“Great Unity” (da yitong 大一統) is an ancient concept defining a unified China of Han and other ethnic peoples under tianxia (天下), or “All Under Heaven.” But it is very much still on the minds of the Communist Party’s propaganda tsars today.
A recent piece in the government-run Outlook (Liaowang 瞭望) magazine highlighted “How General Secretary Xi Jinping Discusses the Unity of Chinese Civilization.” At a 2023 symposium on Chinese culture, Xi linked Communist China to the imperial past: “The unity of Chinese civilization fundamentally determines that the cultures of all ethnic groups within the Chinese nation integrate into one whole. Even when faced with great setbacks, we remain firmly cohesive. This unity underpins our shared belief that the land is indivisible, the country must remain stable, the nation must stay united, and our civilization must not break. It determines that national unity is always at the heart of China’s core interests, and that a strong and unified nation is essential to the fate of all ethnic groups.”
And yet, as historian Zhaoguang Ge (葛兆光) points out in an essay below, the size and scope of China changed significantly from dynasty to dynasty, from a relatively diminutive, monocultural Ming Dynasty to the enormous Qing Empire with vast non-Han Chinese territories. So what, then, does “great unity” mean, and what political purpose does it serve for Xi Jinping and the Communist Party? Why is “great unity”—a concept dating back at least to the Warring States period, more than 2,500 years ago—so important in China today?
We asked several leading China scholars—Professors Mark Elliott (Harvard University), Zhaoguang Ge (Fudan University), Madeleine Yue Dong (University of Washington), and James Millward (Georgetown University)—to help us answer these questions. Stay tuned for more in this ongoing series, as additional scholars contribute their analysis in the coming months. Additionally, if you would like to add your own voice to this series, we welcome submissions. Send an email to the fairbankcenter@fas.harvard.edu with the subject line “Great Unity 大一統,” along with a bio, the name of your affiliated institution, and a headshot.
「大一統」是個古老的概念，用以界定在「天下」或者說「普天之下」由漢族和其他民族組成的統一中國。時至今日，這一概念仍存在於中共宣傳部門的思維之中。
中國政府主辦的《瞭望》雜誌最近發表了「習近平書記這樣談中華文明的統一性」專題文章。在2023年的一場關於中華文化的座談會上，習近平將共產主義中國與帝制時代的歷史關聯起來：「中華文明的統一性，從根本上決定了中華民族各民族文化融為一體……決定了國土不可分、國家不可亂、民族不可散、文明不可斷的共同信念，決定了國家統一永遠是中國核心利益的核心，決定了一個堅強統一的國家是各族人民的命運所系」。
然而，正如歷史學家葛兆光在本系列的文章中所指出，中國的版圖與規模歷經各朝而大不相同，從疆域相對袖珍、文化趨於單一的明朝，到幅員遼闊、涵蓋大量非漢族領土的大清帝國，可謂天差地別。那麼，「大一統」究竟指什麼？它對習近平和中國共產黨當下的政治目的有何作用？為什麼這個可以追溯到2500多年前戰國時期的概念，在今天的中國仍如此重要？
我們邀請了幾位著名的中國研究學者——哈佛大學的歐立德教授、復旦大學的葛兆光教授、華盛頓大學的董玥教授，以及喬治城大學的米華健教授——幫助我們探討這些問題。請持續關注這個系列，我們將陸續刊登更多學者的分析文章。如果您希望參與本系列的對話，我們歡迎您投稿。請發送電子郵件至 fairbankcenter@fas.harvard.edu，郵件主題請註明「Great Unity 大一統」並附上您的個人簡介、所屬院校名稱和頭像。
Mark C. Elliott
歐立德 Harvard UniversityMark C. Elliott
歐立德 Harvard UniversityVice Provost for International Affairs and Mark Schwartz Professor of Chinese and Inner Asian History
Zhaoguang Ge
葛兆光 Fudan UniversityZhaoguang Ge
葛兆光 Fudan UniversityDistinguished Senior Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences
Madeleine Yue Dong
董玥 University of WashingtonMadeleine Yue Dong
董玥 University of WashingtonProfessor of History and Chair of China Studies Program
James A. Millward
米華健 Georgetown UniversityJames A. Millward
米華健 Georgetown UniversityProfessor of Inter-societal History at the School of Foreign Service
“‘Grand Unity,’ Qing Political Legitimacy, and the Chinese ‘Geo-body'”
《略談「大一統」、清代正統和中國的「地緣機體」》
Mark C. Elliott — Harvard University
Mark C. Elliott is the Mark Schwartz Professor of Chinese and Inner Asian History in the Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations and the Department of History at Harvard University. His first book, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (2001), is an influential study in the “New Qing History,” an approach that emphasizes the importance of Manchu political and military institutions in giving the last empire its particular shape and identity.
歐立德 — 哈佛大學
歐立德是哈佛大學東亞語言與文明系及歷史系的馬克．施瓦茨中國與內亞史講座教授。他的第一本書《滿洲之道：八旗與晚期中華帝國的族群認同》，於2001年出版，是「新清史」研究中的一部具有影響力的著作，該研究方法強調滿洲的政治與軍事制度在塑造這一末代帝國的特有形態與身份方面的重要性。
An enormous amount has been written about the idea of “grand unity” (da yitong 大一統) in the last several years: by one estimate, nearly one thousand articles have appeared on the subject in the last fifteen years or so. A fundamental idea shared by much of this work is that the concept of “grand unity” helps explain the general trends governing Chinese history throughout the imperial period, and especially since the Qing. What we get is a picture of the gradual extension of claims of central political authority over the territories that today comprise the PRC as part of an inevitable process whereby China grows ever larger and ethnically more diverse, until, by remarkable coincidence, it gets to the size it is today (more or less). Thus the majority of “grand unity” research is about the expansion of China’s frontiers and increasing ethnic diversity within the Qing state. Emphasis on “grand unity” highlights the historical connections between the Qing and China today, whereby the PRC is portrayed as something like the “successor state” to the Qing, making this concept of immediate relevance both for our understanding of the sources of political legitimacy and of the evolution of the Chinese “geo-body.” […]
An enormous amount has been written about the idea of “grand unity” (da yitong 大一統) in the last several years: by one estimate, nearly one thousand articles have appeared on the subject in the last fifteen years or so. A fundamental idea shared by much of this work is that the concept of “grand unity” helps explain the general trends governing Chinese history throughout the imperial period, and especially since the Qing. What we get is a picture of the gradual extension of claims of central political authority over the territories that today comprise the PRC as part of an inevitable process whereby China grows ever larger and ethnically more diverse, until, by remarkable coincidence, it gets to the size it is today (more or less). Thus the majority of “grand unity” research is about the expansion of China’s frontiers and increasing ethnic diversity within the Qing state. Emphasis on “grand unity” highlights the historical connections between the Qing and China today, whereby the PRC is portrayed as something like the “successor state” to the Qing, making this concept of immediate relevance both for our understanding of the sources of political legitimacy and of the evolution of the Chinese “geo-body.”
In an important recent book, How the “Mandate of Heaven” was Transferred: The Formation and Implementation of “Grand Unity” in the Qing (天命”如何转移：清朝“大一统”观的形成与实践), Yang Nianqun (杨念群) of the Institute of Qing History at Renmin University advances a more sophisticated argument, to say that “grand unity” was key to Qing claims of political legitimation. In his view, expansion of the physical borders of the empire served to prove that the Manchus had received the “Mandate of Heaven” (tianming 天命) and were thus part of the “line of orthodox succession” (zhengtong 正统). He writes that, “After the Qing emperors established their rule over China, as non-Han, the greatest challenge they faced in legitimizing their authority was how to break through the rigid narrative conventions of the Song and Ming dynasties that strictly delineated the distinction between ‘barbarians’ and ‘civilized’” (139). To meet this challenge, Yang argues, the Manchus focused their attention on creating “grand unity”—meaning the geographic expansion of the empire, eventually to about double the size of Ming territory. This played to their strengths as a regime organized for military conquest and was their best shot at distinguishing themselves from the Ming and getting beyond Han ethnic prejudice. He explains:
Therefore, in their discourse on “legitimacy,” the Qing emperors deliberately emphasized the connotation of “great unity” to highlight the psychological advantage of their vast territory. They then aimed to infuse the act of unification with a “moral” meaning, seeking to combine the strengths of the different arguments for “legitimacy” from the Song, Yuan, and Ming into a cohesive whole. (140)
Put succinctly, Yang says, “The Qing emperors regarded the expansion of territory as a necessary condition for asserting their inheritance of orthodox succession” (151). In other words, the unification of tianxia (天下) helped the Manchus convince Han literati who were otherwise skeptical of their barbarian origins that they truly had won Heaven’s Mandate. This is the “transfer” of tianming (天命) referred to in the book’s title.
There is a logic here, and we certainly sometimes do see Qing emperors talk about their accomplishments in terms of “unification” (usually expressed as yitong 一統), not “grand unification” (da yitong 大一統). But there are a few problems with asserting that “grand unity” played a key role in the Manchu quest for political legitimacy or that imperial expansion was a factor in Han Chinese acceptance of Qing rule. One is that we never see recourse to “grand unity” being discussed by Qing rulers or ministers as a strategy, as a solution to a problem that should be planned and then carried out. On the contrary, most of the evidence we have shows that Qing expansion northward and westward was contingent, in response to immediate perceived threats to national security.
A second problem in trying to make the case for “grand unity” as a legitimating strategy in Qing discourse is that even when the term is used, it does not appear to mean what Yang says it means, i.e., a tianxia (天下) of greater dimensions than the Ming. A search of the Qing Veritable Records (Qing shilu 清實錄) shows only 26 uses of “da yitong” for the entire Qing period. When we examine these cases, we find they refer either to the extension of Qing control over China proper in the Shunzhi and Kangxi reigns, or to discussions of the term in historical texts, not to the expansion of the frontiers in the Qing. For example, in praising his great-grandfather, Qianlong states that, following the fall of the Ming and the chaos brought by the Shun rebels,
He [the Shunzhi emperor] defeated them in one battle and established the capital in Yanjing. The welfare of the people being the principal concern of [ruling] the world, one after the other he took control of Shandong, Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Hubei. Pacifying the area between the Yangzi and the Huai rivers, he took Hunan and Sichuan; then, moving south to Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, and Guizhou, one by one he cleaned them up, thus achieving grand unity. (Shunzhi shilu 順治實錄, SZ18.1.7)
Clearly, the “da yitong” spoken of here is all about the Qing consolidation of power over the Chinese provinces.
Another Shilu entry citing the imperial preface to the 1842 revision of the 1686 Records of the Unity of the Great Qing (Da Qing yitong zhi 大清一統志) reads, “To today, since Our Great Qing received the Mandate of Heaven to govern the world and we expanded our borders to [foster] Grand Unity, it has been two hundred years.” (Daoguang shilu 道光實錄, DG22.12.27). The context strongly suggests that, again, the “Grand Unity” being talked about here is the imposition of Manchu control over China proper 200 years earlier, in the 1640s. There is no reason to think that this refers to the military conquest of Xinjiang or the political settlement of arrangements for Qing suzerainty over Tibet.
In sum, there appears inadequate evidence to show that pursuit of “grand unity” was a political goal in the Qing or that it had much to do with the achievement of Qing legitimacy. Whatever “grand unity” might mean to historians today, as we can see, Qing deployment of this idea appears to have been limited to the Manchu assumption of control over the Chinese heartland and was in fact unconnected to the extension of power over the lands and peoples of Inner Asia. As recent work has shown, other concepts played a part in Qing imperial expansion, concepts derived from the Manchus’ understanding of their own political traditions and their inheritance of Mongolian and Tibetan ways of thinking about power, politics, religion, place, and identity. Thus, while one can agree with Yang’s broader suggestion that a Manchu-led China-based empire differed from a Han-led China-based empire, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that as far as “grand unity” is concerned, this is largely the projection back into the Qing of the preoccupation of modern scholars who are determined to find in the historical record grounds for believing that the borders of modern China were not only geographically set, but also conceptually developed during the Qing.
Making such a case has come to be seen as an important part of efforts in recent years to locate the sources of political legitimacy less in the 1949 Revolution and more in the relationship to the late imperial state. As Li Guoqiang (李國強), a historian at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, wrote in early 2025, “contemporary China is the continuation and development of historical China, and Qing history is our window for observing contemporary China.” This investment of political significance into interpretations of Qing history has led to calls for historians of China based in the mainland to “firmly control the discursive rights over Qing historical research,” as it was phrased by the associate editor of Historical Research (Lishi yanjiu 歷史研究), Zhou Qun (周群), in a 2019 editorial in People’s Daily. In that article, Zhou was quite explicit about the ideological value of Qing history to the Party today:
It should also be noted that in recent years, some major public opinion issues in the field of ideology are often directly related to Qing history, making Qing history research a matter of ideological security. Therefore, how we view Qing history, especially its frontier, ethnic, and religious policies, is not just a matter of historical understanding but a significant contemporary issue of great practical importance.
Concerns over “correct” views of the Qing have thus led not only to continued calls for vigilance with respect to Western scholarship on the period, allegedly tainted by so-called “historical nihilism,” but also to the indefinite postponement of the publication of the State Council-sponsored History of the Qing, into which roughly $300 million (2 billion RMB) had been invested—an even greater historiographical catastrophe than the Draft History of the Qing (Qing shigao 清史稿), a project that 100 years ago also failed to produce an authoritative history of the Qing. From this, it is evident that those in charge of managing intellectual orthodoxy in the “New Era” prefer to have no history of the Qing than a history of the Qing not written to their liking. If there is to be such a history, it must be a work such as the two-volume set devoted to the “history of national unification” in the Qing, published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 2023. That is a sign of how much “grand unity” and the Qing matter today.
近年來，關於「大一統」的著述可謂汗牛充棟。據統計，至2023年相關論文已近兩千篇，其中半數集中於近十五年間。這些論文的一個核心觀點強調，「大一統」概念最完美地詮釋自清朝以來中國歷史發展的總體趨勢。 部分學者更將「統一」模式推向極端，聲稱「大一統」是解鎖整個中國歷史的密鑰，是支撐中華民族形成的元敘事。「大一統」話語基本的模式是講中央政權通過必然的歷史進程，逐步將實權延伸到當今中國版圖所涵蓋的疆域及境內的各个族群。 這一進程被構建為中華文明持續擴展、直至清代，機緣巧合之下，最終形成當今國家的規模。 因此，多數“大一統”研究聚焦疆域擴張、邊疆治理與非漢民族族群，旨在論證其如何成為 “中國” 的組成部分。 這樣注重「大一統」自然而然地突顯了清朝與當今中國之間的歷史聯繫，在這種聯繫中，中華人民共和國被描繪為清朝的「繼承國」，使得這一概念對於我們理解歷史中國政治合法性的根源以及國家「地緣機體」(geo-body)的演變具有直接的相關性。「⋯⋯」
全文：《略談「大一統」、清代正統和中國的「地緣機體」》
近年來，關於「大一統」的著述可謂汗牛充棟。據統計，至2023年相關論文已近兩千篇，其中半數集中於近十五年間。這些論文的一個核心觀點強調，「大一統」概念最完美地詮釋自清朝以來中國歷史發展的總體趨勢。 部分學者更將「統一」模式推向極端，聲稱「大一統」是解鎖整個中國歷史的密鑰，是支撐中華民族形成的元敘事。「大一統」話語基本的模式是講中央政權通過必然的歷史進程，逐步將實權延伸到當今中國版圖所涵蓋的疆域及境內的各个族群。 這一進程被構建為中華文明持續擴展、直至清代，機緣巧合之下，最終形成當今國家的規模。 因此，多數“大一統”研究聚焦疆域擴張、邊疆治理與非漢民族族群，旨在論證其如何成為 “中國” 的組成部分。 這樣注重「大一統」自然而然地突顯了清朝與當今中國之間的歷史聯繫，在這種聯繫中，中華人民共和國被描繪為清朝的「繼承國」，使得這一概念對於我們理解歷史中國政治合法性的根源以及國家「地緣機體」(geo-body)的演變具有直接的相關性。
論及清朝的“大一統”研究，中國人民大學清史所的楊念群教授2022年出版的重要著作應該說是至今最詳盡的論述。作者闡釋“大一統”問題的核心立論在於：該概念構成清朝政治合法化訴求的關鍵維度，是證明其承繼天命、執掌“正統”的重要途徑。 楊念群指出：“清朝帝王以非漢人身份定鼎中國之後，其建立正統面臨的最大挑戰就是如何衝破宋明儒家嚴分夷夏之別的敘述陳規”(139)。為應對此挑戰，楊教授認為滿洲統治者著力構建「大一統」——即通過帝國疆域擴張彰顯統治優勢。 這樣就能夠凸顯清廷超越明朝的治理能力，又可突破漢人族群偏見，確立不容置疑的政治權威。他闡釋道：
「所以清帝在’正統性’論述中必然刻意發揮’大一統’古義中’大統一’之內涵，以彰顯疆域巨集闊的心理優勢，然後再賦予一統之舉以“道德’涵義，以期合併宋元明三朝”正統觀“的各自優長為一體。」(140)
簡言之，楊念群指出：“清帝以開疆拓地之廣作為攝位’正統’之必要條件”。楊念群認為，通過實現「天下一統」，滿洲統治者得以說服原本質疑其「夷狄」出身的漢族士大夫， 這也正是楊教授著作標題所指涉的「天命轉移」之樞機所在。
此間邏輯可自洽。 我們確實可以看到清朝皇帝在談論其成就偶爾使用「統一」這一概念，通常表達為「一統」，而非「大一統」字樣。然而，斷言「大一統」在滿洲統治者尋求政治合法性中發揮了關鍵作用，或認為大清帝國的擴張是漢人士大夫之所以認同了清朝統治的因素，這些說法存在一些問題。其一，清廷君臣好像從來沒有把「大一統」作為預設策略或解題方案加以籌謀。相反，現有證據表明清朝向西北的疆域拓展具有偶然性，是對國家安全即時威脅的臨時回應。
要論證「大一統」作為清朝合法性話語策略的第二個問題在於：該術語並未被清朝統治者或官員頻繁利用。 即便在清代文獻中它偶爾出現，但一般的時候它的含義亦並非如楊教授所說的“超越明朝版圖的天下”的意思。 通過漢籍電子文獻庫檢索《清實錄》可見，整個清朝時期“大一統”僅出現二十六次。 細察這些用例發現，大多數指涉或為順治、康熙朝對中原的控制延伸，或為史籍術語的討論。例如，乾隆帝頌揚順治帝功業時言道
值明運已終。流寇肆虐。順天應人。命將出師。百萬巨寇。一戰而克。 定鼎燕京。為天下生民主。 齊晉秦豫。傳檄而定。平江淮、收楚蜀。下浙閩、 兩粵滇黔。以次掃蕩。遂成大一統之業。(「世祖章皇帝實錄」卷之一百四十四，順治十八年正月七日)
顯然，這裡所說的 “大一統”指的是清朝對中原諸省統治權的鞏固，與西域無關。
《清實錄》另一條目（道光二十二年十二月二十七日）援引1842年重修《大清一統志》御制序稱：“我大清之受天命有天下，增式廓而大一統者，於今二百年”。此段文意可作多解，但語境暗示這個地方用“大一統”的詞彙指的是二百年前（即1640年代）滿洲對中原的統治確立，好像沒有理由認為這是涉及新疆軍事征服或西藏主權安排。至少，我沒有找到一個例子是涉及到邊疆議題。
總之，似乎沒有充足的證據表明「大一統」的追求被定為滿洲統治者的政治目標，或者它與清朝合法性的實現有很大關係。無論「大一統」對當代史學家意味著什麼，正如我們所見，清朝對這一思想的運用似乎僅限於滿洲政權對中國腹地的控制，而與其向內陸亞洲的進展實際上沒有直接關係。最近的研究說明，在清朝的擴張中其他政治概念發揮了作用，這些概念源自滿洲人對自身政治傳統的理解，以及他們對蒙古和西藏在權力、政治、宗教、地域和認同個方面思維方式的繼承。我們想要認同楊教授的一種說法——就是滿洲主導的中原帝國與漢人主導的中原帝國存在著本質的差異。但就「大一統論」而言，難免得出的結論是，這主要是現代學者把自身對當代中國疆界的執念投射到清朝歷史，以證實現代中國版圖不僅在清季地理成型，更於理念層面奠基。
主張這種論點可以視為屬於近年來將當代政治合法性的來源從1949年革命的基礎上，更多地轉向與大清帝國的關係上的一種趨勢。2025年1月的《清史研究》刊登了中國社會科學院歷史學家李國強在清史所重組儀式上的演講，演講名為“構建中國自主的清史研究體系是新時代的使命”，作者強調：“當代中國是歷史中國的延續與發展，清史是觀察當代中國的重要窗口。”正是因為清史敘述這樣賦予了這種政治意義，就導致了對境內史學家的呼籲，要照《歷史研究》副主編周群在2019年1月《人民日報》的一篇社論所強調的那樣，“牢牢把握清史研究話語權。”周群很直白的描述了清史研究與意識形態安全息息相關：
「還要看到，近些年來，一些意識形態領域的重大輿情，也往往與清代歷史直接相關，清史研究事關意識形態安全。 因此，如何看待清代歷史，特別是清代的邊疆政策、民族政策、宗教政策，就不僅僅是歷史認識問題，而且是具有重大現實意義的時代課題。 」
近十幾年來，有關清代歷史的「正確」解釋和觀點的關注因此導致了對被所謂“歷史虛無主義”所污染的西方學術研究的持續警惕。除此之外，也另外還導致了國務院推動的所謂「清史工程」2023年十一月份突然給無限期推遲。這次比1928年的《清史稿》的未竟全功更嚴重的一場史學災難顯示，管理意識形態正統性的負責人不願出版一本不合其意的清史，寧願沒有一本清史，也即使這意味著浪費約三億美元（二十億人民幣）的投資。要出一本“正宗”清史的話，唯有新組建的中國社會科學院歷史研究所推出的首部出版物，兩冊的《清代國家統一史》才行。這就是“大一統”和清史敘述在今天中國的重要性所在。
“‘Great Unity’ of What, Exactly?“
《「大一統」，從何而起？》
Zhaoguang Ge — Fudan University
Zhaoguang Ge is a Distinguished Senior Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences and the Department of History at Fudan University. His main research areas include the history of religion, thought, and culture in East Asia and China. He is the author of What Is China?, which was the topic for a recent conference co-sponsored by the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies.
葛兆光 — 復旦大學
葛兆光是復旦大學人文社科高等研究院和歷史系的文科資深教授。他的主要研究領域包括東亞與中國的宗教、思想和文化史。他著有《何為中國》一書，哈佛大學費正清中國研究中心最近參與主辦的一場學術會議即以此為題。
Recently, in discussing the concept of “great unity” (da yitong 大一統), a concept extolled throughout Chinese history, some scholars have, intentionally or not, linked the historical notion of “great unity” with the contemporary idea of the national “unity” of China. This maneuver contemporizes and politicizes the discourse on this historical issue.
However, if we were to discuss “great unity” from a historiographical vantage point, I have certain doubts regarding the concept itself. Below are four questions I would like to raise […]
Recently, in discussing the concept of “great unity” (da yitong 大一統), a concept extolled throughout Chinese history, some scholars have, intentionally or not, linked the historical notion of “great unity” with the contemporary idea of the national “unity” of China. This maneuver contemporizes and politicizes the discourse on this historical issue.
However, if we were to discuss “great unity” from a historiographical vantage point, I have certain doubts regarding the concept itself. Below are four questions I would like to raise:
First, from the original meaning of “great unity,” the concept was initially intended to safeguard the absolute control of imperial authority over the empire against uprisings of barbarians, feudal lords, and local powers (such as the Rebellion of the Seven States, the War of the Eight Princes, the Upheaval of the Five Barbarians, the An Lushan Rebellion, the Liao and Jin Invasions of the South, and the Prince of Ning Rebellion.) Thus, the question that demands further pursuit is whether the concept of “great unity” held by monarchical or imperial power throughout history is a fundamental principle. Why is “great unity” considered absolutely justifiable?
Second, how expansive must China’s territory and accepting must its ethnic groups be in order for it to be considered “great unity”? Is historians’ regard for the territory and ethnic groups of the Qing Dynasty as the genuine realization of “great unity” not a revisionist approach that projects modern ideas onto the past? The Shang Dynasty controlled only a small area centered around the northern Central Plains historically. The Zhou Dynasty was a mix of the “Chinese” and the “non-Chinese,” along with many feudal lords implementing feudalism; even so, its territory was only around one-fifth of what later became China. During the Qin and Han Dynasties, their territories were bounded only within the Great Wall. Does that count as “great unity”?
On the other hand, does the Mongol Empire, which spanned across Eurasia, count as “great unity”? Additionally, regions such as Korea and Vietnam, originally incorporated into the Qin and Han territories, gradually became foreign countries. The Song Dynasty considered Dali, a part of Tang China, to be a foreign country, recognizing Annam’s independence. The Ming Dynasty even stated that “beyond Jiayu Pass is not China,” delineating the Western Regions beyond its domain. It also recognized Annam’s independence soon after the administrative integration of Annam as a county in the 15th century. The Qing Dynasty expanded its territory but later ceded regions like the Outer Khingan Mountains, Sakhalin Island, and Tannu Uriankhai to Russia. Does this count as “great unity”?
Third, did “great unity” truly bestow legitimacy? Was the political legitimacy (“Mandate of Heaven,” or tianming 天命) of the Qing Empire bestowed by “great unity,” in other words self-proclaimed by the rulers, or was legitimacy achieved through conquer by military forces? Was “great unity” a condition for the possibility of obtaining the so-called “mandate of heaven”? If the legitimacy of traditional Chinese dynasties truly depended on “great unity,” then did the Song and Ming dynasties lack a “mandate of heaven,” since they never achieved “great unity” in this sense? (The historical geographer Ge Jianxiong (葛剑雄) once pointed out that, upon careful calculation, China’s duration of “disunity” exceeds that of “unity.”)
And what about ethnic disparities and nationalist uprisings? Did the Qing Dynasty truly achieve “great unity” and resolve the Chinese and non-Chinese, or “Hua-Yi” issue, or the problem of ethnic identity? If the “great unity” unification efforts by emperors such as Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong (including Kangxi’s combination of political and moral governance, Yongzheng’s Resolving Confusion with a Discourse on Righteousness (大义觉迷录) and A Record of Distinguishing Demons and Discerning Heresies (拣魔辨异录), and Qianlong’s “Ten Great Campaigns” to achieve “great unity”) could genuinely resolve the centuries-old conflicts between the Han, the non-Han, the Chinese, and the non-Chinese, then why did the underlying tensions between the Manchus and the Han persist throughout the nearly three centuries of Qing rule (as shown in private conversations between Han scholar-officials and Korean envoys recorded in the Records of Travels to Yan (Yanxinglu 燕行录)? Why were there later uprisings like the Hui Muslim Rebellion and the rise of popular Han nationalist sentiments (in figures like Sun Yat-sen and Zhang Taiyan, leaders of the Revolution of 1911 that toppled the Qing Dynasty, and slogans like “Expel the Manchus, Restore China”) in the late Qing period? And why do issues surrounding ethnic and national identity still exist today?
Today, historians praise the “great unification” of the traditional era, but it is doubtful whether the concept can really achieve equality and harmony among various ethnic groups in history (and reality). Can the inherent inequalities between rulers and subjects, Chinese and non-Chinese, and the domestic and foreign found within the historical concept of “great unity” be eliminated in its modern imagination? Should the realization of ethnic and national identity rely on the traditional “great unity” of the traditional era, or should it depend on the modern system of a nation-state?
最近，在討論中國歷史上的「大一統」觀念的時候，一些學者有意無意地把歷史上的「大一統」與當代中國的國家「統一」聯繫了起來。這項舉措現代化了也政治化了對這個歷史問題的討論。
但是，如果是從史學視角討論「大一統」，我對這個概念的本身，便有了一些疑問。具體有以下四點。「⋯⋯」
最近，在討論中國歷史上的「大一統」觀念的時候，一些學者有意無意地把歷史上的「大一統」與當代中國的國家「統一」聯繫了起來。這項舉措現代化了也政治化了對這個歷史問題的討論。
但是，如果是從史學視角討論「大一統」，我對這個概念的本身，便有了一些疑問。具體有以下四點。
其一，從大一統的本義來看，所謂「大一統」原本是指對帝國王權的絕對統治的維護，防止蠻夷、諸侯和地方的叛亂（例如七國之亂，八王之亂，五胡亂華、安史之亂，遼金南下和辰濠之亂）。因此，值得進一步探討的問題是，在歷史上，王權或帝國的「大一統」從來都是天經地義地麼？為什麼「大一統」是絕對合理的？
其二，中國的疆域要有多遼闊，民族要有多包容，才能算是「大一統」？難道歷史學家將清朝的疆域和民族當作「大一統」的正確體現，不算是一種用現代視角看古代的修正主義行為嗎？在歷史上，殷商只不過掌控了以北方平原為中心一小圈；周朝，則華夷雜處，諸侯林立，以實行封建。但就算如此，疆域也不過後來中國的五分之一；到了秦漢，疆域也不過在長城以內，這能稱作「大一統」嗎？
進一步說，蒙古朝代橫跨了歐亞大陸，這算不算「大一統」呢？再就是，原本已納入秦漢版圖的朝鮮和越南，歷史上陸續成為外國；宋朝把唐代仍屬中國的大理視為外國，承認安南的獨立；明代甚至以為嘉峪關外非中國，把西域排除在外。十五世紀初把安南地區郡化之後，卻隨即又承認了它的獨立；清朝雖然擴大了版圖，但是又把外興安嶺、庫頁島、唐努烏梁海劃給了俄羅斯，這算不算是「大一統」呢？
其三，「大一統」是否真的有正統性？在「大一統」背景下的清朝統治是否正當（或者說「天命」所歸？「Mandate of Heaven」）—是統治者自我標榜應得的，還是憑藉武力打下來的？ 「大一統」是成為了獲得所謂「天命」的條件嗎？如果傳統中國王朝的合法性，真的要靠「大一統」才能建立，那麼，宋代、明代都沒有實現這個意義上的所謂「大一統」（歷史學家葛劍雄曾指出，如果仔細算起來，中國的「分裂」時間要長於「統一」的時間），那麼這兩個王朝就沒有「天命」了嗎？
還有，如若有民族差異和民族主義的起義呢？清朝真的實現了「大一統」，並且解決了“華夷”矛盾，也就是族群認同問題了嗎？如果說，靠康雍乾等清朝皇帝的對於“大一統”的作為（包括康熙提出的『政統』兼『道統』，雍正的《大義覺迷錄》、《揀魔辯異錄》，還有乾隆的「十全武功」，真的能解決了幾千年積淀的華夷，胡漢矛盾嗎？那麼，為什麼整個清代近三百年間，仍然隱隱之間存在著滿漢矛盾（參考《言行錄》中記載漢族士大夫與朝鮮使者的私下談話）？而晚清為何又有著回民之亂以及漢族民族主義崛起（如孫中山、章太炎，1911年那些推翻了清治的領袖們，以及「驅逐韃虜，恢復中華」的口號）？甚至直到如今，還存在著民群與國家認同的問題？
如今，歷史學家們讚美傳統時代的「大一統」，但令人懷疑的是，它是否真的能夠在歷史與現實中，實現各個族群之間的平等與和諧？「大一統」這個歷史概念中所隱含的君臣、華夷、中外之間的自古不平等，能夠在對所謂「大一統」的現代思考中消除嗎？是否實現民族與國家認同的認同，必須依賴統時代的「大一統」，或者還是得去依靠現代的國民國家製度？
“China’s Global Civilization Initiative: What Would Levenson Say?“
《通過列文森看中國的全球文明倡議》
Madeleine Yue Dong — University of Washington
Madeleine Yue Dong is Professor in the History Department at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies and Chair of the China Studies program at the University of Washington. Her research on Modern Chinese history focuses on social/cultural, urban, and gender history.
董玥 — 華盛頓大學
董玥是華盛頓大學歷史系和亨利傑克遜國際關係學院教授，也擔任中國研究項目主任。她的現代中國史研究關注社會/文化史，城市歷史和性別史。
As China seeks a more prominent role on the global stage, its international discourse is evolving. The Global Civilization Initiative, launched by the central government in March 2023, exemplifies this shift. The Initiative highlights four guiding themes: respect for civilizational diversity, promotion of shared human values, recognition of the importance of both civilizational inheritance and innovation, and the enhancement of civilizational exchange and cooperation. It explicitly advocates values such as “peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy, and liberty” as globally shared ideals, while simultaneously asserting that “all civilizations created by human society are splendid. They are where each country’s modernization drive draws its strength and where its unique feature comes from.”
At first glance, the Initiative appears to affirm ideals that resonate across many cultures in today’s world. Its emphasis on equality in global governance and the protection of cultural difference reflects long-standing concerns not only among Chinese thinkers since the late nineteenth century but also among postcolonial and other non-Western intellectual traditions. Yet ambiguities remain. What exactly constitutes a “civilization” in this framework, and who defines its boundaries or membership? Has modernization historically interacted with civilizations in manners as benign and harmonious as the Initiative suggests? More crucially, can a single state credibly define “common values” without eroding the civilizational diversity it claims to defend? […]
As China seeks a more prominent role on the global stage, its international discourse is evolving. The Global Civilization Initiative, launched by the central government in March 2023, exemplifies this shift. The Initiative highlights four guiding themes: respect for civilizational diversity, promotion of shared human values, recognition of the importance of both civilizational inheritance and innovation, and the enhancement of civilizational exchange and cooperation. It explicitly advocates values such as “peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy, and liberty” as globally shared ideals, while simultaneously asserting that “all civilizations created by human society are splendid. They are where each country’s modernization drive draws its strength and where its unique feature comes from.”
At first glance, the Initiative appears to affirm ideals that resonate across many cultures in today’s world. Its emphasis on equality in global governance and the protection of cultural difference reflects long-standing concerns not only among Chinese thinkers since the late nineteenth century but also among postcolonial and other non-Western intellectual traditions. Yet ambiguities remain. What exactly constitutes a “civilization” in this framework, and who defines its boundaries or membership? Has modernization historically interacted with civilizations in manners as benign and harmonious as the Initiative suggests? More crucially, can a single state credibly define “common values” without eroding the civilizational diversity it claims to defend?
For much of the post-Mao era, China has appealed to its “special conditions” to explain or deflect external criticism, particularly regarding liberal-democratic norms. The Global Civilization Initiative, however, suggests a notable discursive shift. While it appears to move from emphasizing exceptionalism to promoting globally shared values, it does not abandon exceptionalism; rather, it naturalizes and retains it within the very framework of “common values.” The Initiative incorporates liberal-democratic terms such as “democracy” and “liberty,” but implicitly redefines them through China’s national experience. The stress on a country’s “uniqueness” reintroduces an earlier narrative and effectively recasts exceptionalism as a civilizational contribution to a shared global ethic. Meanwhile, by substituting the language of “universal values” with that of “common values,” China appears to propose an alternative to Western liberal hegemony—one that has been justifiably subjected to sustained critique from both Chinese and Western scholars for its Western-centric parochialism. This complex rhetorical shift raises an important question: does it create space for genuine normative pluralism, or merely mask a new universalism under another name?
These questions are not only political but intellectual—and not entirely new. The problem of how civilizations define themselves in relation to others was a central concern of the historian Joseph R. Levenson (1920-1969), whose methodology and framework—though not without limitations rooted in his historical moment—remain strikingly relevant today. Writing during the early decades of the People’s Republic, when China was reasserting its position in a post-imperial world, Levenson proposed a relational model of civilizational identity: the universal, he argued, does not precede the particular but emerges from it. Universality, in his view, cannot simply be declared; it must arise through lived relationships among distinct traditions. In his trilogy Confucian China and Its Modern Fate, the posthumous Revolution and Cosmopolitanism: Western Stage and Chinese Stages, and other works, Levenson examined how Chinese thinkers negotiated between inherited cultural forms and external pressures. He cautioned against both absolutism and relativism, insisting that particularity exists only in relation to other particularities—not through isolation, but through interaction and mutual recognition. As he memorably put it, quoting Alfred North Whitehead, “A traveler who has lost his way should not ask, ‘Where am I?’ What he really wants to know is, ‘Where are the other places?'”
Levenson rejected the notion of China as a closed or self-contained historical entity. In “Genesis of Confucian China,” he described China as “an action painter on a world canvas,” emphasizing its role in shaping—and being shaped by—global currents. By juxtaposing Chinese, European, and Jewish historical experiences and narratives, he demonstrated that comparison was not about erasing difference but about illuminating how societies confront shared human dilemmas in distinctive ways. Crucially, Levenson grounded his comparative method not in fixed cultural essences but in historically contingent encounters and mutual perceptions. His approach also recognized the affective dimension of civilizational life: civilizations are animated by the feelings invoked by human aspirations, conflicts, losses, and hopes that cross cultural boundaries. Comparison, then, was not merely analytical; it was a way of affirming the ethical and emotional dimensions of a shared, if uneven, human experience. This human-centered, relational perspective helps displace the state as the exclusive locus of agency and meaning. It reminds us that civilizations are shaped as much by thinkers, different communities, and cross-cultural movements as by policy and power.
In light of Levenson’s insights, China’s Global Civilization Initiative raises significant concerns in its promotion of “common values.” When such values are defined and advocated primarily by a single nation, there is a risk that specific historical and political experiences may be projected as universal norms and exported to other cultural contexts. Communities that interpret shared ideals—such as liberty or justice—through different institutional or philosophical lenses, or whose experiences of modernization diverge, may find themselves marginalized. What is framed as inclusion may, in practice, result in a moral hierarchy, wherein one “civilizational” voice dominates under the banner of commonality. Smaller or less influential traditions may feel pressured to conform, while their distinct contributions to global discourse risk being overlooked or excluded. China, in fact, is familiar with such alienation itself, having long experienced the imposition of external norms through imperialism and colonialism during its own modern history.
Challenging Western-centric universalism is a serious and legitimate endeavor—but it requires more than substituting one vocabulary or civilizational center for another. True pluralism demands co-authorship: a historically grounded, collective process of negotiating what ‘common’ means across difference. This is where the Initiative has yet to fulfill its promise. Its limitations reflect broader structural flaws in state-centric paradigms that pervade both political discourse and academic analysis. Rather than fostering open-ended dialogue, the Initiative risks articulating values from a singular vantage point, seeking assent rather than participation. In contrast, Levenson’s vision offers a more generative alternative: a world in which universal values are not imposed but co-created and discovered through historical encounter, mutual recognition, and comparative understanding.
If China genuinely seeks to offer a departure from Western hegemony, it must co-author that vision with others. The shift required is not only geographical, but from dominance to dialogue—affirming both particularity and universality within a truly pluralistic framework. Such a reorientation would not only make China’s global discourse more inclusive but also enhance its credibility as a contributor to international norm-making. Embracing co-authorship over unilateralism would allow the Initiative to move beyond rhetorical pluralism and cultivate the kind of mutual recognition Levenson envisioned—one grounded not in sameness but in the shared task of negotiating meaning across difference. It would also reaffirm, as Levenson emphasized, that universality cannot be declared or dictated; it must be historically earned through interaction, reflection, and reciprocal acknowledgment.
In this regard, the role of the historian remains vital. As the language of values becomes a contested terrain of global power, scholars bear a responsibility to interpret, critique, and situate such discourses. Historians do not merely recount the past—they shape the narratives through which civilizations understand themselves in relation to others. By unsettling fixed categories, illuminating contingent historical encounters, and recovering neglected voices, historians create the intellectual conditions necessary for meaningful pluralism. In an age marked by overlapping crises and fractured global imaginaries, the promise of a relational, co-authored civilizational future is not only political and ethical—it is also historiographical. The ultimate challenge is not merely to assert values, but to cultivate the historical consciousness through which shared values can be meaningfully negotiated and co-created.
隨著中國尋求在全球舞臺上扮演更重要的角色，其國際話語體系也在發生演變。2023年3月中國政府提出的「全球文明倡議」正是這種轉變的體現。此倡議強調四大指導原則：尊重文明多樣性、弘揚全人類共同價值、重視文明傳承與創新、加強國際人文交流合作。它明確倡導「和平、發展、公平、正義、民主、自由」等全球共享理念，同時強調「人類社會創造的一切文明都是燦爛奪目的，它們是一個國家實現現代化的力量之源和特色之所在」。
這個倡議似乎肯定了當今世界多種文化共鳴的理想。它對全球治理中的平等性和保護文化差異的強調，不僅呼應了十九世紀末以來中國思想家的長期關切，也與後殖民及其他非西方知識傳統產生共鳴。但是這個倡議中仍存在諸多模糊之處：在此框架下，究竟什麼才構成「文明」？其邊界與成員資格由誰裁定？在歷史上，現代化與文明之間是否始終是這樣一種和諧的良性互動關係？更為關鍵的是，單一國家是否能夠在不削弱其所聲稱要維護的文明多樣性的前提下，真正推廣「共同價值」？「⋯⋯」
全文：《通過列文森看中國的全球文明倡議》
隨著中國尋求在全球舞臺上扮演更重要的角色，其國際話語體系也在發生演變。2023年3月中國政府提出的「全球文明倡議」正是這種轉變的體現。此倡議強調四大指導原則：尊重文明多樣性、弘揚全人類共同價值、重視文明傳承與創新、加強國際人文交流合作。它明確倡導「和平、發展、公平、正義、民主、自由」等全球共享理念，同時強調「人類社會創造的一切文明都是燦爛奪目的，它們是一個國家實現現代化的力量之源和特色之所在」。
這個倡議似乎肯定了當今世界多種文化共鳴的理想。它對全球治理中的平等性和保護文化差異的強調，不僅呼應了十九世紀末以來中國思想家的長期關切，也與後殖民及其他非西方知識傳統產生共鳴。但是這個倡議中仍存在諸多模糊之處：在此框架下，究竟什麼才構成「文明」？其邊界與成員資格由誰裁定？在歷史上，現代化與文明之間是否始終是這樣一種和諧的良性互動關係？更為關鍵的是，單一國家是否能夠在不削弱其所聲稱要維護的文明多樣性的前提下，真正推廣「共同價值」？
在過去的四十年裡，中國多以自身的「特殊國情」來解釋或回應來自外部的批評，特別是與自由民主規範相關的質疑。全球文明倡議則顯示出顯著的話語轉型。表面上看，它從強調特殊論轉向推廣全球共享價值，但實際上並未放棄特殊論，而是將其自然化並嵌入「共同價值」框架。這個倡議吸納了「民主」「自由」等自由主義術語，卻通過中國自身歷史和政治經驗對之進行重新定義，並格外強調文明的「獨特性」，這便巧妙地將特殊論本身轉化為對全球文明的貢獻。同時，以「共同價值」取代「普世價值」的修辭，表明中國似乎在構建替代西方自由主義霸權的方案——這種西方中心主義因其狹隘性一直受到中西方學者的持續批判。這種複雜的修辭轉換引發出一個關鍵問題：它究竟是為真正的規範多元主義開闢空間，還是以新名目包裝另一種普遍主義？
這些問題不僅是政治議題，更是思想命題，而這些矛盾並非全新的現象。歷史學家約瑟夫·列文森（Joseph R. Levenson, 1920–1969）在半個多世紀前所關注的中心問題便是文明如何在相互關係中界定自我。儘管他的論點受到那個時代的侷限，但他所採用的思考框架和方法至今仍具啟示意義。在中華人民共和國成立初期，即中國在後帝國時代試圖重新確立其國際位置的年代，列文森以關聯性的方法來理解文明認同。他認為，普遍性並非先於特殊性存在，而是從特殊性中生成。於他而言，普遍性不能靠宣示建立，而必須通過不同的傳統之間的現實互動生成。在《儒教中國及其現代命運》三部曲及遺作《革命與世界主義》中，列文森考察了中國思想家如何在傳統文化形式與外來壓力間斡旋。他警示絕對主義與相對主義的雙重陷阱，強調一個特殊性只有在與其他多個特殊性的相互關係中才具有意義——這種關係並非通過孤立與閉鎖，而是通過互動與相互承認建立的。他援引懷特海的名言解釋道：「一個迷路的旅行者不該問『我在哪裡？』，他真正想知道的是『其他地方在哪裡？』」
列文森拒絕將中國視為封閉的歷史個體。他在“《儒家中國及其現代命運》之源起”一文中形容中國是「在世界畫布上作畫的行動派畫家」，強調中國不僅塑造著全球格局，也被全球格局所塑造。他將中國、歐洲與猶太歷史經驗並置，顯示比較研究並非抹除差異，而是揭示各個社會如何以獨特方式應對共同的人類困境。尤為重要的是，列文森的比較方法不依託固定的文化本質，而是建基於歷史的遭遇與互鑑。他的分析也關注文明的情感維度：文明不僅由政策與制度構成，更由跨越文化邊界的人類願望、衝突、失落與希望所激發的情感所驅動。因此，比較不僅是分析工具，更是對共同（但非均質）的人類經驗的倫理與情感確認。這種以人為本的關係視角，有助於消解國家作為唯一行為主體的壟斷地位，提醒我們文明不僅由政策權力塑造，更受思想家、多元社群和跨文化運動的影響。
用列文森的洞見為啟發來觀察，全球文明倡議對「共同價值」的倡導令人深思。當這些價值主要由單一國家界定並推廣時，其特定的歷史經驗與政治目標就可能被投射為普遍規範，並被輸出至其他文化語境中。那些通過不同制度或哲學體系理解「自由」與「正義」等理想，或經歷了不同現代化進程的社群，可能因此而被邊緣化。在這種背景下，表面上的「包容」在實際操作中可能構成一種道德等級，其中某一種「文明」話語在「共同性」的名義下淩駕於他者之上，而那些較小或不具話語主導權的傳統，可能被迫趨同，其對全球話語的獨特貢獻有被忽視或排除的風險。事實上，中國自身在近現代史上長期承受外來規範的強加，對此異化感並不陌生並且記憶猶新。
挑戰西方中心普遍主義是嚴肅正當的追求，但不能停留於術語替換或文明中心的輪替。真正的多元主義要求「共著」：一種有歷史根基的、通過差異協商來定義「共同」之內涵的集體過程。這正是當前倡議的未盡之處。其侷限性反映了國家中心主義這一結構性缺陷在政治與學術話語中的廣泛存在。這個倡議更傾向於自上而下地建構價值體系，追求認同而非參與，未能真正打開通向開放對話的大門。與此相比，列文森的願景提供了更具建設性的替代路徑：一個普遍價值不是被強加，而是在歷史遭遇、相互承認與比較理解中被共創與發現的世界。
中國若慾真正尋求擺脫西方霸權的模式並超越其上，那麼這一願景必須由多方「共著」。這裡所需要的轉變不僅是地理上的，更是從主導向對話的範式轉變——在真正多元的框架下同時肯定特殊性與普遍性。這樣的重構不僅將使中國的全球話語更加包容，也有助於提升其在國際規範建構中的可信度。以共著代替單邊主義，才能超越修辭上的多元論，轉而培育列文森所期許的那種相認精神：這種精神不追求同一性，而是致力於差異間的意義協商。正如列文森強調的：普遍性不能宣示或強加，它必須通過互動、反思與互認，在歷史中「贏得」。
在這一過程中，歷史學家的角色至關重要。當價值話語成為全球權力角逐場，學者有責任對這些論述進行詮釋、批判與定位。歷史學家不僅是過去的敘述者，更是一個文明理解自身與他者關係之方式的塑造者。通過打破固化的範疇、照亮偶然的歷史遭遇、重拾被忽視的聲音，歷史學家可以為真正的多元主義創造必要的知識和思想條件。在這個危機交疊、全球想像破碎的時代，一個關係性的、共著的文明未來，不僅具有政治與倫理意義，它本身也是一種史學使命。真正的挑戰不在於宣示價值，而在於培育那種能夠促成價值協商與共創的歷史意識。
“The Greater Unity, or a Frog in a Well?”
《大一統，還是坐井觀天？》
James A. Millward — Georgetown University
James A. Millward is Professor of Inter-societal History at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. His books concern the Qing empire, the Xinjiang Uyghur region, and the Silk Road. He is currently working on Decolonizing History in China, reexamining how the concepts of Sinicization, the tribute system, and Chinese dynasties support an exceptionalist and exclusionary paradigm of Chinese history.
米華健 — 喬治城大學
米華健是喬治城大學外交學院的跨社會史教授。他的著作關注清帝國、新疆維吾爾地區和絲綢之路。他目前的研究主題是「中國的去殖民化歷史」，旨在重新審視漢化、朝貢體制以及中國朝代等概念如何為一種例外論和排他性的中國歷史範式提供了支持。
There is a logical flaw at the heart of today’s often propagandistic use of the “Great Unity” (da yitong 大一統 ), or the similar “All Under Heaven” (tianxia guan 天下觀 ), to highlight the greatness of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and justify a larger role for the PRC in world affairs. The problem is that today’s Communist Party, while celebrating territorial Great Unity and promoting its version of cultural Great Unity, is simultaneously ignoring and often directly attacking diversity. Its version of Great Unity purports to be universal (of value to humankind), but cannot be if it will not accommodate the particular (individuals and groups who don’t fit the new official template for Chinese culture (zhonghua 中華)).
This flaw is analogous to a problem of universal vs. particular that China studies (Sinology) has stumbled over since its origins as a modern field of research: how to apply universal academic concepts to China while honoring China’s uniqueness—or, conversely, if honoring China’s uniqueness, how to study China as a part of, rather than an exception to, global history? […]
There is a logical flaw at the heart of today’s often propagandistic use of the “Great Unity” (da yitong 大一統 ), or the similar “All Under Heaven” (tianxia guan 天下觀 ), to highlight the greatness of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and justify a larger role for the PRC in world affairs. The problem is that today’s Communist Party, while celebrating territorial Great Unity and promoting its version of cultural Great Unity, is simultaneously ignoring and often directly attacking diversity. Its version of Great Unity purports to be universal (of value to humankind), but cannot be if it will not accommodate the particular (individuals and groups who don’t fit the new official template for Chinese culture (zhonghua 中华)).
This flaw is analogous to a problem of universal vs. particular that China studies (Sinology) has stumbled over since its origins as a modern field of research: how to apply universal academic concepts to China while honoring China’s uniqueness—or, conversely, if honoring China’s uniqueness, how to study China as a part of, rather than an exception to, global history?
Since first appearing in the texts of Sinitic antiquity, Great Unity has meant different things, and people have argued over those meanings. Most simply, it refers to the unification, standardization and centralization of all things, including territory, politics, economics, weights and measures, language, ethnicities, and so on. It is both a practical goal, and the expression of a value, one concerning the universal good.
The animating spark for Great Unity is traced to texts such as the “Gongyang Commentary” of the Spring and Autumn Annals, one of the five classics of Confucianism, compiled around the 5th century BC. Its actualization is seen as beginning with the Qin empire, built through conquest of Chinese and non-Chinese peoples and polities in 221 BCE. Milestones of Great Unity were marked during other dynasties along the way. And, for today’s political propagandists, the culmination of Great Unity was realized by the Communist Party of China. Chinese propagandist and researcher Xie Maosong declared in a 2021 piece that China is “the only continuous unified civilization in the world,” a theme echoed in the Communist Party’s 2021 “Resolution Regarding the Party’s Great Achievements and Historical Experience from 100 Years of Struggle” and now a common catch-phrase in official PRC ideology as well as, arguably, conventional wisdom outside China.
The problem lies in whether this great unity is universal—and thus has global relevance—or particular—and thus applies only to China. In so far as China is great because it is exceptional (“the only continuous unified civilization in the world”), then it lies apart from and cannot be understood and evaluated in the same terms by which we understand and evaluate the rest of the world. This is basically an Orientalist assertion, with the polarities flipped: China is exceptional, though not pathologically as in Orientalist discourse, but rather in ostensibly positive ways. Either way, however, as a special case where N = 1, it’s hard to say what this idiosyncratic greatness has to offer everyone else. The world desperately needs common ground from which to seek common approaches to common problems, but insofar as Great Unity is defined as exceptionally Chinese, no matter how marvelously unified, it backs itself into a corner, a narrow niche with limited universal appeal and, worse, inability to empathize with those outside its glorious bubble.
The contradiction is similar in tianxia theory. As articulated by political philosopher Zhao Tingyang (趙汀陽), the idea that the ancient Chinese political philosophy of “all under heaven” offers a better model for world order than current concepts. If tianxia refers to “China” or is too Sinocentrically defined, then it is not global; more problematic, if “ruling all under Heaven” (ding tianxia 定天下) is a Chinese civilizational goal, then that represents an imperialist threat to other peoples and places. If tianxia means “the whole world,” it cannot by definition be a unified Chinese world—to be universal, it must leave room for other elements, and thus be variegated, not homogenous; pluralist, not unified.
Chinese studies has struggled with an analogous contradiction. China seemed to be unique and exceptional when academic concepts and theories that were supposedly universal, but which were in fact based on Euro-American cases, didn’t seem to apply to China. The first reaction of China studies to that disjuncture was to dismiss China: China couldn’t capitalize, industrialize, modernize, develop, or democratize because it lacked whatever special sauce we believed was responsible for Western success in those regards. Rather than redesign the models on the basis of a fuller dataset that actually includes China, China studies has often erected Orientalist and Eurocentric dichotomies (east / west; tradition / modernity; capitalist / communist; Westphalian / Tribute System) which leave China as a special case excluded from the “universal” norm.
One exception to that failed approach is Joseph Fletcher’s “Integrative History: Parallels and Interconnections in the Early Modern Period, 1500-1800.” In this famous article (known as “Fletcher’s airplane ride,”) rather than ask “was China (and elsewhere outside Europe) early modern in 1500-1800,” Fletcher asked instead, “What was happening across the Eurasian continent in 1500-1800?” This allowed Fletcher to describe the early modern based on comparative examination of a more complete, pan-Eurasian sample. Another work that wove China into the narrative of global history—escaping the universal / particular problem besetting China studies—is Kenneth Pomeranz’ The Great Divergence, which did not presume a certain European path to industrialization and then test China against it, but rather started from scratch to examine outcomes of a broad range of factors. By redefining the question in ways that did not a priori exclude China, Pomeranz came up with a new, more universal answer regarding capitalism and industrialization in Europe as well as Asia.
The other thing that Fletcher, Pomeranz, and some other thinkers about the sweep of Chinese history (but not the propagandists) do, is to take what we might call a prismatic view. That is, they look from micro, medio and macro perspectives and see the individual parts making up the whole. In the case of Great Unity, the prismatic view doesn’t focus exclusively on retrospectively-constructed categories we consider proto-Chinese (Huaxia 华夏or Han 汉) to track unification as a triumphal ascendency over the “four barbarians” (si yi 四夷), i.e. non-Han “others,” in an effort to tell China’s story well. Rather, a prismatic view tells China‘s story better by recognizing that it includes the “four barbarians” (and their historical and metaphorical descendants) as part of the story on their own terms, alongside Sinitic elements. Indeed, a prismatic view sees the diversity even within such categories as Huaxia or Han. From this perspective, “China” is not limited to the Sinitic, nor is the Sinitic limited to “China,” and the Sinitic itself has a plural nature.
Were it actually true that China was “the only continuous unified civilization in the world,“ that would be a sad thing! Fortunately, neither as a polity, ethnicity, territory, nor economy has China been more continuous (i.e. stagnant) or unified (i.e. homogenous) than other places. In other words, there have been many different empires and kingdoms over the centuries in geographical China, not one continuous one. And they have been very diverse in character—and this should be considered an asset, not a liability. Moreover, all civilizations, as opposed to polities, are “continuous”: civilization is by definition what is passed on, despite political vicissitudes, and what is spread, despite political borders. And since civilizations are also always changing and exchanging with other civilizations, they cannot, by definition, be “unified.”
A frog in a well, contemplating his own unique tianxia, sees one kind of Great Unity: a unified space neatly defined within four walls. Under his particular square of heaven, he may be master of all he surveys. But few would wish to join him there.
當今常被用於宣傳的“大一統”或類似的“天下觀”，其核心存在邏輯缺陷。這些概念被用來彰顯中國共產黨的偉大，並為中國在世界事務中擴大作用提供依據。問題在於，當今的中國共產黨在慶祝其領土大一統與推廣其文化大一統時，卻同時忽視甚至直接攻擊多樣性。中共版本的大一統標榜其普世性（對全人類有價值），但若不能包容特殊性（即不符合新官方“中華文化”模板的個體和群體），其普世性便難以實現。
這一缺陷類似於中國研究（漢學）自作為現代學科肇始以來所面臨的“普遍與特殊”之難題：如何在尊重中國獨特性的前提下，將普世學術概念應用於中國研究？反之，若強調中國的獨特性，又如何將中國視為全球歷史的一部分，而非例外？「⋯⋯」
當今常被用於宣傳的“大一統”或類似的“天下觀”，其核心存在邏輯缺陷。這些概念被用來彰顯中國共產黨的偉大，並為中國在世界事務中擴大作用提供依據。問題在於，當今的中國共產黨在慶祝其領土大一統與推廣其文化大一統時，卻同時忽視甚至直接攻擊多樣性。中共版本的大一統標榜其普世性（對全人類有價值），但若不能包容特殊性（即不符合新官方“中華文化”模板的個體和群體），其普世性便難以實現。
這一缺陷類似於中國研究（漢學）自作為現代學科肇始以來所面臨的“普遍與特殊”之難題：如何在尊重中國獨特性的前提下，將普世學術概念應用於中國研究？反之，若強調中國的獨特性，又如何將中國視為全球歷史的一部分，而非例外？
“大一統”自漢語古籍中初現以來，其含義歷經多次演變，且各方對其解釋爭論不休。簡而言之，它指的是包括領土、政治、經濟、度量衡、語言、民族在內的一切事物的統一化、標準化與集中化。這既是一個務實目標，也是一個關於普世價值的表達。
大一統的濫觴可追溯至如儒家五經之一的《公羊傳》，一本大約編於公元前5世紀的春秋編年史文本。通過征服中華與非中華民族和政權建立的秦帝國（公元前221年）被視為大一統的真正實現。其後的諸多“朝代”則標誌了大一統的里程碑。而對於當今的政治宣傳者來說，大一統的巔峰則是由中國共產黨到達的。中國的宣傳及研究者謝茂松在2021年的一篇文章中聲稱，中國是“世界上唯一持續統一的文明。” 這一主題在中國共產黨2021年關於“黨的偉大成就和百年奮鬥歷史經驗的決議”中得到了呼應，並已成為官方意識形態，乃至成了海外的通行說法。
問題在於，這種大一統是否因其普世性而具有全球意義，還是因其特定性而只適用於中國？若中國因其例外性（“世界上唯一持續統一的文明”）而偉大，則它與世界其他地區相異。因此，我們無法以理解和評估其他地區的同一標準來理解和評估中國。這本質上來說是一種東方主義的主張，只不過兩極反轉了。中國確實顯得例外，但其例外性並非像東方主義論述中那樣病態，而是以看似積極的方式呈現出來。但無論如何，我們很難說這樣一個特殊案例（N = 1）的偉大能夠為其他人提供什麼。世界迫切需要共同的基礎，以尋求解決共同問題的普遍方法。然而，若“大一統”被定義為獨特的中國式理念，無論其統一何等輝煌，它都將自陷於狹隘一隅，淪為普世吸引力有限的孤立範疇。更糟的是，它無法與身處其輝煌卻封閉的意識形態之外的人們產生共鳴。
天下理論中的矛盾與之類似。正如政治哲學家趙汀陽所述，古代中國政治哲學中的“天下”概念，提供了一個比當前概念更好的世界秩序模型。如果天下指的是“中國”，或者定義得過於以漢為中心，那它則不是全球的。而更成問題的是，如果“定天下”是中國文明的目標，其則代表了中國對於其他人民和地方的帝國主義威脅。如果天下意味著“整個世界”，那其從定義上就不能是一個統一的中國世界。如要普世，天下就須是多樣而非同質的，是多元主義而非統一的，從而給其他元素留出餘地。
中國研究亦在類似的矛盾中掙扎：當那些被認為普世、實則基於歐美案例的學術概念和理論似乎不適用於中國時，中國顯得獨特且例外。中國研究對這種脫節的初步反應是將中國排斥在外：中國無法資本化、工業化、現代化、發展或民主化，因為它缺乏導致西方在這些方面成功的靈丹妙藥。與其基於（包括中國在內）更完整的數據集而重新設計模型，中國研究往往建立起東方主義和歐洲中心主義的二元對立（東/西；傳統/現代；資本主義/共產主義；威斯特伐利亞體系/朝貢體系），將中國排除在“普世”的規範之外。
在這一失敗方法中的一個例外是傅禮初的《整合歷史：早期現代時期的平行現象與相互聯繫，1500-1800》。在這篇被稱為“弗萊徹的飛機之旅”的著名文章中，傅禮初沒有問“中國（以及歐洲之外的其他地方）在1500-1800年是否為早期現代”，反而問道“1500-1800年期間在歐亞大陸上發生了什麼？”這使他能夠通過比較更為完整的、泛歐亞的樣本來描述早期現代。彭慕蘭的《大分歧》則是另一將中國納入全球歷史敘事的作品。它克服了困擾中國研究的同/異（普遍性/特殊性）問題。該書並未假定某種特定的歐洲工業化路徑，以反觀中國，而是從零開始探討導致這一結果的一系列廣泛因素。彭慕蘭通過以不在預設排除中國的方式重新定義問題，從而得出了一個關於歐亞資本主義和工業化的更普世的新答案。
傅禮初、彭慕蘭以及一些對中國歷史全局有所思考的學者（而非宣傳者）所做的另一件事，就是採取我們所謂的多維視角。也就是說，他們由微觀、中觀和宏觀的角度出發，從而看到構成整體的各個部分。就大一統而言，多維視角並非通過專注於那些我們事後重建（retropsectively-constructed）並視為原中華（華夏或漢）的類別，將統一作為針對於四夷（非漢族的“他者”）的勝利崛起，以此試圖來更好地講述中國的故事。相反，多維視角通過承認“四夷”（及其歷史和象徵意義上的後代），以其自身的視角，與華夏元素並存，更好地講述了中國的故事。實際上，多維視角角度甚至在中華或漢這樣的類別中也能看到多樣性。“中國”不僅不侷限於漢文明體系，而漢文明體系也不限於“中國” ；且，“漢文明體系”本身也具有多樣性。
如果中國當真是“世界上唯一連續統一的文明”，那將是一件悲哀的事！幸運的是，無論是作為政體、民族、領土還是經濟體，中國都沒有比其他地方更連續（即停滯不前）或統一（即同質化）。換言之，數世紀以來，中國地理範圍內存在過眾多不同的帝國與王國，而非單一連續的政體。它們在性質上極為多樣，且並非連續統一。這應當被視為一種優勢，而非劣勢。此外，所有文明（不同於政體）都是“連續的”。文明本質上不論政治波折都得以傳承，不論政治邊界都得以傳播。而且，由於其總是在不斷變化並與其他文明交換，因此從定義上來說，文明不能被定義為“統一的”。
井底之蛙，注視著自己獨特的天下時，看到了一種大一統：一個在四面牆內整齊劃一的封閉空間。他可能在那片特定的天空下主宰一切所見之物，但卻無人問津。