Speaker: Y.S. Lee, West Virginia University College of Law

The United States has returned to tariffs and subsidies with renewed force, seeking to rebuild domestic manufacturing, promote strategic industries, and counter geopolitical rivals such as China. This resurgence of industrial policy marks a sharp departure from the rule-based international trade order under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade Organization since 1947. Yet despite costly tariffs and hundreds of billions of dollars in subsidies, the economic results remain uncertain, while concerns over inflation, trade conflict, and market distortion continue to grow. Current debates in economics, politics, and trade law have focused largely on whether tariffs and subsidies are desirable. Far less attention has been paid to a more fundamental question: whether the United States possesses the legal and institutional capacity to implement industrial policy effectively.

This Article addresses that question through the General Theory of Law and Development, a framework that examines how law, broader legal frameworks, and institutions shape economic and social transformation. It argues that contemporary U.S. industrial policy is structurally inadequate to achieve its stated objectives due to serious legal and institutional deficiencies undermining effective implementation, coordination, and policy coherence. These deficiencies also generate significant tensions with both domestic and international legal obligations, as illustrated by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump. The Article develops foundational elements of a new legal and institutional framework for industrial promotion grounded in international collaboration, economic rationality, and institutional coordination.

A light lunch will be provided. Please register here.