, the self-reflexive policy of criticizing great Han Chauvinism was part of a larger dialogue regionally and globally about how you incorporate difference, whether it's religious difference, ethnic difference into this new thing called the Nation State. And there are different models for how you do it. And again, they're in competition, for instance, with the imperial Japan who are also making promises to Hui people at this time. And the Wangchen Döndrup is also, despite saying that they're a loose minority, they're also being much more practical on the ground trying to figure out ways to accommodate these people, or maybe to transform these people. So I guess my answer to that is that it's always gonna be a domestic mix with these global influences. I don't think it's just a US led dialogue, not that you necessarily meant that. It's certainly a narrative that the US has been very loudly in front of, but I think it's a question that goes back before 9/11, for instance. What do we do with these Muslim people who in this case look like us and talk like us, but aren't like us. And so a lot of what I've been trying to do both in my book and what I'm trying to work on now is I really think about this question again, of, how you do something that's almost unprecedented, and that is turn a diverse empire into a nation state? And in some sense, I've been very impressed with the Communist Party's ingenuity and creativity. On the other hand, I don't think it's worked. On other hand they've also done this to people, right? In every sense, they are making decisions and they are deciding for other people, they are incorporating other people, other people are not equals in that decision. So again, without having a real good answer to your question, I see it as part of a longer problem of how do you accommodate diversity? Do you accommodate diversity? Do you try to eliminate it? Do you try to export it, get rid of these people? Do you try to transform them to something else? Do you try to protect that diversity? And I think China's gone back and forth, zigzagged and as a result they're left with this very difficult problem that Xi Jinping seems to be trying to resolve through a much more ethno-national integrationist assimilationist approach. And I think the argument is that more relatively more benign policies of the past didn't work.

- [Arunabh] Great, thank you Jason.

- [Jason] Hi, I'm Jason, a student based in Harvard. So in your previous book you mentioned about sort of the role of cadres, especially in the, Revolutionary movement in sort of collapsing what power, physical power, and also basically sort of stressing the difference in temple, and some translation of old language studies in Tibet. I'm curious where you might tell a bit more about how, the rope, what role Chauvanist cadres might have sort of, influence

historic pressure the sort of the collapsing of distinguishing the betrayed Great Han Chauvinism and local nationalism contributed to the collapse of Gansu-Qinghai?

- Yeah, that's a good question, and again, I wish I knew more than I do, but my instinct is say that it was similar to what I talk about in the book actually. In some ways it may be more pronounced in Muslim areas because of this friction seems to just from, what you can sort of glean from the sources, the friction between both Han Communities, and Hui communities, but also the friction between is mostly Han Cadres, and Hui people seems to have been even sharper. And, my again, inclination would be to suggest that that these transgressions that I talked about were more common than not. That this relationship was always poisoned by poor implementation and perhaps people who did not really believe in the policies as they were being obligated. And the speed by which these relatively accommodationist policies became these very heavy handed assimilationist policies in '57, '58 again leads me to believe that people were ready for that. People were maybe priming it already. And I think I suggest in the book that they're, again, reading between the lines, there may have been even pressure from the bottom on the leadership to sort of have a more heavy hand. 'Cause what happens in '57 and '58 is essentially that Beijing gives 'em the go ahead. Not literally they don't say, "Okay, Gansu-Qinghai, go for it." But the impression I get is people are ready for this transformation. They're communists and they wanna transform this area into a socialist place, and Beijing is basically saying no, and Xinning is saying no, and Lanzhou is saying no. And when they say yes, it happens very, very quickly. If that answer to, yeah.

- [Arunabh] A lot of hands up, great, great answer.

- [Antuan] I'm Antuan, PhD student at UC Berkeley, and I'm here at Harvard this year. Thank you so much, it was really fascinating. There was just an article that came out in JAAS, that leader student movement, the 1980s. That brings up

- I mean, so first of all, there's a fascinating reckoning in inner Mongolia that people don't know much about. There were protests in inner Mongolia in '82 and '83, I think. And Inner Mongolias were the really, the worst of the ethnic programs happened in the culture revolutions. That's an interesting story. But they, again, they were demanding sort of recompense for what happened to them. So among Tibetans, yes, and I write a little about my book. I unfortunately haven't looked at that in terms of Hui in this area. Again, there's maybe people out there, maybe online or not that, that would know more about this, but certainly in the case of Tibetans in this case, because they have leadership, the Panchen Llama, reemerges from house arrest to really lead a rejuvenation of Tibetan culture and language. And much of the rhetoric he uses to do so is against Han Chauvinism and again, which is now called ultra leftism by the 1980s, right?

Well, Han Chauvinism is ultra leftist, so you need to not be chauvinistic, that would make you like the gang of four. And we need to go back to the policies in the 1950s. And so that's a very, very dominant thread within the Minzu establishment leeway. It's not just a bunch of Lama leeway. Han is doing this, who was the head of the United Front Work department. So I would imagine that it's similar within Hui communities as well. I just don't know the details about that.

- [Arunabh] Okay, Charlotte.

- [Charlotte] I'm sorry, I'm PhD student, thank you so much for a fascinating talk. I have few questions . One is a conceptual question and the other is on sources. The conceptual question is that just when we mentioned that it's just conceptualization of Chinese Muslim relation, the Chinese-Hui co-relation as friend enemy, and I'm wondering, in Peng Dehui's writing was he referring it to as friend enemy or self-enemy like ? So that's something-

- No, friend,

- [Student] Yeah, friend, okay, okay, thank you so much. I think that's very interesting. And the second question I have is that you mentioned just now that in 1949, when the PLA was making the advances due into the Northwest--

- Yeah.

- [Student] Is there any documentary base that we can know of the ethnic, like the demographic make up of the PLA soldiers?

- My impression, I mean, I'm not a historian of the PLA, maybe people are, but my impression, it's overwhelmingly Han.

- Yeah, overwhelming.

- And the documents I've seen don't suggest that they have a lot of, that they have Hui people that they can send in, so they'll say things like, "Han women have to be sent in to deal with Hui women, "we can't have men do it," but they don't talk about Hui people going in there as sort of advance operatives. I'm sure there were some, but.

- [Student] That's interesting. Where they're coming from, like how local they were or?

- For Hui?

- As in for the PLA, yeah--

- PLA. Again, from what I know, 'cause this is the same army that

would go into Qinghai, and would stay in Qinghai, and went to Xinjiang. The most part they seem to be from Shanxi, and from Hubei and sometimes Sichuan, but not many of them are from local regions as far as I can tell. I'm sure there are some, there's almost none from Qinghai, still, so yeah.

- [Arunabh] Okay, Hegan?

- [Hegan] Yes, thank you very much for being here. I want to say I also have a strong interest in this, this area. So I have to pass into first one has to do with the, the Hui rebellion that was Ma Bufang after the PRC. You mentioned that it was kind of a brief alliance between, I forgot his name and forgot Wangch

- [Hegan] Wangchen Döndrup.

- Wangchen Döndrup.

- Yeah,

- [Hegan] Him and some of the Hui forces there. There's a new trending in the . Established all the schools for recruited actively Mongol and students, mingled with the Hui students, sort of like established hegemony. I wonder if you have traced the actual connection between this figure, this protagonist and what Ma Bufang might be following?

- Yeah, that, yeah, yeah. I'd like to think I contributed a little bit, at least to that, thinking about Ma Bufang as a warlord or not. And the truth is it's a much more complicated ethno-political dynamic than just Tibetans versus Muslims or Hui, Han. As I try to talk about it in the book, it seems that some of these rebels did have connections with Wangchen Döndrup prior. Wangchen Döndrup, the Nangra fought a war with Ma Bufang and his family in 1931, '32. And that gets solved when a Tibetan Lama, and the Tibetan Headman from another part of Amdo comes, and negotiates a piece between the two. And Wangchen Döndrup goes to Xinning and supposedly him and Ma Bufang become blood brothers, or blood brothers, they swear an oath of brotherhood between the two of 'em. And there's pretty decent relationships after that. I think once Wangchen Döndrup joins Ma Bufang's government, and he may have even joined the Guomindang at some point, point being is that these relationships were very, very, the layered and woven together. So it was not just Han, Hui versus Tibetan by any stretch. So for instance, there's another rebellion of... I'm forgetting his name, Amal Yong and Ma, I'm forgetting the other one's name. But these were two generals who spent most of their careers in the Southern Amdo grasslands. And when they rebel in '52, they flee into the grasslands, and they operate there, and they have Mongol and Tibetan support, and the CCP is convinced that they're tricking these people. But of course they had much greater experience, longer experience, they know these people, right? This is their homes, these Muslims were not, are not

not foreign to this area. They are indigenous as well. So that's just a long way of saying that yes, Tibetans made decisions based on experience, and networks and friendships and old relationships, and the CCP, it seemed to have a hard time understanding that at least at first because their concept of Minzu animosity was such that it didn't really fit into their frameworks. Does that make sense?

- [Student] That's very satisfactory. The second question, I want to complicate the word you used the model minority notion.

- Yes.

- [Student] In my own study encountered the, at least until 1958 before Sino-Korean relations, North Korean relations soured, Koreans actually put up as more minority because of their, there were like a lot of communists around there and.

- [Benno] Yeah. Later on also understand that Wan Fuwu kind of was a very prominent leader nationally, and the Mongols were at some point, a model minority. I think the latest work by done by Davis Fault. And that has shown that the Muslims, the Hui Muslims in Xining internal population size were much bigger than, for example, the Hui in Changjing, Xinjiang but the Changjing Hui were in an autonomous prefecture, whereas the Xining Hui never got any authority at all. So the way peoples portray the Hui as the model minority, I think of people like Bai Shou-yin and his eastern well trained internationalist lawyers served as diplomats

- When I said that I meant that they have been portrayed sometimes over the last couple decades not going back in history. And I don't think that they were a model minority in the fifties or sixties, for instance. I'm saying that it may be in the '90s and '00s, at certain times certain people have suggested that they were more well integrated, and less of a better example of Minzu approachment. So yeah, I agree with you. I do not think that we can look at the Hui as being a model minority, especially compared to the way that Koreans, you know there weren't a lot of communists among the Hui, right? But there were a lot of communists among the Mongols and the Koreans. So they were much more of a ideal communist model minority during the Maoist period than Hui or Tibetans were, for example. I was referring to a later period.

- [Student] Yes, I just wanted clarification.

- [Benno] Yeah, no, I agree with you, yeah.

- [Arunabh] We're gonna turn to a question from the online audience here. This is an anonymous attendee. Thank you for your lecture. And they said, "My question would be, "on the term of nationality chauvinism, "is there any definitions given on it? "Is it counted as

or considered in relations to racism, "and is there any gender element "whether explored in your book, "and then innovation of national chauvanism?"

- That's a great, the question about... I used the standard translation of chauvinism, knowing that I don't think it's a good translation. I didn't want to get into it. means Great Hanism. It means Han nationalism, essentially. I think it is racism. I think the anonymous person out there is hitting something that I wondered if we'd talk about. I didn't feel like I had time to get into in the talk, but I think it's a problematic term, and one that maybe one of us here, maybe me, maybe somebody else needs to tackle at some point because I think it is purposely smooths out a very, very nasty idea, right? Now, they were arguing that they were against it, so that's good, right. The Communist Party wasn't Han Chauvinist, but the in the end of course, and this is not unique to China, minorities are almost always, or quite often become the target of these types of stereotypes of, of disempowerment to disenfranchisement, of assimilationist efforts, of efforts to remove them. So I think that's not different than many other settings. But I do find it interesting the way the Chinese Communist party tried to tackle that. But I do think Great Hanism is a better translation, or Han, Great Han, Han nationalism maybe is a better translation than chauvinism. In terms of gender, I'm embarrassed to say that there's so little, I don't tackle it in this paper, and I don't tackle it enough in my book, partially 'cause of the sources. There are interesting things in here. They are very critical of Han culture, the Communist Party of Hui culture that is, in a part because of how conservative it is vis-a-vis the gender relations as they see it. They see it to be very backward because of the way that women are theoretically treated. And I actually took something out about that because I just didn't have time to discuss it. And interestingly, they think the opposite for Tibetans. They think the Tibetans are too loose essentially, and the women are too wild. So there are these deeply stereotypical ideas that they expressed, Han chauvinistic ideas that they express. But that much more to say about it right now.

- [Arunabh] Okay, great, thank you. Question back over there.

- [Issa] My name is Issa. I'm a first year PhD students at Inner Asian and Alpine studies here. I have a question actually, it's a follow up to Bai-Feng's question, and also the anonymous question here.

- Yeah.

- [Issa] It's about chauvinism and minority. You mentioned at least two types of chauvinism, Han chauvinism and Hui chauvinism. I was wondering, and both of them served as causation of rebellion or oppression. I was wondering, are these two type of tribalism, both of them are, are both rooted in the minority and majority dichotomy? Or

to put it another way, if there is a Hui chauvinism, how different is it from the Han chauvinism, you were saying?

- This term, as far as I know, is only used to express what they call as nationality exploitation, right? They don't use the same phrasing for class exploitation. So this is considered to be a separate problem, and in ethnic "minority regions." I mean, they're only minority regions because the state says that they're minority regions. So that's a matter of definition as well. The idea was that we have to tackle the nationality problem before we can get to the class problem, right? So these are separate. The only difference, I can see it as I'm thinking through it, between Han chauvinism, or whatever you wanna call it, Hanism and Huism, is that Huism is only possible because of... Han chauvinism is the root of all problems, essentially. It creates the conditions where the Hui have become this exploitative Minzu in this one particular area. Does that make sense? But I don't think there's a, I'm trying to think through this. I don't think there's a qualitative difference between the two that I can think of. Maybe I'm missing it though. Is there another part?

- [Arunabh] Well, I can just sort of pick, It's kinda interesting to think about it in terms of, I was thinking about this, this relationship also between sort of any kind of chauvinism, or nationalism, and then class analysis, which is so central to events that are going on in other parts of China during this period in the early fifties, right? And then you come to this later in the story, you came to this point where there's land reform attempted.

- Yeah.

- [Arunabh] But it's tempted almost before as you sort of suggest that there is a clear implicit sort of ideology where the you have to solve the national problems first, nationality problems first, and then you can only get to class.

- Yeah.

- [Arunabh] So what happens in cases whereas, that the order gets confused and in some ways when you ended the paper by saying the nationality problem is back in some ways.

- Yeah.

- So you know, how to sort of think of that relationship then between the nationalities problem and the class problem keeping in mind, so the meta project that you have, which is I think, which is really casting on the empire to state transition. So I don't know if you have thoughts on that.

- Yeah, I mean, I think that, the problem the Communist Party runs

into is that their formula for resolving the nationality problem doesn't work or it doesn't work in the time that they're allotting for it to work. And it's always running up against what I referred to as revolutionary impatience. How long are we gonna give these people, how long are we going to, in the Tibetan case, how long are we gonna cater to these Lamas, and these headmen who are clearly feudal? Who are clearly not part of the proletarian class? This is upsetting, I think to a lot of people's sensibilities. So they're unable to resolve it. They're unable to resolve it in the time that they allow themselves, but they're also, that doesn't mean that they would've been able to resolve it had they given more time. To put it another way, how do you do this? How do you transform an empire to a nation state? What are the examples of this happening successfully? Well, maybe China, but if we look around China, I don't think we can categorically say that it's been a success. Clearly, the state is very powerful, there's no doubt about that, But is the nation, is there a common identity, common national identity? So, put it another way, you talk about sort of class struggle, right? So that's the normative sort of way we think about malice China operating in most areas. When the reform regime comes into power in the late seventies, early eighties, they need to deal with all of the damage that class struggle, for lack of a better word, has caused, and they do it by basically saying, well, it was a big mistake, they went too far. Everybody's a victim. I mean, we're gonna rehabilitate almost everybody. And whether or not that narrative works for all the individual Han people who suffered during that period and their families, they didn't have to repair the narrative of nationhood itself, right? That's where I think the difference is. They try to do the same thing with Tibetans, right? Sorry, it was a mistake, we're gonna be better from now on, and we're all gonna make money in this new era. But the narrative of nationhood was never established. People never believed that they were Chinese, for lack of a better word. So I think that's, I'm not sure if that really quite answered your question, but I think that's where the two don't lock up.

- That was great, great. I think we'll hear from Yajing here.

- [Yajing] Hi, I'm Yajing

- Good, good, nice to meet you.

- [Student] I would love to hear a little bit more illumination of the term . According to basically the time you live here, it seems to be a bother being put into different whys and people's stories point out a little bit as. But I think that's probably later on you will have bigger, or maybe you want other people to do that. One thing, you guys give me a sense that it is in the 1950s, it is an interesting moment dealing with exclusion, and inclusion for, say for the Empires and Nation, right? Obviously the socialist kind of ideologues would like to use class, but then class doesn't fit in the frontier, so there's a

misfit, even though in the cities, there's also misfit, if you think about bad elements, it's never just about class, right?

- No, for sure.

- [Student] And resolution, the corruption also. So it seems to have this resonance of this influx moment of figuring out how do you have a clear cut, and towards the end it still need to be a clear cut, exclusion, inclusion, but at the same time cannot have a clear cut categories right on the other spectrum towards the other end of what we nation, not that it's nation, but obviously that seems to be a puzzle that just cannot be solved easily when you imposing on this exclusion-inclusion in an absolute sense. Another thing I wanna comment on, I found it interesting is Han Chauvanism also provided a flip side is for the ethnic minority of all of the Han nationalities to point finger at who's a good Han. That seems also trigger some sort of annoyance among the people who are policing Han chauvinism by that and made those state partners. I wonder if that seems to... Would you like to comment on that as see the longer trajectory of that flipping the script, the non-Han people pointing finger at it?

- Yeah, so in the Tibetan regions throughout the 1950s, higher levels are constantly harping on lower levels for Han chauvinism, right? So it's part of the discourse, the rhetoric up until 1957 or '58, everything that goes bad is partially or wholly because of Han chauvinism. It's never 'cause of the policies of course, right? The policies are great, but it's the implementation of the policies, that's due to Han chauvinism. What I haven't seen as much examples of non-Han people making that particular... I mean, I know there are examples of high profile people doing it, and getting in trouble in '58, being sent down for instance, or worse. But I just don't know examples of it. And it may be the sources, it may be that they're there, just that sources aren't showing me as much. The few times that I have for instance, have I guess kind of transcripts of Tibetans in meetings with party leaders, they're being critical of themselves, and meanwhile the Han are being critical of the state, or the party, not of the party, but the administration. So they're not accusing the Han of anything wrong, and the Han are not accusing the Tibetans of anything wrong. They're both being self-critical. In fact they, they're talking about making self criticisms quite often. So whether or not that's representative of larger trends, or just this particular documents I'm thinking about, which are really fascinating, but unfortunately they're pretty unique as far as I've seen, it's hard to say. I'm just thinking if there's more I can say to that. I would imagine that there are examples of, of local people making those type of accusations. And certainly in '58, people are accused of making accusations upon, of using Han Chauvinism to try to get things, and then they're called the whole nationalists, or separatists or if they're Han, they're called capitulationist.

- [Arunabh] Great, so we are at time, but Jason had a follow up or?

- Yeah,

- We can give Jason. Let's give it to Jason, last question and--

- [Jason] Bottom line of the early discussion on great Great Han Chauvinism because I think many of us here directly relate to Great Hanism as self-domestication of Great Russian Chauvanism. And I'm sort of wondering how sort of the rise of the term Great Hui Chauvanism as a response to that because sort of known during the conquest of the Northwest that basically the public, party leadership has been in direct conduct with Stalin the the Soviet insights on their great evangelism or something collapsed, so it even or might not have influenced the story in China.

- I mean, what I can say is basically people like James Labeled, and Niu Xiayuen have talked about how this Great Han Chauvinism was actually initially, as I understand it was used really as a way for party leaders to launch accusations against each other. Like Li Ni-San was accused of being a Great Han Chauvinist, and then during the Long March, Mao and Zhang Guotao accuse each other of being Great Han Chauvinist on the long march as they went through. So it came from the Soviet Union, and initially was sort of used in this, I won't say high level, but in this sort of weird discourse of ways, to be critical of the way of being people being too rightest or too leftist. Then the application of course starts on the Long March when they have to figure out why these people, when they first encountered non Han people on the Long March, they tried to connect with the masses, and of course the masses didn't want any part of this Chinese army walking through their region. And they came to the realization, quote unquote, that it was because of Han Chauvinism that these people feared the Han. And instead of trying to link up just with the masses, we need to link up with their leaderships as well as a whole because they're all oppressed, they're all victims. So they kind of transformed the idea of class, of class struggle or class difference to nationalities of a victim and an oppressor. The idea of Hui Chauvinism, that doesn't come up so much. The actual term only comes up a few times that I've seen it, but it comes up in these documents that really establish how the party's gonna approach the Hui in Yan'An, for instance. Yeah.

- [Arunabh] I guess we get to have Mark Elliot to get the last word in.

- [Mark] I wanted to ask about the frontier on the Long March and the shifting of the narrative and trying to reconcile the contradictions thrown up with a perspective on the revolutions that is spent entirely in terms of class, which we can see in its quotation there.

- Yeah.

- [Mark] Where nationality is... We would really rather we didn't have to deal with this because Marx didn't give us very much to work with, when it came to trying to understand how this fits the march of history, otherwise we'll start putting that out there. What you said just now reminded me of a very similar kind narrative that emerges in a much earlier period in the '20s. about women who are also a victim.

- Interesting. Yeah.

- [Mark] And so gender, like, ethnicity or call it there, it turns out also to be another complicating factor in the way to making class struggle, and the party adopts a very similar sort of response it seems with respect to the women's question as it does to the nationalities question, both how it resorts to victimhood as a way to incorporate people into the revolution. And in both cases, of course, it turned out to be highly imperfect. I know you haven't written on this, if you have, I have missed it, but is this something that it doesn't make sense?

- Yeah, it does make sense to me. I mean certainly, the anthropologists, well known ones have talked about the way that minorities are often feminized in China.

- [Mark] Well, there's that too.

- Yeah, right, so that's a different thing that you're talking about. But maybe, maybe similar in terms of some sort of gender dynamics between the the oppressors and the victims, the Han and the other, the men and the women. But no, I don't know if I've seen anyone that's specifically written about that. Yeah.

- [Student] Can I add on this? In Soviet History, there is a book about this, it's called "The Surrogate Caveat." It's about Soviets in Central Asia because the communist, they want you to like conduct reforms there, but they didn't find a frontier in Central Asia.

- Yeah.

- [Student] So because, so the Marxist theory doesn't work, so they just focus on women as their kind of ideal target, and they want to talk to women. So I think that's the idea. I don't know if in Chinese studies anyone has written a study on this, so someone should

- Yeah, we know that, thank you. It just, every time I hear people talk about, scholars talk about research on Soviet nationalities, policy and history, I'm just so overwhelmed. It's just so deep, and so they just, it's just so much more developed, for obvious reasons, than ours. And then they ask me questions I'm like, I don't know, archives are still closed. And they're going to be closed. State's still there,

party's still in power. But yeah, thank you, that's interesting.

- [Arunabh] That's a relatively depressing note. The future of knowledge production. Thank you so much.

- Thank you.

- [Arunabh] Really fascinating and thank you so much.