Fairbank Center experts weigh in: Ya-Wen Lei, Professor of Sociology, Harvard University; Rana Mitter, S.T. Lee Professor of U.S.-Asia Relations, Harvard University; Chia-hung Tsai, Research Fellow, Election Study Center and Professor, Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies, National Chengchi University; Shane Hsuan-Yu Lin, Assistant Professor, Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica (IPSAS); Kevin Luo, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities.
The views expressed in this blog post belong to the individual contributors and do not represent those of the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies.
Ya-Wen Lei, Professor of Sociology, Harvard University
Taiwan’s 2025 “Great Recall” movement emerged from a deepening power struggle between the executive and legislative branches following the 2024 elections. While the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) retained control of the presidency, an opposition alliance between the Kuomintang (KMT), which advocates for deeper cross‑Strait ties, and the centrist Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) secured a majority in the Legislative Yuan. This new majority swiftly moved to expand legislative power — cutting government budgets in critical areas, such as defense, and repeatedly rejecting President Lai Ching-te’s nominees to the Constitutional Court. As a result, the Court was rendered inoperative, lacking the quorum of ten justices required to function.
These developments sparked significant public backlash and gave rise to the “Bluebird Movement,” in which civic groups and the DPP launched recall campaigns targeting KMT legislators. Recall supporters, largely aligned with the DPP, accused the KMT of “selling out Taiwan” and undermining democratic norms, often linking their actions to alleged Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence. The KMT rejected such claims, denouncing the recalls as a DPP “power grab” and portraying their legislative agenda as a necessary check on executive overreach and “creeping authoritarianism.”
While some recall organizers described their efforts as decentralized and citizen-led, the campaign was widely understood as an extension of the DPP’s strategy to regain legislative control. The first wave of the “Great Recall” ended in decisive failure: When results were announced on July 26, 2025, all 24 recall efforts against KMT legislators, along with one mayoral recall, were rejected. While polling data had indicated limited public enthusiasm for the recalls, the complete rejection of every attempt came as a stark surprise to recall supporters and to the DPP, who had invested considerable effort in mobilization and had hoped to shift the legislative balance of power.
The resounding failure revealed the limits of the DPP’s strategy, which relied heavily on anti-CCP rhetoric and President Lai’s series of “Ten Speeches on National Unity.” Not only did these tactics fail to rally widespread public support, but they also exposed a growing disconnect between Lai’s administration and the broader electorate. Lai’s messaging, rather than unifying the nation, was increasingly seen as polarizing. According to a July 2025 survey by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation, President Lai’s approval rating stood at just 43%, down 5.8 percentage points from the previous poll. Even within the DPP, criticism of Lai had become increasingly common among members outside his faction, signaling limited support within his own party.
The recall results underscore a broader imperative: While Taiwan must continue to confront the complex challenges posed by China, the DPP can no longer lean on the “China threat” as a smokescreen for unresolved domestic issues such as economic inequality, low youth wages, energy insecurity, and international pressures — including tariffs imposed by the United States. Despite sharp ideological divides and polarized views on the recall efforts, a shared commitment to democracy and national unity persists among Taiwan’s citizens. Yet this moment demands deeper reflection: What does democracy truly mean—and what does it require? How can Taiwan bridge its deepening social divides? And what might a more inclusive vision of national unity look like? These questions are particularly urgent as Taiwan now faces a constitutional crisis, with a paralyzed Constitutional Court unable to function amid escalating institutional deadlock.In the context of U.S.-Taiwan relations, the failure of the recall efforts has weakened President Lai’s political standing. A leader perceived as lacking strong domestic support and constrained by a hostile legislature will have reduced leverage in negotiations with the United States, especially on critical issues like defense spending. Without a clear mandate at home, Lai’s credibility abroad is diminished. At the same time, his declining popularity may offer the CCP limited opportunities to exploit political divisions.
Rana Mitter, S.T. Lee Professor of U.S.-Asia Relations, Harvard University
The attempt by Taiwan’s Bluebird Movement to recall 24 KMT legislators has been rejected by the voters. In the short term, this means that President Lai Ching-te’s ability to get legislation passed will remain stymied by the gridlock in Taiwan, where the presidency is held by one party, the DPP, and the majority is held by an alliance of the KMT and TPP in the Legislative Yuan.
The longer term effects are the ones likely to have the most important effect, however. The recall election was just one example of the tendency of both sides in Taiwan’s politics to use increasingly confrontational political tactics against each other. Lai has been unable to get judges confirmed; the KMT has talked about using recall tactics against the DPP.
The establishment of a genuine liberal democracy in Taiwan was one of the great success stories of democratization in Asia in the 1990s, as well as a potent argument for why the prospect of Chinese rule was and is so troubling for many. (Few in the west would have been terribly concerned if Deng Xiaoping’s authoritarian China had taken over Chiang Ching-kuo’s authoritarian Taiwan in, say, 1979.) Yet the health of that democracy is now in danger because of increased political polarization.The 2028 Taiwan election will likely revolve around various issues. One will be the economy: Taiwan’s sluggish growth may lead voters to demand a change. The attitude of the U.S. and its willingness to help Taiwan defend itself will be crucial, as will voters’ reaction to military and economic threats from Beijing. But a sense that Taiwan’s politics no longer provides grounds for reasoned civil discourse would add further uncertainty to Taiwan’s future. The lesson of the recall failure may be the need for all sides to remember that the nurturing of Taiwan’s democratic culture is the best argument against its future and way of life being simply absorbed or erased by its massive neighbor.
Chia-hung Tsai, Research Fellow, Election Study Center and Professor, Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies, National Chengchi University
2022-23 Visiting Scholar, Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University
In Taiwan’s 2024 national election, the DPP secured a third consecutive presidential victory — an unprecedented achievement in Taiwan’s democratic history. However, DPP candidate William Lai Ching-te won with only 40% of the vote, a 17-point decline from the previous election. KMT candidate Hou You-yi received 34%, while Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) captured 26%. In the Legislative Yuan, the DPP secured 51 seats, while the KMT and TPP won 52 and 8 seats, respectively. Two independents were also elected.
Following the election, the KMT formed a coalition with the TPP and the two independents to pass legislative amendments that significantly expanded the oversight powers of the legislature. Some of these amendments were later declared unconstitutional. In response, the KMT-TPP coalition amended both the Constitutional Court Procedure Act and the Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures, which raised the quorum required for the Constitutional Court to hear a case and revised fiscal allocation rules to channel more funding to local governments. Subsequently, the legislature froze or reduced portions of the national budget, including military expenditures. These actions prompted criticism from two U.S. senators, who viewed the defense cuts as undermining Taiwan’s national security. Although the Executive Yuan vetoed the legislative amendments, the Constitutional Court was unable to convene due to a lack of quorum, as the KMT-TPP coalition continued to block the nomination of new Grand Justices. Without a functioning constitutional court, the legislative power is not balanced.
In reaction to what many viewed as an overreach by the KMT-TPP coalition and a weakened DPP, a wave of civic mobilization emerged. Numerous civic groups criticized the KMT-TPP for consolidating power and jeopardizing national defense. These groups launched recall campaigns in 31 legislative districts; however, 24 of these failed to meet the legal threshold, either because the “yes” votes were fewer than “no” votes or because they failed to surpass the required quorum of one-fourth of eligible voters. Nonetheless, seven recall elections are scheduled for August 23.
At the heart of the recall campaign lies the issue of national identity. The DPP has long advocated for distancing Taiwan from China. In March, President Lai referred to China as a “foreign adversary” and accused it of political infiltration. The KMT criticized Lai’s remarks as unnecessarily provocative, arguing that Taiwan should demonstrate goodwill to ease cross-Strait tensions. Against this backdrop, recall organizers have questioned the KMT legislators’ allegiance, appealing to traditional KMT supporters who once identified as staunch opponents of the Chinese Communist Party.
From this perspective, the recall movement reflects the anxiety of many Taiwanese over the island’s uncertain international status — regardless of how many countries formally recognize or support Taiwan. Despite dominance in semiconductor manufacturing — producing 60% of global chips and 95% of advanced ones — Taiwan faces not only external threats but also increasing internal division. Experts have warned that China may exploit Taiwan’s domestic fractures through cognitive warfare, infiltration, espionage, and targeted funding, rather than resorting to military invasion. In this sense, the recall campaign serves as a grassroots effort to awaken public awareness — especially among KMT and TPP voters — about the risks of appeasement and internal fragmentation.
Although no survey data is currently available to explain voting behavior in the recall elections, recent polls suggest that Taiwanese citizens broadly support checks and balances over a unified government. Most respondents also agree that elected officials should be subject to recall if they are not seen as serving the public. These findings reflect public commitment to constitutional democracy. Yet, they also raise deeper questions: How do voters balance democratic values against national security concerns? How do they weigh the threat of domestic illiberalism and foreign influence on Taiwan’s democracy?
During the recall campaign, the DPP largely refrained from playing an active role. The party appears to believe that while it may support civil action, it should not directly lead grassroots mobilization. The rise of the TPP suggests that the DPP may increasingly be perceived as a party of the status quo. By distancing itself from those demanding change, the DPP risks further alienating voters. The recall groups have not only challenged the KMT-TPP-controlled legislature but have also indirectly criticized the DPP. Their ability to mobilize millions of signatures highlights widespread discontent — not just with the legislative majority but also with a ruling party perceived as resistant to reform. The upcoming 2026 local elections will test whether the DPP can reconnect with change-seeking voters and reframe its image as a party that listens, adapts, and leads.
Shane H. Lin, Assistant Professor, Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica (IPSAS)
2021-2022 Hou Family Pre-doctoral Fellow in Taiwan Studies, Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University
Taiwan’s July 2025 recall campaign, which sought to unseat 24 Kuomintang (KMT) legislators, concluded with all of them retaining their seats. What began as a response to political gridlock following the 2024 elections gradually evolved into a broader discussion about democratic accountability and, to some extent, Taiwan’s relationship with China—particularly given the KMT’s reputation as a party more open to engagement with Beijing. In the 24 out of 73 legislative districts where the recall votes were held, voters chose not to overturn the results of the previous election. This outcome reflects a public preference for allowing elected officials to serve out their terms and for resolving political disagreements through regular democratic procedures. Despite partisan divisions, many voters in these districts appeared to favor incremental change over abrupt disruption.
The outcome also carries implications beyond Taiwan’s borders, particularly for China. Although the campaign involved only a subset of legislative districts, it nonetheless offers a window into broader public sentiment. By opting to retain KMT legislators—some of whom favor closer ties with Beijing—voters signaled a preference for preserving a diversity of voices in the legislature. For policymakers in Beijing, this may offer tempered reassurance: Taiwan’s electorate appears to support pluralism and a political landscape oriented toward stability and the status quo. At the same time, the result should not be mistaken for a concession. Taken together with recent elections, the recall outcome suggests that Taiwanese voters continue to send a clear and consistent message in the face of growing military and political pressure: they value peace, but not at the expense of principle.In sum, the recall campaign’s result reflects more than a preference for procedural continuity—it may also suggest a quiet reaffirmation of the status quo in cross-Strait relations. While the vote involved only a portion of the electorate, the outcome points to a broader inclination toward a cautious, steady approach in managing ties with China. Rather than signaling a push for major change, voters appeared to favor continuity and moderation. By retaining a range of political voices—including those more open to engagement—some voters may also have been expressing a desire for balance and deliberation within the legislature. In this light, the result can be seen as an endorsement of shaping Taiwan’s future through democratic channels, guided by stability, pluralism, and thoughtful decision-making.
Kevin Luo, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities
Visiting Scholar 2021-22, Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University
The result of the July 26 recall vote was perceived by many as a resounding victory for the defending KMT. But more importantly, I would argue that it is indicative of a larger political deadlock between the executive and legislative branches for the past year. The DPP’s Lai Ching-te, having won only 40% of the presidential vote in 2024’s three-way race, will continue to face a majority opposition coalition in the Legislative Yuan for the rest of his term, without any easy way around it. Foreseeable escalation in Taiwan’s partisan conflict will likely inject an additional element of uncertainty in the tripartite relationship of Taiwan, China, and the United States.
Why did the recall votes fail? Given that most, though not all, of the recall elections were targeted at predominantly KMT-favorable districts, perhaps we should not be that surprised. Yet given the mismatch between expectations and actual results, there are plenty of factors to speculate about: hypotheses include the DPP’s awkward relationship with grassroots civic groups who spearheaded the initial petitioning efforts, DPP overconfidence from the outset by broadening recall vote targets, a KMT policy proposal to issue a 10000 NTD universal cash payout, and the decisive vote of a ‘silent majority’ (likely supporters of the Taiwan People’s Party, who can constitute 20% of the voting bloc in many electoral districts) that was not accurately captured in pre-election polling. These factors likely all contributed in part, with some playing more of a role in certain electoral districts. Ultimately, lower turnout (56% versus 72% in 2024’s legislative elections) overall may signal a sense of general voter fatigue, diminished swing voter engagement with the pro-recall camp’s theme of “Defending Taiwan through Anti-Communism” (反共保台), and disillusionment with partisan squabbling over the past year. A stronger sense of urgency within the KMT also facilitated disproportionate turnout for the KMT at the 11th hour.
What are the implications for Taiwanese politics? President Lai and the DPP will inevitably enter into a prolonged period of soul-searching, and face backlash from party activists and grassroots civic groups who invested tremendously in the recall vote effort. More importantly, there are currently no clear pathways for the DPP to get out of the current partisan deadlock in the Legislative Yuan. The administration’s go-to strategy for the past year was to appeal its case to the Constitutional Court, but the KMT-TPP coalition responded by vetoing all of the DPP’s 7 nominees for the currently half-vacant Court, rendering it de facto inoperable. On the other hand, the likelihood of a KMT-TPP electoral alliance has increased substantially, in contrast to the failed attempt at a joint presidential ticket in 2024. This parliamentary coalition had already attempted to pass several bills earlier last year to broaden Legislative prerogatives, which sparked the recall votes against KMT legislators in the first place. With the Constitutional Court out of the picture and with no looming threat of a big recall vote, both KMT and the TPP can more effectively bolster their legislative agenda unfettered by judicial interference. However, there are some worrying signs for the KMT; its earlier inability to mobilize any petitions for a recall campaign of its own against DPP legislators does indicate some organizational weakness in the once vaunted KMT party machine. Whether it can cruise control and coast on anti-establishment sentiments to victory in 2028 remains very much an open question.
For many inside and outside of Taiwan, the most important question is whether this result will significantly impact relations across the Taiwan Strait. At first glance, no seat in the Legislative Yuan has actually changed hands. But this is undeniably a morale boost for KMT party whip Fu Kunchi (傅崐萁), who survived a recall vote of his own in Hualien and is a supporter for stronger linkages with the mainland. Fu, along with 16 other KMT legislators, visited CPPCC Chairman Wang Huning (王滬寧) in Beijing last April. We can expect Fu and other KMT leaders who support strong cross-strait ties to employ similar forms of subnational diplomacy with China, in open defiance to the Lai administration. Beijing is sure to welcome this, although it needs to think more carefully about how to more productively engage with the KMT, and other oppositional forces, without unwittingly fueling anti-China sentiment in Taiwan.
Curiously, the United States and the Trump Administration has remained silent on Taiwan for a while and throughout the recall vote. Just a few days ago, President Lai had reportedly asked for a U.S. layover / unofficial state visit as part of a planned trip to Latin America and was denied (the Lai administration announced that they had simply just rescheduled the trip). This contrasts with the previous DPP President Tsai Ing-wen, who had successfully negotiated for a similar 2023 visit, during which she met with both Republican and Democratic leaders on U.S. soil. Regardless, if the US is now much more concerned with striking a trade deal with China, the DPP, I suspect, may find itself losing some of the geopolitical leverage that it once enjoyed in the previous Tsai and Biden administrations.
In short, there are three overall takeaways from this round of the recall elections (more recall elections are scheduled for August 23, but many predict that chances of these passing are even slimmer): 1. Expect to see more political deadlock in Taiwan, which will render the Lai administration, in effect, a lame duck presidency until 2028; 2. Voter preferences, with regards to partisanship and cross-Strait relations, may have not shifted dramatically, but there are some noticeable signs of DPP voter fatigue; 3. Given that the Trump administration’s stance on U.S.-China relations is yet unclear, Taiwan’s own debates about cross-Strait relations will be primarily dictated by internal partisan dynamics, as well as Beijing’s continued effort to ‘market’ reunification — or at least tighter socioeconomic integration between both sides of the Taiwan Strait — to the Taiwanese public through various means.